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INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY AND SECRET DIPLOMACY IN EAST ASIA, 1896–1950

Bruce A. Elleman



International Rivalry and Secret Diplomacy in East Asia, 1896–1950

East Asia was a major focus of struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War of 1945 to 1991, with multiple “hot” and “cold” conflicts in China, Korea, and Vietnam. The struggle for predominance in East Asia, however, largely predated the Cold War, as this book shows, with many examples of the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union working to exercise and increase control in the region. The book focuses on secret treaties, 26 of them, signed from the mid-1890s through 1950, when secret agreements between China and the USSR, including several concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, gave Russia greater control over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. One of the most important was negotiated in 1945, when Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, that included a secret protocol granting the Soviet Navy sea control over the Manchurian littorals. This secret protocol excluded the US Navy from landing Nationalist troops at the major Manchurian ports, thereby guaranteeing the Chinese Communist victory in Northeast China; from Manchuria, the Chinese Communists quickly spread south to take all of Mainland China. To a large degree, therefore, this formerly undiscussed secret diplomacy set the underlying conditions for the Cold War in East Asia.

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Bruce A. Elleman

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Preface: territorial ownership as a guarded state secret

Recently, an article in the PRC was published entitled “Chinese People Have No Right to Know Their Territorial Map.” It told the story of an independent history researcher, named Yin Minhong, who requested during August 2017 that the Chinese Foreign Ministry release documents regarding the territorial ownership of the Tannu Uriankhai (also called Tannu Tuva), an obscure region on the Sino-Russian border just north and west of Outer Mongolia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the request on the grounds that it “involved secrecy.” Yin Minhong told BBC Chinese that he was hoping that the Chinese authorities would explain whether Tannu Uriankhai was still a Chinese territory and whether it hoped to reclaim it some day from Russia.

Tannu Uriankhai was historically a region in the Mongolian Empire and, later, the Qing dynasty. It is located north of Xinjiang and northwest of modern-day Mongolia, in an area near the Tuva Republic in today’s Russia. During World War II, the area became an independent state under Soviet domination. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this region remained in the Russian Federation as an autonomous republic. Neither the People’s Republic of China nor Taiwan has ever made a clear public statement on the sovereignty of this land.

The official reply to Yin Minhong from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “According to Articles 14 and 21 of the Regulations on the Openness of Government Information of the People’s Republic of China, the information you applied for is confidential and does not belong to the scope of government information disclosure.” In March 2018, Yin appealed to the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court and later to the Beijing Municipal High People’s Court, but to no avail. Yin told BBC Chinese, “The signing of a territorial treaty is diplomatic state behavior, but the treaty that was signed belongs to [the realm of] government information.”

Si Weijiang, a lawyer in Shanghai, told BBC Chinese that, according to China's secrecy system, whether a document is confidential or not can be determined by the authority that issued the document or by the Bureau of State Secrecy, concluding: "Every citizen should have the right to know information such as national territory and borders."¹

This book takes as its basic starting point the view that all formerly secret treaties should be published, and so will address 26 formerly secret agreements that greatly impacted China's national territory and borders.

Note

- 1 *BBC Chinese*, 7 November 2018.

Acknowledgments

During a three-decade-long research journey, I spent more than ten years overseas, including one year in Russia, a year in the PRC, a year in England, three years in Japan, and—counting both long and short visits—almost five years in Taiwan. Research trips within the United States were too numerous to keep track of.

It is almost impossible to thank everyone who assisted me but, in particular, I want to thank those who shared their insights and expertise, including the archivists, archives technicians, and archives specialists at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, including Jim Armistead, David Clark, Janice Davis, Sam Rushay, Randy Sowell, Tammy Williams, and finally, Kurt Graham, Ph.D. At the Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library, Kevin M. Bailey was extremely helpful, as was Michelle Kopfer. At the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, I would like to thank Jenna de Graffenried, Ian Frederick-Rothwell, Allen Fisher, Brian McNerney, John Wilson, Lara Hall, Alexis Percle, Carrie Smith, Liza Talbot, Alan Houke, and Jennifer Cuddeback. At the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, I want to thank Greg Cumming, Melissa Heddon, Nick Herold, Dorissa Martinez, and, in particular, Ryan Pettigrew for helping me with copying photographs.

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During this entire period, I remained determined to figure out the Soviet Union's secret diplomacy with China. However, I could not wait until my research was concluded to publish. Therefore, this book makes use of material previously presented in several of my earlier published books, including, but not limited to, *Diplomacy and Deception* (1997), *Modern Chinese Warfare* (2001), *Wilson and China* (2002), and *International Competition in China, 1899–1991: The Rise, Fall, and Restoration of the Open Door Policy* (2015). By an incredible twist of fate, all of these titles are now owned by Routledge Publishers. Any mistakes are my own, of course, and any virtues are mainly due to the dozens of librarians and archivists who made this book possible. A certain amount of repetition was unavoidable to make the treaty chapters clear.

A word about sources

Forty years ago, I started my study of Sino-Soviet diplomatic history at UC Berkeley, with Nicholas Riasanovsky as my main Russia advisor and Frederic Wakeman doing China. While completing my Ph.D. at Columbia University, I located the sole Vladimir Vilenskii copy of the Karakhan Manifesto in the US, plus used the Wellington Koo papers at the Rare Book Archives. During a one-year Master's program in International History at London School of Economics, with Ian Nish as my advisor, I was able to use both the British Library and the National Archives (then called the Public Records Office) at Kew.

What followed next was almost seven years of overseas archival research in Moscow, Beijing, Nanjing, Taipei, and Tokyo, during which time I found copies of many of the secret treaties presented in this study. I located many other corroborating documents at American libraries and archives, including the Library of Congress (both at College Park and at the downtown manuscript collection), the Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library in Staunton, VA, the FDR Library at Hyde Park, NY, and the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri. Finally, the Hoover Archives at Stanford University, CA, proved to be incredibly valuable.

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in Moscow during the final year of the Cold War, to living on the embattled Beijing University campus just months after the Tiananmen Massacre. All mistakes in this book are my own, of course, while any positive features are largely due to outside assistance.

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His twenty-six books include *Taiwan's Offshore Islands: Pathway or Barrier* (NWC Press, 2019); *Seaborne Perils: Piracy, Maritime Crime, and Naval Terrorism in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2018); *China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea: Evaluating Legal, Strategic and Military Factors* (Folkestone, UK: Renaissance Books, 2018); *International Competition in China, 1899–1991: The Rise, Fall, and Restoration of the Open Door Policy* (Routledge/Curzon Press, 2015); *Navies and Soft Power: Historical Case Studies of Naval Power and the Non-use of Military Force*, edited, with S. C. M. Paine (NWC Press, 2015); *Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the US Navy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015); *Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009*, edited, with S. C. M. Paine (NWC Press, 2013); *Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia*, edited, with Stephen Kotkin and Clive Schofield (M.E. Sharpe Press, 2013); *High Sea's Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979* (NWC Press, 2012); *China as a Sea Power, 1127–1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Sung and Yuan Periods*, Unpublished manuscript by Professor Jung-pang Lo, edited, and with commentary, by Bruce A. Elleman (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, and

Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong press, 2012); *People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Combat Systems Technology 1949–2010*, co-written with Jim Bussert (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011); *Naval Power and Expeditionary Wars: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*, edited, with S. C. M. Paine (Routledge, 2010); *Nineteen Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries*, edited, with John B. Hattendorf (NWC Press, 2010); *Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies*, edited, with Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg (NWC Press, Newport Paper 35, 2010); *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History*, edited, with Stephen Kotkin (M.E. Sharpe, 2010); *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present*, textbook, co-authored with S. C. M. Paine (Prentice-Hall, 2010); *Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China, 1925–30: The Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army* (Routledge, 2009); *Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom*, edited, with S. C. M. Paine (Routledge, 2008); *Waves of Hope: The US Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia* (NWC Press, Newport Paper 28, 2007); *Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941–45* (Routledge, 2006); *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805–2005*, edited, with S. C. M. Paine (Routledge, 2006); *Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective*, edited, with Christopher Bell (Frank Cass, 2003); *Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question* (M. E. Sharpe, 2002); *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989* (Routledge, 2001); *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, edited, with Stephen Kotkin (M. E. Sharpe, 1999); and *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927* (M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

Several of Dr Elleman's published works have been translated into foreign languages, including Chinese translations of *High Sea's Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979* as *Kan bujian de pingzhang: jue ding Taiwan mingyun de qijiandui* (Xinbei Shi: Baqi Wenhua, 2017) and *Modern Chinese Warfare* as *Jindai Zhongguo de junshi yu zhanzheng* (Taipei: Elite Press, 2002), and a Czech translation of the Naval Mutiny book: *Námořní vzpoury ve dvacátém století: mezinárodní souvislosti* (Prague: BBart, 2004).

Introduction

The international impact of secret diplomacy

Perhaps the single greatest social, economic, and military event during the 20th century was the geopolitical struggle between the United States and Russia commonly known as the “Cold War.” Much of this struggle took place in secret, through the use of confidential negotiations resulting in secret treaties. Although this struggle was labeled the “Cold War” after World War II, this book will show that this secret diplomacy began much earlier—during the 1890s, in fact—and formed an important element of Russia’s later anti-American strategy. This interpretation is based on archival materials in the Lenin Library’s “special archive” collection in Moscow, the Number Two Historical Archives in Nanjing, People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Foreign Ministry archives in Taipei, Taiwan (Republic of China (ROC)), the Foreign Ministry archives in Tokyo, Japan, and from a large number of rare book libraries, archives, and Presidential Libraries in the United States. Few of these formerly secret documents have ever before been fully available to historians or political scientists.

One of the most important contributions these new archival sources make is in highlighting the intricacies of Sino-Soviet relations. Rather than being equal, as formerly thought, these documents show instead just how much the Soviet Union depended on secret diplomacy to renew Tsarist Russia’s special rights and privileges throughout China. During 1924, for example, two secret agreements negotiated by Soviet diplomats with, first, the Beijing government and, second, Zhang Zuolin’s separatist Mukden government, allowed Moscow to retain Tsarist Russia’s unequal rights and privileges in China, as well as recover most of the former Tsarist territorial concessions. As a result of this secret diplomacy, the Soviet Union never carried out treaty provisions promising to withdraw Red Army troops

from Outer Mongolia, sell its share of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) to China, redraw Sino-Soviet borders, and renegotiate all former Sino-Russian treaties on the basis of equality. But, meanwhile, Soviet propaganda gave all the outward appearances of treating China equally. Since all pertinent diplomatic records remained completely confidential, the myth of Sino-Soviet equality was created. This myth was to have an enormous impact throughout the rest of the 20th century.¹

Secret diplomacy was absolutely essential in creating the myth of Sino-Soviet equality. Archival evidence showing that the Soviet government had already reverted to secret diplomacy in the Far East during the 1920s not only alters our understanding of the early dynamics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR) foreign policy, but also suggests that East Asia was much more important to Moscow's expansionist goals than previously thought. This view of the USSR's actions was largely hidden precisely because almost all information about these important events revolved around published documents, not archival sources, which all remained top secret. Since the majority of information on Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations was published by the USSR, these published materials conformed closely to the Soviet-sponsored propaganda. By relying too heavily on this biased information, therefore, historians generally supported the validity of the myth of Sino-Soviet equality. References to Soviet advisers in China as revolutionary "missionaries" merely reinforced the misguided belief that Moscow's foreign policy was not self-serving, and so unwittingly elevated Soviet actions in China onto a moral high ground that they little deserved.²

This fundamental misinterpretation of the USSR's China policy can also be traced to the unrealistic division and separation of the Soviet Union's propaganda and its diplomatic policies in China into two entirely different fields of study, which over time spawned a series of scholarly historical works that intensively studied either propaganda or diplomacy, but rarely both.³ In fact, archival sources show that Moscow succeeded in creating a viable diplomatic and political foothold in China only because two Soviet organizations—the Communist International (Comintern) and the Soviet Peoples' Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel)—cooperated closely in implementing these policies. The tight interaction between Moscow's propaganda and diplomacy brought about the initial success of its China policy, and from the earliest period, the Comintern's propaganda in China coincided with the Narkomindel's diplomatic interests and goals.

The USSR's secret treaties concerning China were also at the heart of US-Russian diplomatic relations. Russo-American differences appeared early in the 19th century, when American expansion westward met

Russian fortifications—such as Fort Ross—in northern California. While minor geopolitical frictions between the United States and Tsarist Russia over the sale of Alaska appeared prior to the 1917 October Revolution, sharp social, economic, and political differences appeared only after the Bolsheviks came to power. In addition to calling for total elimination of capitalism and the overthrow of democratic governments, the Bolsheviks soon adopted secret diplomacy to undermine the United States' political and commercial position in East Asia. The Soviet-American struggle also included a major military component after 1925, when the Comintern-sponsored revolution in China precipitated American military intervention.

Most importantly, beginning in 1925, the Soviet Union's secret diplomacy actively supported a future military conflict between Japan and the United States. The 20 January 1925 Soviet-Japanese Convention even recognized the pre-World War I Tsarist-Japanese secret alliance aimed at the United States. During the 1930s, the USSR then provided Japan with essential supplies of oil, coal, and foodstuffs—especially fish—that assisted Japan in initiating the Pacific War against the United States in 1941. To support this Japanese attack, Soviet and Japanese diplomats secretly divided most of East Asia between them.

This book will argue, therefore, that while what has been commonly called the “Cold War” may not have officially started until after the end of World War II, the precursors of this conflict date back to the 1920s, and even before that, to 1896. In 1945, Soviet secret diplomacy sought to retain not only all of Tsarist Russia's previous sphere of influence, but, whenever possible, to absorb Japan's spoils as well. Moscow carried out its expansionist goals in Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Bessarabia, and the Kuriles to benefit the USSR's own national interests. This conclusion contradicts most accounts based on the myth of Sino-Soviet equality. The Cold War began early, therefore. Some scholars have even traced the Cold War's beginnings back to the 19th century “Great Game.”

The 19th century “Great Game”

In order to understand the 19th century's so-called “Great Game” between Great Britain and Russia, the best starting point is with the concept called “spheres of influence” (or “spheres of interest”). As the name implies, spheres of influence were specific geographic areas where a country had predominant economic interest and where it often retained some administrative and military control. The competition between Great Britain and Tsarist Russia for spheres of influence in Eurasia was particularly keen, as Great Britain used its empire to contain persistent

Russian expansion into Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and in South Asia. In the Middle East, the Russo-British rivalry over the crumbling Ottoman Empire was even called the “constant theme of the century.”⁴ This struggle soon shifted to the decaying and crumbling Chinese Empire as the Great Game continued unabated in the Far East during the first half of the 20th century.

Russo-Chinese relations were first established in the Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed on 27 August 1689. After the Qing defeated Ming loyalists on Taiwan in 1683, the Kangxi Emperor used the defeated Ming troops to attack Russian border towns to the north. This was in response to gradual encroachment by Russian trappers and hunters, soon followed by settlements in the Amur region. The Qing also feared that border tribes might prefer Russian domination over that of the Qing. After fighting, the border town of Albazin fell to Qing forces in 1685. The local crops were not burned, however, and Russian forces based nearby at Nerchinsk used these crops to prepare for a siege. The Russians retook Albazin, and successfully fought off the Qing attackers in 1686. The Russians then sued for peace, and with Jesuit assistance in interpretation, Russian and Qing officials met at Nerchinsk in 1689 to hammer out a treaty.

This was the first treaty signed by China and Russia. The Russian negotiator was Fyodor Alexeyevich Golovin and the Qing officials were Songgotu and T’ung Kuo-kang. In it, China retained the valuable land just north of the Amur River and the Russians gave up Albazin, but retained Nerchinsk, where an active border trade was conducted. The Sino-Russian border ran along the Argun River in the west and the Sranovoy Range going from south to north, the watersheds of the Amur, Argun, and Gorbitsa Rivers. This remained the valid Russo-Chinese border through 1860. The original text was in Latin (see below), with translations in Russian and Manchu, but not in Chinese.⁵

Most importantly, Article I of the treaty set the border along the Gorbitsa River to form the boundary between the two Empires. The river ran along the southern slope of the Xingan Mountains to join the Amur River, while all the river basins on the northern side of these mountains belonged to the Russian Empire. The Argun River, which flowed into the Amur, formed the western frontier. Most importantly, Article V stated:

It is to be understood by both Governments that from the time when this Treaty of Amity is made, the subjects of either nation, being provided with proper passports, may come and go [across the frontier] on their private business and may carry on commerce [*lit.* buy and sell].⁶




Figure 0.1 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 27 August 1689

Later, on 21 October 1727, the Treaty of Kiakhta (also written Kyakhta) altered the Russo-Chinese economic relations by setting up cross-border trade, as well as opening up caravan trade for the first time. The text of this new Russian-Chinese treaty was formally exchanged on the Kiakhta River on 14 June 1728. This treaty established a formal border between Qing and Russian territory along the stretch from Kiakhta to the Argun River, a borderline that is still in place today as the eastern half of the Russo-Mongolian border, and also a portion of the Russo-Chinese border on the western side.

This treaty also provided for certain tribal peoples to be resident in Chinese territory, established Kiakhta as an official border trading town, and allowed for one Russian caravan to be able to trade at Beijing once every three years. In addition, a Russian Orthodox Church was to be permitted in Beijing; Russians already resident in the city, most of whom were descendants of prisoners of war, were to be incorporated into the Chinese banners and encouraged to learn Chinese. As for the locals, they were required to pay a tax: “And those Uriankhai [people] who paid [yasak of] five sables to one side will henceforth be left as before with their leaders.”⁷

New trade regulations proved to be one of the most important parts of the treaty. Article 4 specified that Russians were allowed to trade by caravan under the following restrictions: “free merchants will be allowed to come to

Beijing once in three years, providing their number, as specified aforetime, does not exceed 200.” The Chinese were obliged to move marketplaces from Urga (today’s Ulan Bator) and Qiqihar in Manchuria (Tsitsikhar in Russian) to two sites at the Russian-Chinese border. One of them was situated on the Kiakhta River near Selenginsk, another in Tsurukhait (also written Tsurukhaitui) on the Argun River (today’s Priargunsk) where Russians were allowed “to build houses and enclose them in fence or palisade.” Most importantly, trade negotiated in this treaty was not liable to duty, which gave Russian traders a distinct trade advantage over Europeans trading at China’s southern port city of Guangzhou (Canton).⁸ By far the most important provision of this treaty was that a firm boundary had to be drawn between the Russian and the Qing empires, a development that ultimately undercut China’s hegemony over much of Eurasia.

The redrawing of the Russo-Chinese border

The treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta started the process of defining where the two great land empires of Russia and China met. But it was between 1858 and 1860 when Russia signed a series of treaties with China—including the Treaty of Aigun, the Treaty of Tianjin, and the Treaty of Beijing—that ceded to Russia over 600,000 square miles of territory, including the Amur region, the Maritime Province, and territories in Xinjiang, equal in size to France and Britain combined. This transfer of land has continued to plague Sino-Russian relations to the present day.

Just as Siberia was traditionally considered to be Russia’s frontier, the Far East was seen as Russia’s best opportunity for territorial and economic expansion during the late 19th and early 20th century.⁹ As chance would have it, the Manchu dynasty was in a period of decay, with its hands full, first, with the Taiping and Nian Rebellions during the 1850s and 1860s, and later with incessant Moslem uprisings. Russia took advantage of China’s weakness during 1858 when its envoy to Beijing, Count E. V. Putiatin, demanded that the Qing government recognize the Amur region as Russian territory.

Putiatin’s negotiations were furthered by the Chinese policy of dealing with each foreign power separately, known as *yi-yi-zhi-yi* (*i-i chih-i*) or, literally, “using barbarians to govern barbarians.” This policy can be traced back to the Han dynasty, and “has continued to be resorted to by strategists from time to time in reality if not in name.”¹⁰ This traditional Chinese strategy attempted to use one foreigner to influence another foreigner, or in other words, to “play” one foreign power off another. Accordingly, Putiatin was able to “keep Russia’s private Amur demands on China secret from the other envoys, yet managed to hoodwink the Chinese into believing that he had the backing of the others for them.”¹¹

Separate parallel negotiations were meanwhile underway at the Russo-Chinese border, as Yishan, a member of the imperial clan and the military governor of Heilongjiang province, opened negotiations with Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav'ev, who had previously been appointed by Tsar Alexander II to negotiate the border on the Amur. The Treaty of Aigun established the modern border in northeast China, transferring 231,660 square miles (about 600,000 square kilometers) of territory between the Sanovoy Range and the Amur River from China to Russia.

The treaty of Aigun was hammered out in just six days, between 23–28 May 1858, in part due to Murav'ev's demand that the Chinese envoy sign the treaty immediately or else Russian troops would expel all Manchus living on the north bank of the Amur. This treaty fundamentally redrew the Sino-Russian border. Murav'ev rejected sending the draft treaty to Beijing for approval, making several minor concessions in exchange for rapid signing. For example, Murav'ev agreed to be vague about the Ussuri section of the boundary by saying that it would be under joint protection, and he abandoned all attempts to review the trade, communication, and official representation clauses of the previous treaty system. But these issues, unbeknownst to Murav'ev, were at that very moment being resolved by other Russian officials in Tianjin, so Russia ended up getting both sets of privileges.

After agreeing to sign the Treaty of Aigun, Yishan memorialized the emperor that he had signed the treaty only as a temporary measure so that hostilities would not break out and endanger the border. Although Yishan implied that he did not consider the treaty to be a permanent document settling the border between China and Russia, in fact, Article 1 set the boundary along the Amur, ceding to Russia the entire northern bank of the Amur from the Argun all the way to the sea. Furthermore, the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari rivers were opened exclusively to Russian and Chinese navigation, thereby cutting out all other foreigners, including the Japanese, British, and Americans. In addition to the border revisions, the treaty also lifted the former restrictions on where trade could be carried out, thus allowing trade all along the Russo-Chinese border.

Meanwhile, secret diplomacy further to the south also led to the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin on 13 June 1858, which gave Russian traders greater access to Chinese markets. The Qing government initially refused to ratify the Treaty of Aigun, but following Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev's arrival in Beijing during July 1859, he presented a list of demands, including the full demarcation of the Russo-Chinese boundary, opening China's interior to Russian trade, and establishing consulates in Mongolia, Manchuria, and Kashgaria. By December 1859, the only progress that Ignat'ev had made was to get the Chinese to admit that the Treaty of Aigun existed and that the eastern bank of Ussuri was uninhabited. Beijing still considered the

Treaty of Aigun to be invalid, however, since Yishan had signed it before the emperor had read its contents.

Stymied, Ignat'ev threatened that Russia might be compelled to act in concert with the British government, clearly hoping to frighten the Chinese into ratifying the Treaty of Aigun. By continuing Russia's *de facto* occupation of the Ussuri coastal region, Ignat'ev next tried to use the unfolding Chinese war against Britain and France—called the *Arrow* War or the Second Opium War—to Russia's advantage. Ignat'ev was concerned that the Chinese might inform the British about the Russo-Chinese territorial dispute, but Chinese officials apparently did not realize that they could rely on British commercial interests to oppose Russian territorial expansion, nor did Great Britain seem to be aware of the enormous amount of territory that Russia was claiming north of the Amur River. According to one scholar, these facts remained obscure because the Chinese “tenaciously clung to their tradition of conducting secret bilateral negotiations with all outsiders.”¹²

Circumstances soon began to work in Ignat'ev's favor, since by March 1860, both the Second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion had reached critical stages. During the climax of the Anglo-French war with China, Ignat'ev sent Chinese officials a letter accusing them of not accepting Russian mediation and promising to save them if they followed his advice. Despite warnings that the Russians were no less of a threat than the British or the French, Prince Gong accepted Ignat'ev's offer to act as an intermediary. But, as his price for settling China's dispute with Britain and France, Ignat'ev insisted that the Chinese agree in advance to all of Russia's territorial and commercial demands. Prince Gong finally agreed.

With Russian mediation secured, the Chinese eventually gave into the Allied demands by signing the Treaty of Beijing with Great Britain and France, thus recognizing the previously signed treaties of Tianjin as well. Ignat'ev signed his own Treaty of Beijing with China on 14 November 1860; however, soon after, the Allied forces completed their evacuation of Beijing. Unlike the British and French treaties by the same name, the Russo-Chinese Treaty of Beijing reconfirmed the validity of the former treaties of Aigun and Tianjin, and so set the Russo-Chinese boundary on the Amur and Ussuri rivers. In addition, it defined China's western border for the first time.

Both points confirmed the transfer of huge amounts of territory from China to Russia. Furthermore, the Treaty of Beijing required that by 13 May 1861, a Sino-Russian border commission assemble in Tarbagatai to survey the western border. At the outset, the Russians refused to accept any Chinese maps, claiming that they were inaccurate. The Chinese unsuccessfully argued that the Treaty of Beijing could not be taken as the basis for the boundary survey since the officials in Beijing did not understand

local conditions. In the end, Russia employed the threat of force to secure its demands. The Russian and Chinese border commissioners completed this task three years later on 7 October 1864, when they signed the Treaty of Tarbagatai.

The Tsarist diplomacy that made possible the successful negotiation of the treaties of Aigun, Tianjin, Beijing, and Tarbagatai not only made Russia a Pacific power, but also gave it the international prestige required to be able to project Russian influence throughout East Asia. As one contemporary observer remarked, Russian possession of the northern bank of the Amur signaled “the commencement of a new era for Siberia.”¹³ Without the Amur river, Russia could not fully develop Eastern Siberia, just as without the newly-acquired port at Vladivostok—meaning “Ruler of the East”—Russia could not maintain a Pacific fleet. The success of Russia’s diplomacy immeasurably boosted her international prestige, which had formerly been damaged by the Crimean War. Without sending any troops and, by Ignat’ev’s own account, with the most underfunded mission in China, the Tsarist government secured sovereignty over approximately 665,000 square miles of territory, a land mass five times larger than all of the Japanese islands combined.

One scholar of the 1858–1864 Russo-Chinese border negotiations has concluded that: “Russia first established *de facto* control of an area and only afterwards negotiated a treaty legitimating Russian sovereignty—a kind of *ex post facto* diplomacy.”¹⁴ But China was in no position to resist, since it was in the midst of a series of internal rebellions and uprisings. Thus, it was China’s domestic weakness that really allowed the Tsarist Russian government to use secret diplomacy to take control over what had formerly been considered to be Chinese territory. Ignat’ev’s achievement was especially notable since, unlike Britain and France, Russia had sent zero troops to China and yet Russia’s gains were arguably much greater than those countries that had troops in the theater. When the Chinese later realized that they had been duped by a man who had absolutely no military resources at his disposal, unlike Great Britain and France, and who had offered his services as mediator to “help” China, it merely added to their sense of national humiliation.

The Ili Crisis, 1871–1881

Secret treaties were crucial to Russia’s success in taking enormous swaths of land from China. In contrast to Russia’s successful use of secret diplomacy during the Second Opium War, in the Ili Crisis (1871–1881), China forced Russia to back down. In 1871, Russia had occupied the Ili Valley in western Xinjiang to prevent the great Muslim Rebellion (1862–1878) from spreading into Russian territory. To quell the rebellion, China deployed

large forces under Zuo Zongtang and, much to Russia's surprise, restored order. Despite paying a large indemnity to Russia, the Chinese widely regarded the Treaty of St Petersburg as a diplomatic victory, because they had made Russia, one of the most powerful European nations, back down.

The Ili Valley was strategically critical, since the Tian Shan mountain range ran east–west through Xinjiang, separating the Zungharian Basin from the Tarim Basin, with the Muzart Pass to the south and the Talki Pass to the north linking the two basins. The Ili River Valley ran east–west through the mountains joining Chinese with Russian territory. Thus, the Ili Valley controlled a prime invasion route to China, as well as access to the Zungharian Basin. Because the Tian Shan mountains were the last geographic barrier against Russia's ongoing expansion into Central Asia, the Manchus considered retention of Xinjiang as vital to their empire's security. They expended enormous funds to retain Xinjiang, but never won the allegiance of its inhabitants. By the early 1860s, more than a hundred years after the Qing conquest of Xinjiang in 1759, it was still a military colony with a military-governor stationed at Ili.

Russia's goal in taking Ili was part of its rapid expansion into Central Asia. After the founding of the city of Vernyi in 1854, the Russians conquered all the local khanates and established a governor-generalship of Turkestan in 1867. The Ili Valley was the best strategic route for Russia to continue expanding into Xinjiang. In June 1871, the governor-general of Russian Turkestan ordered Russian troops to cross the Sino-Russian border to occupy Ili, and Russia formally incorporated the area into the Russian provincial system as Kuldzha province in 1873. This action resulted in tensions with Qing China.

The Russians were not eager to relinquish control over Xinjiang's mountain passes, since they gave Russia the strategic advantage in dealing with China, and provided direct trade routes with Gansu, Shaanxi, and Mongolia. Therefore, the Russian price for withdrawal was high. Russia proposed that it retain control of the Muzart Pass, the most strategic part of the Ili Valley; acquire trading privileges throughout Xinjiang, Mongolia, and beyond the Great Wall into the heart of China; and receive a five million ruble indemnity to defray the occupation costs. The Russians also proposed a separate agreement giving them the right to navigate the Songhua River, in Manchuria, as far inland as Potuna. China's diplomatic representative, Chonghou, agreed to these terms when he signed the Treaty of Livadia on 2 October 1879. As soon as China's government understood the treaty terms, however, it immediately repudiated the agreement. The resulting diplomatic scandal threatened to end in a war between Russia and China.

Meanwhile, the Tongzhi emperor had suddenly died in 1875, resulting in a power struggle within the Manchu ruling court. Although Chonghou

appears to have kept officials in Beijing fully apprised of his 10-month-long negotiations, dynastic matters seem to have completely overshadowed his border negotiations. Once Chonghou had signed the Treaty of Livadia and officials in Beijing finally focused on its contents, the court refused to ratify it and condemned Chonghou to death. The foreign powers deplored such treatment of a diplomat, joined together in protest, and pressured the court to rescind the execution. However, Chinese outrage at the lopsided terms of the treaty made war with Russia appear imminent.

Russia had thousands of troops stationed near Ili and deployed 23 warships to threaten Beijing, but China had even more soldiers in theater, since Zuo Zongtang had only just put down the Muslim Rebellion in Xinjiang. The Qing put their most famous officers from the Taiping suppression in key positions and hired the former leader of the Ever-Victorious Army, Charles Gordon, to provide military advice. Russia, in contrast, had just lost a war with Turkey during 1877–1878 and got a bad post-war settlement at the Congress of Berlin. The cost of the war had undermined the already faltering Russian economy. Then, in 1879, Britain took control of Afghanistan, potentially threatening from the south Russia's position in Central Asia. All of these factors made it particularly poor timing for Russia to go to war with China.

Diplomacy prevailed when Russia agreed to accept a new negotiator, Marquis Zeng Jize, the son of the famous general Zeng Guofan, who was serving as China's minister to Great Britain. His negotiations in St Petersburg were acrimonious, but Russia preferred a large indemnity to an expensive war and restored most of the disputed territory for a nine million ruble indemnity. Russia curtailed its demands for greater trade privileges and dropped the provision concerning navigation rights on the Songhua River. As a result, the 24 February 1881 Treaty of St Petersburg superseded the Treaty of Livadia. This halted, temporarily at least, Russia's expansion into China. This public defeat convinced Russia that secret diplomacy was the best way to dominate the imperial periphery and get what it wanted from China.

Russia moves into Manchuria and Mongolia

Russia's expansionist policies succeeded. By using secret diplomacy, Tsarist negotiators were able to obtain hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory from the Chinese empire without a fight. The size of its winnings dwarfed all of the other foreign powers' territorial concessions combined. Moscow's territorial appetite was not satisfied, however, and it set its sights on the Chinese provinces of Manchuria and Mongolia. N. N. Murav'ev, the mid-19th century Governor General of Eastern Siberia, even wrote: "[I]n the event of the fall of the Empire of

the Manchus our activities must be so aimed as to enable the formation of an independent domain ... in Mongolia and Manchuria.”¹⁵ Throughout the rest of the 19th century, Russia’s expansion in the Far East revolved around finding ways to increase its influence in China’s northern and northeastern periphery.

The first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) gave Russia an unexpected opportunity to continue its expansion into Manchuria. After China was defeated by Japan in 1895, a British Asian expert, A. R. Colquhoun, predicted:

Now, consider the position of China. The result of the war is to bring forcibly to our minds the inevitable downfall and disintegration of that Empire. The process is being hastened by the squeezing to which she is being subjected in the north by Russia, and in the south by France. And observe there is no internal sign of regeneration or resistance. What is going to happen? Obviously a break up. In these circumstances the sooner the Powers make up their minds to define their several spheres of influence the better.

Colquhoun then warned the British government should act quickly to come to terms with Russia, since, with the building of the Panama Canal, “the United States will come forward with a great and legitimate demand to take her place as one of the chief factors in the commerce of Eastern Asia.”¹⁶

A major breakthrough in obtaining Russia’s sphere of influence goals took place in 1896, when Russian diplomats bribed Qing government officials to permit the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in Manchuria. On 3 June 1896, Li Hongzhang, Foreign Minister Lobanov-Rostovskii, and Minister of Finance Sergei Witte signed a secret alliance against Japan. China’s agreement was gained through the use of a three million ruble fund intended solely to bribe Chinese officials. In exchange for China’s permission for the construction of the CER across northern Manchuria linking the Trans-Siberian railway with Vladivostok, Russia secretly agreed to ally with China against any future Japanese aggression, an alliance that the Russian government later broke when it took the Liaodong peninsula during the Boxer Uprising. (See Treaty 1)

The CER cut through the rich heartland of northern Manchuria and controlled 105,661.98 “dessiatins,” with one dessiatin being equal to two-and-a-half acres, or over 250,000 acres total, making it one of the largest foreign territorial concessions in China.¹⁷ The length of this railway—1,073 miles, after the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) was ceded to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905—also made

it the single longest foreign-run railway in China, accounting for almost 45% of all such railways in the early 1920s.¹⁸ When Moscow used secret diplomacy to take back control of this railway in 1924, it was still 14% of all of China's railway mileage, and when joined with Japan's railway, the two together accounted for 22.5%.¹⁹ Both in terms of foreign-owned railway mileage and China's total railway mileage, therefore, the CER was arguably the single most important foreign concession in China.

Keeping the geopolitical importance of this railway in mind, it should not come as a shock that Russia's acquisition of the CER concession in 1896 helped spark an aggressive battle among the foreign powers for additional concessions in China, with Japan, Russia, and Germany leading the way in carving out their share in Taiwan, Liaodong, and Shandong, respectively. Great Britain, in the meantime, added to her Hong Kong concession by signing a 99-year lease with China for the New Territories. Competition for concessions was so blatant that when Italy demanded, without provocation, that China give land for an Italian naval base in Zhejiang province, the *North China Herald* wryly commented: "The Italians were utterly unreasonable in their action—they did not even wait for a [single] missionary to be killed."²⁰

While Japanese, Russian, and German interests were primarily in northern China, British and French interests were mainly in southern and central China. This demarcation was even spelled out in a 28 April 1899 agreement between Great Britain and Russia, in which Great Britain promised not to seek railway concessions north of the Great Wall, while Russia likewise promised not to move into the Yangzi River basin. These were clearly distinct Anglo-Russian spheres of influence. (See Treaty 2) Great Britain later formed an alliance with Japan in 1902, which had a similar effect of dividing China into a northern Japanese and southern British spheres of influence.

The dismembering of China into foreign territorial concessions had a profound impact on the Chinese government. In 1898, the Qing dynasty attempted to adopt a series of internal government reforms along the self-strengthening lines first taken by Japan during the Meiji restoration. These reforms failed, however, and were followed in 1900 by a disastrous anti-foreign outburst, called the Boxer Uprising, in which the Chinese government turned to bands of martial arts experts—the Boxers—to try to force the foreigners out of China. The failure of both movements was additional proof that the Qing dynasty was incapable of responding effectively to the threat of foreign intervention. This left China particularly vulnerable to secret diplomacy. It was precisely at this time that the US government attempted to eliminate secret diplomacy and to engage only in public agreements.

The supposed end of secret diplomacy

Prior to the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, secret diplomacy was considered to be a normal part of diplomatic intercourse throughout Asia, as well as in much of Europe and the rest of the world. Only by maintaining absolute secrecy in foreign diplomacy could a government retain the power to create, or later break, its agreements at will to further its own national interests. With the increased power wielded by the middle classes, however, came demands for diplomacy to be carried out in public view, since knowledge of a country's actual foreign diplomatic agreements had important ramifications for a whole range of public activity, from international commerce to banking and investment, to tourism.

The United States was the first country to reject secret diplomacy openly. In 1861, the US Congress mandated that all diplomatic correspondence be published in yearly *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Washington stood largely alone, however, and throughout the rest of the 19th century, as well as during the early decades of the 20th century, secret diplomacy was an accepted, albeit much-criticized, fact of life. Secret diplomacy was later blamed for being a root cause of World War I, and during the course of the war, numerous secret treaties were signed by Japan, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, and France in order to divide up the German and Austrian spoils after the war was over.

These secret treaties not only hurt US economic interests, but American soldiers lost their lives fighting on behalf of secret agreements Washington never signed. This prompted one American authority on international relations to describe how secret diplomacy had “aroused the greatest resentment because they were in several cases directed against the interests of third parties, and particularly because when the United States was making its enormous and unselfish sacrifices, these treaties were kept from its knowledge.”²¹ It was abhorrence of secret diplomacy that convinced President Woodrow Wilson to advocate public diplomacy on 8 January 1918 as the very first of his Fourteen Points: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”²²

In the case of the United States and Russia, the most fundamental foreign policy difference was that while America relied primarily on open diplomacy backed up by her economic strength, Russia relied mainly on secret diplomacy backed up by her military might. These Russo-American characteristics were not completely new, but had been discussed by Alexis de Tocqueville during the 1830s when he observed:

The one has liberty as the chief way of doing things; the other servitude ... Their points of departure are different, their paths are divergent; nevertheless, each seems summoned by a secret design of providence to hold in his hands, some day, the destinies of half the world.

He further stated: "The conquests of the American are won by the plowshare, those of the Russian by the sword."²³ This contrast in methodology was especially clear from pre-World War I statistics showing that the United States had a standing army of only 50,000 men, while Russia's exceeded 1,400,000.²⁴

One of the main areas of potential conflict between the United States and Russia was in East Asia, since it was in the Pacific that the westward-expanding American economic interests met with the eastward-expanding Russian, and then Soviet, land empires. Unlike most other foreign countries, the United States had no desire to divide up China. At the turn of the century, Theodore Roosevelt acknowledged the importance of the recent American acquisition of the Philippines from Spain, as well as the construction of the Panama Canal, by observing that the history of mankind had "begun with a Mediterranean era, continued with an Atlantic period, and was entering upon a Pacific epoch."²⁵ Initially, the Russian government supported America's expansion into the Pacific Ocean, since it directly competed with, as well as undermined, the British empire. But with Secretary of State Hay's 6 September 1899 declaration of the Open Door Policy, America's goal of turning China into a free trade zone struck a direct blow at Tsarist Russia's hope of expanding its land empire into China's imperial periphery, and most importantly into Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. The American Open Door Policy directly clashed with the Russian goal of creating spheres of influence.

The emergence of American power in East Asia

The Open Door Policy was developed by the United States as a political and economic counterweight to Russia's rapid territorial expansion into China during the 1890s. While the United States already had one of the most developed industrial economies in the world by 1900, Russia's commercial sector was comparatively backwards. The Tsarist government depended on high tariffs and exclusive spheres of influence in order to protect its markets from foreign competition. Because its industry was highly modernized, the United States preferred free economic competition to exclusive concessions.

The origin of the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry can, in part at least, be traced back to this turn-of-the-century competition over China.²⁶

Washington was the only major Western government not to have any significant railway or territorial concessions in China. American interests revolved around commerce and focused on opening Chinese domestic markets to foreign trade. While other major powers had staked out claims to specific territories in northern and southern China, and then tried to keep other foreigners out of their spheres of influence, American commercial interests were primarily located in central China, with approximately 65% of all American investment in and around Shanghai.²⁷ This situation gave the United States a pivotal position, since its commercial interests were located directly between the Russian, Japanese, and German spheres of influence to the north, and the British and French spheres of influence to the south.

The American Secretary of State, John Hay, first proposed the Open Door Policy on 6 September 1899, and then officially announced the creation of this policy on 1 January 1900. While the Russian government agreed to uphold the Open Door, they clearly hoped this policy would fail. (See Treaty 3) Hay tried to limit foreign rivalry by calling for the preservation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which challenges those historians who have accused this policy of being little more than a "viable alternative to imperialism."²⁸ One early historical account explained the Open Door Policy's success:

The 'open-door' is one of the most creditable episodes in American diplomacy, an example of benevolent impulse accompanied by energy and shrewd skill in negotiation. Not one of the statesmen and nations that agreed to Hay's policy wanted to. It was like asking every man who believes in truth to stand up—the liars are obliged to be the first to rise. Hay saw through them perfectly; his insight into human nature was one of his strongest qualities.²⁹

The struggle to partition Manchuria ended in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). After Russia's defeat in 1905, Washington offered its services to help to negotiate a peace treaty. Taking advantage of its role as broker, the US government convinced Russia to declare on 5 September 1905 that "they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."³⁰ (See Treaty 4) Although the Portsmouth Peace Treaty publicly supported the Open Door Policy, it also reaffirmed that Russia retained the CER, while Japan acquired the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), the section of the railway that ran from Harbin to Port Arthur. In practical terms,

therefore, Manchuria was still divided into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence.

Ignoring all attempts by the United States to enforce the Open Door Policy, Russia and Japan continued to carve up China into exclusive spheres, even signing two secret agreements in 1907 and 1910 that further delimited their respective spheres of influence. In the first, an east–west line was drawn from Korea through the heart of Manchuria, granting Japan a free hand in Korea in return for Russia receiving a free hand in Outer Mongolia. (See Treaty 5) The second, suspiciously signed on 4 July to indicate that the United States was most likely the target, promised not only not to interfere in the other’s sphere of influence, but actively to support these spheres against outside interference. (See Treaty 6) These secret agreements became especially important once the Han Chinese ousted the Manchus and attempted to form a republic.

The warlord years in Republican China

Following the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the formal abdication of the Qing dynasty on 12 February 1912, Sun Yat-sen resigned his position as provisional president of the Republic of China (ROC) and handed over power to General Yuan Shikai, who immediately moved the capital back from Nanjing to Beijing. On 5 April 1912, Beijing was made China’s national capital by parliamentary vote and the United States became the first country to recognize the ROC. To offset the newly formed Han Chinese government and the United States, Russia and Japan signed a third secret protocol on 8 July 1912. This treaty divided Inner Mongolia into a Russian section, west of the 116°27'E meridian, and a Japanese section east of this meridian, which was directly north of China’s capital city of Beijing, thereby implying Russia and Japan had equal leverage over the actions of the Chinese government. (See Treaty 7)

The turmoil surrounding the 1911 Chinese revolution was also successfully used by Russia to negotiate an advantageous treaty with breakaway Outer Mongolia in 1912, and Russian diplomats pressured China to sign an agreement in 1913 that limited her rights in Outer Mongolia. Russia then convinced China to sign a tripartite treaty with Russia and Outer Mongolia in 1915, by which Urga recognized the *suzerainty* of China in exchange for China recognizing its *autonomy* from China.³¹ (See Treaty 8) The immediate effect of this tripartite treaty was that Outer Mongolia, which formerly had been internationally recognized as part of China, fell under the sway of the stronger Russian government. D. I. Abrikossov, a Tsarist diplomat, openly admitted that Russia had considered Outer Mongolia to be China’s territory before the 1911 Chinese revolution.³²

With the European nations already embroiled in World War I, and with the United States' attention also directed mainly across the Atlantic, Japan carried out expansionist policies in southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong. During January 1915, the Japanese government responded to Russia's 21-point proposal on Outer Mongolia when it presented China with Twenty-One Demands of its own, pushing Beijing into ceding a long list of territorial and economic rights, including the transfer of Germany's former concession in Shandong province to Japan. On 13 March 1915, Washington stated that it opposed the acquisition of political, military, or economic domination over China by a foreign power, and requested Japan to refrain from "pressing upon China an acceptance of proposals which would, if accepted, exclude Americans from equal participation in the economic and industrial development of China and would limit the political independence of that country."³³

When Beijing protested, the US supported China, condemning the Twenty-One Demands as a violation of the political and territorial integrity of the Republic of China.³⁴ On 30 March 1915, US Secretary of State W. J. Bryan criticized Japan for trying to force Japanese advisors on the Chinese government, as well as claiming exclusive rights to sell arms and manage Japanese police forces in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.³⁵ Finally, on 13 May 1915, Washington stated that

it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the 'Open Door Policy'.³⁶

Thus, long before the end of World War I, the US government showed that it remained an active supporter of the Open Door Policy. On 3 July 1916, Russia and Japan signed a fourth secret agreement opposing any third country—presumably the United States—that might try to interfere with their further expansion into China. Article I stated:

The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that their vital interests demand that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan, will frankly and loyally enter into communication whenever circumstances may demand, and will agree upon the measures to be taken to prevent such a situation being brought about.

This secret agreement furthermore stated that in case of war between one of the “Contracting Parties” and a third party, then “the other Contracting Party will, upon the demand of its ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party.”³⁷ (See Treaty 9)

Although this secret agreement was intentionally vague on which country the “third party” was supposed to be, Price has concluded that later Russian explanations prove that it was directed against “some power other than those with which Russia was then at war.”³⁸ Since Russia was currently at war with Germany and Austria, this tends to rule these two countries out. Furthermore, ever since 1902, Japan had been closely allied to Great Britain, which suggests that Britain was not the “third party” in question. This left only the United States, which was not allied to either Russia or Japan. This conclusion is supported by the simple fact that Washington refused to recognize Japan’s Twenty-One Demands.

The United States urged China to end diplomatic relations with Germany and join the Allies, as an important first step in having Japan’s provisions reversed. On 14 March 1917, China broke with Germany, and then on 14 August 1917, declared war against Germany and Austria. Tokyo foresaw the problems that China’s actions might cause to Japan’s position in Shandong, however, and so in early 1917 signed secret agreements with Great Britain, France, and Italy that guaranteed her rights to the German concessions in Shandong.³⁹ The Russian government also signed a secret agreement on 5 March 1917 specifically supporting Japan’s claim to the former German concession in Shandong in return for Japan’s recognition of Russia’s preeminent position in Outer Mongolia.

US government attempts to enforce the Open Door Policy in China were never entirely successful, but Washington did protect Manchuria and Outer Mongolia from being openly annexed by Russia and Japan, and it later helped return Germany’s concession in Shandong to China some 75 years before the lease was due. Although both Russia and Japan negotiated a series of secret agreements increasing their respective spheres of influence in northern China, neither was willing to act too openly against the United States. As China broke up into opposing regional governments, however, and fell deeper into civil war, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia completely changed the political environment in East Asia.

The Bolshevik Revolution and East Asia

Soon after the 1917 October Revolution, the Bolsheviks called for the overthrow of capitalist governments. The American journalist John Reed quoted Leon Trotsky as saying that either the Russian Revolution would

create a revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European powers would destroy the Russian Revolution.⁴⁰ In 1919, Lenin stated:

We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperial states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. Until this end occurs, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois states is inevitable.⁴¹

The USSR's 30 December 1922 constitution then announced that the world had been divided into a capitalist camp and an opposing socialist one.⁴²

As these and many similar pronouncements show, the Bolsheviks' goal of destroying democratic-capitalism was a real objective. Propaganda backed up by secret diplomacy played an important role in the Soviet attempt to carry out its expansionist program. After renouncing all of Russia's foreign debts, the 26 December 1917 issue of *Pravda* published a decree signed by Lenin and Trotsky reallocating two million rubles to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs' officials abroad for the needs of the international revolutionary movements.⁴³ On 16 January 1918, the Bolsheviks turned to the Far East and condemned the enslavement of hundreds of millions of toilers in Asia.⁴⁴ This anti-imperialist announcement was followed by another dated 22 February 1918, which appealed specifically to the Far Eastern peoples to rise up against the Western countries.⁴⁵

The Bolsheviks' appeals for the immediate overthrow of colonialism in the Far East helps explain why Washington refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet government. Soon after the October Revolution, US Secretary of State Robert Lansing characterized the Bolsheviks as a threat to the existing social order.⁴⁶ With Russia temporarily weakened, Japan attempted to consolidate its position in East Asia by signing the Lansing-Ishi agreement with Washington. This agreement defined Japan's special relationship with China, called "territorial propinquity." Even though this agreement fell far short of recognizing Japan's Twenty-One Demands, it tacitly admitted that Japan had legitimate economic interests in China. However, a secret note also reconfirmed Japan's continued adherence to the Open Door Policy. (See Treaty 10)

These already complex arrangements were further complicated on 24 September 1918, however, when the Beijing government signed a separate secret agreement with Japan. In return for withdrawing the Japanese civil administration from Shandong, and turning this responsibility back over to China, Beijing agreed to manage the former German railway line as a joint Sino-Japanese company. Included in this agreement was the provision that Japanese policemen could patrol this railway. Beijing then

accepted a Japanese loan of 20 million yen as an advance on this railway agreement. It later proved difficult for China to show that this agreement had been forced on her by Japan, since the Chinese Minister to Tokyo, Chang Tsung-hsiang, wrote to the Japanese government at the time: "I beg to acquaint you in reply that the Chinese gladly agree."⁴⁷ (See Treaty 11)

Although Moscow was unable to convince Washington to open diplomatic relations, the Bolshevik leaders repeatedly used the Open Door Policy to oppose Japan's military intervention in Siberia. During early March 1918, Trotsky asked Washington how it would oppose Japan's proposed intervention into Siberia: "what steps would be taken by the other allies, particularly and especially by the United States, to prevent a Japanese landing on our Far East and to insure uninterrupted communications with Russia through the Siberian route?"⁴⁸ A few days later, on 9 March 1918, Chicherin expressed appreciation to America for restraining Japan:

The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs warmly thanks the American Embassy for the friendly attitude which is being shown by it at the present critical time and for assistance being given by it in the complications which are arising now in the Far East.⁴⁹

On 5 August 1919, Trotsky admitted that the Bolsheviks' advance into Siberia was made possible by the United States. Trotsky further noted that the Soviet government could rely on the continued direct support of the "Washington rascals" to oppose Japan.⁵⁰

In its foreign policy, the Bolsheviks clearly relied on the Open Door Policy for protection from Japanese aggression. But, meanwhile, the Bolshevik-funded Comintern, founded in March 1919, criticized America for contemplating "the exploitation of weak States and peoples by means of trade and capital investment."⁵¹ In fact, the Comintern condemned the Open Door Policy mainly because it interfered with Russian attempts to expand into East Asia. Moscow's dual policy did not go unnoticed: in early 1919, the American chargé d'affaires at Archangel pointed out to Washington that the Bolsheviks' call for organizing the Comintern did not conform to their apparent eagerness to participate in Allied-sponsored peace talks.⁵²

The USSR adopted a double-edged sword policy. While the Bolsheviks were clearly willing to work diplomatically with the democratic-capitalist countries when they could obtain protection from attack, they simultaneously supported revolutionary propaganda advocating the destruction of these very same governments. The Comintern's call to destroy the Open Door Policy in China was just one example of this dual policy. This dual policy was to become especially effective with the formation of the first United Front in China.

The formation of the first United Front in China

By 1919, the diplomatically isolated Soviet government was trying to open relations not only with the internationally recognized Beijing government, but with Sun Yat-sen's opposition government in Guangzhou. Attempts to form an alliance with Sun largely followed Tsarist government policy, as outlined by a November 1911 secret telegram from the Tsarist Russian mission in Beijing, suggesting that in a conflict between north and south China, Russia's natural ally would be Guangzhou.⁵³ Not only did the two governments not have any territorial conflicts, they had a common enemy in the central capital in Beijing. On 1 August 1918, Chicherin sent a letter to Sun, expressing his hope that relations would improve between the Soviet government and Guangzhou.⁵⁴ Soon afterwards, in March 1919, Lao Xiuzhao, a Chinese delegate at the Comintern Congress, named the Chinese leader with whom the Bolsheviks hoped to ally, the "pride of China—Sun Yat-sen."⁵⁵

The USSR's opportunity to influence China was greatly aided by the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Wellington Koo, a member of China's delegation to Versailles, met with President Wilson during November 1918, at which time Koo told him of China's proposals to regain directly the German concession in Shandong. Even before the Paris Peace Conference had convened, however, Wilson warned Koo that China's 1915 agreements with Japan—the so-called "Twenty-One Demands"—would be difficult to circumvent. But Wilson was never told about China's most recent 1918 secret treaties with Japan. Russell H. Fifield interviewed Wellington Koo on 31 October 1951, and discovered that when Koo talked to Wilson in late 1918, he also did not yet know about Beijing's secret railway agreement with Tokyo, signed only a few months before. The acting foreign minister back in Beijing openly expressed his wish that the 1918 secret agreements had never become public.⁵⁶

When the Paris Peace Conference convened early in 1919, and addressed the problem of Germany's former concessions in Shandong province, it was faced with the prospect of untangling not only China's 1898 treaty with Germany, but China's 1915 and 1918 treaties with Japan, as well as Japan's secret agreements with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia. The Shandong problem, which seemed deceptively simple to many outsiders, actually involved eight major countries: China, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and, finally, the United States. Of these eight nations, only the United States had not signed any agreements—secret or public—recognizing China's and Japan's 1915 and 1918 treaties, making it the only reasonably objective party concerned with the negotiations.

When Germany was ordered to cede its Shandong concession to Japan, the Japanese delegation promised Wilson that the concession would be

returned to China and that they had no imperialist desires in Shandong. Although this promise was not technically supposed to be a secret, it was not widely published and so the general public did not know of its existence. (See Treaty 12) Many mistakenly thought that Shandong concession was being ceded to Japan in perpetuity. Because Japan's promises were not known in China, student demonstrations broke out there on 4 May 1919—the May Fourth Movement—protesting the decision to transfer Chinese territory to Japan.

The Bolsheviks sought to capitalize on this student discontent. During summer 1919, a pamphlet written by Vladimir Vilenskii stated: “Everyone is saying that the revolutionary fire in South China ought inevitably to move to the North. Then revolutionary Russia will find for itself a reliable ally in China against the imperialist predators.”⁵⁷ That the Bolsheviks were trying to play Sun Yat-sen's southern government against Beijing was best shown by the 25 July 1919 Karakhan Manifesto, which was addressed both to the Guangzhou government and to the Beijing government. In this declaration, the Soviet Union promised to annul all unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, all Russian concessions, its share of the Boxer indemnity, and to give back the CER to China without compensation. In a version of this manifesto published a month later in the Soviet Union, however, this critical promise regarding the CER did not appear, creating two manifestos—one public, intended for propaganda purposes, and the other secret for diplomacy. (See Treaty 13)

On 26 March 1920, copies of the public Karakhan manifesto were published in newspapers in Harbin and Vladivostok, the same day Gregory Voitinsky, a 27-year-old Far Eastern Secretariat official, arrived in Vladivostok on his way to China.⁵⁸ The manifesto's publication in newspapers across China guaranteed him a warm welcome, and played an important role in promoting closer ties between China and Russia. As James E. Sheridan concluded: “This declaration by the new Russian Communist regime seemed a concrete manifestation of Leninist hostility to imperialism, the most attractive element of the Marxist-Leninist package to anti-imperialistic young Chinese.”⁵⁹

Voitinsky took advantage of China's positive public response to visit Beijing during April 1920, at which time he met Li Dazhao, a professor at Peking University. It was Li who then introduced Voitinsky to Chen Duxiu, a major leader of the May Fourth Movement, who helped found the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during summer 1921 and became its first leader. The Dutch Comintern representative, Henk Sneevliet (Maring), arrived in Shanghai during the spring and suggested that a party congress be held to found the Chinese Communist Party.⁶⁰ At this congress, Maring supported adopting a United Front between the CCP and the Nationalists. But most of the Chinese believed that Sun's government was just as bad as

Beijing. Ch'en Kung-po, a delegate at the first congress, quoted the unpublished party manifesto as saying the "government of Dr. Sun Yat-sen was no better than the government of the northern militarist party."⁶¹ The CCP refused to join the Nationalists.

The Chinese Communists later joined the Comintern, however, which had strict rules. One Soviet historian has observed the Comintern enforced a tight, almost military discipline.⁶² According to Dov Bing, it was Maring who talked the Chinese Communists into joining the Comintern, a decision that gave the Kremlin a new channel through which to influence China.⁶³ After they joined, the CCP were ordered to form the United Front with Sun Yat-sen. Maring's other goal was to undermine the credibility of the Open Door Policy. He freely acknowledged how difficult this was, since "the American open-door policy has the appearance of defending oppressed peoples," but then insisted that "in reality this policy only serves the capitalist interests of the United States."⁶⁴

Soviet-funded propaganda equating the Open Door Policy with economic imperialism assisted the USSR's territorial expansion into Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and, later, China proper. In fact, the Open Door Policy supported China's sovereignty and territorial integrity from outside invasion, thereby interfering with the USSR's expansionist goals in East Asia. But Maring openly warned the Chinese people not to trust the Open Door Policy, claiming that it would be used as an excuse to send foreign ships, gunships, airships, and troops to China. In fact, the main reason Maring opposed it was that the Open Door interfered with Soviet infiltration of China. The US government actively tried to prop up international support for the Open Door Policy at the 1921–1922 Washington Conference.

The Washington Conference

To strengthen the Open Door Policy, Washington announced that it would convene a conference to discuss issues of importance to the Far East, including returning the Shandong concession to China. On 19 July 1921, Chicherin protested that the USSR had not been invited.⁶⁵ But only two days earlier, *Izvestiia* had called on Asian nations to oppose capitalism: "Just as we are the hopeful bulwark for oriental peoples in their struggle for independence, they in turn are our allies in one common struggle against world imperialism."⁶⁶ The Comintern also denounced the Washington Conference, and once again called on China to join with Soviet Russia, since it was the only country that was trying to establish diplomatic relations with all of the Asian countries based on equality and fraternal aid.⁶⁷

During 1923, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes accused the Bolsheviks of defying all basic principles of international intercourse,

explaining that the USSR's ultimate and definite aim was the destruction of the free institutions that the West had laboriously built up.⁶⁸ It was Hughes's goal to draw China into this new global order. The Washington Conference convened during late 1921, and on 6 February 1922, a general agreement entitled the "Nine Power Treaty" was signed, which outlined the principles of the participant nations' relations with China:

- 1) to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative inviolability of China;
- 2) to grant China completely and without constraint the opportunity to develop and to support its capable and stable government;
- 3) to utilize their influence for the purpose of truly establishing and supporting the principle of equal opportunity for trade and industry of all nations in all the territory of China;
- 4) to abstain, at the present time in the Chinese theater, from striving for special rights and advantages, detrimental to the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly nations, or the support of activities hostile to the security of these nations.

These points embodied complete support for the Open Door Policy. The signatories also promised not to sign agreements that might establish "superior rights in relation to mercantile or economic development in any particular region of China," "monopolies or preferences," or "spheres of influence."⁶⁹

Hans Morgenthau favorably described the impact of the Nine Power Treaty as transforming the Open Door Policy in China into a "multilateral policy which the nations mostly interested in trade with China, as well as China itself, pledged themselves to uphold."⁷⁰ The Washington Conference immediately raised China's tariff rate and set up two commissions, the first to study ways of revising China's tariff system to make it autonomous of foreign control, and the second to find a way to help China adopt legislation and judicial reforms that would allow for the gradual relinquishing of extraterritoriality rights.⁷¹ It also arranged for Japan and China to sign a treaty on 4 February 1922 returning the Shandong concession to China; Japan then transferred this concession to China—exactly as it had promised to do in Paris—on 10 December 1922.

It was Washington's hope that by supporting gradual reforms—not revolution, as the Soviet propaganda advocated—China could soon join the world community as an equal. The Shidehara Foreign Ministry in Japan fully supported these goals and as late as July 1924 publicly expressed its intention to abide by the Open Door Policy.⁷² One unintended diplomatic outcome of the Nine Power Treaty, however, was the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had been in effect since 1902.

During October and November 1920, the British Foreign Office had to choose between the United States and Japan and it felt compelled to side with America.⁷³ Being excluded from this new naval alliance undoubtedly upset Japan, which was then tempted to turn back to its secret pre-World War I alliance with Russia.

This voluntary structure for supporting the Open Door Policy also unintentionally worked to the advantage of the USSR. For example, the checks and balances that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had formerly applied against Tsarist Russian expansionism into China disappeared, and they were not replaced by a similar group of bilateral security agreements to control equally aggressive Soviet expansion. The Bolsheviks were given a free hand to influence political events in China, since they alone did not make any promises of non-interference. For these reasons, Moscow's opportunities to increase its sphere of influence in China were greatly enhanced.

To maximize its position, however, the Soviet government had to carry out its diplomacy in absolute secrecy. Since the Soviet government was not invited, the Washington Conference's decision not to interfere in China removed one of the last restraints on Soviet expansionism. The first example was Outer Mongolia, which was invaded by the Red Army in 1921, and by the fall of 1924 was closed to all capitalist development, at which point a pro-Soviet socialist government was put in power. In other words, it became the very first Soviet puppet state. Outer Mongolia's economic life soon became closely intertwined with the USSR's socialist economy, a state of affairs that continued for over sixty years until the late 1980s. Similar attempts to turn northern Manchuria into an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence also met with initial success.

The Soviet Union's secret diplomacy in China

Both before and during World War I, the Tsarist Russian government signed secret treaties that delimited Russia's sphere of influence in the Far East. During May 1917, however, the Bolsheviks criticized the Russian Provisional Government for keeping these "plundering treaties" secret.⁷⁴ After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks not only published copies of these Tsarist secret treaties, but the Soviet leaders furthermore denounced secret diplomacy as being responsible for drenching the "world in blood."⁷⁵ On 17 November 1922, the Soviet envoy to China, Adolf Joffe, announced that the "Workers and Peasants' Government is opposed on principle to secret diplomacy and never signs secret treaties."⁷⁶ But in reality, almost immediately after the October Revolution, the Soviet diplomats began to reply on secret diplomacy in their foreign relations, and in particular with China.

The first official Soviet diplomat to China, Aleksandr Paikes, arrived in Beijing in December 1921. Alexander Paikes was named the “Plenipotentiary Extraordinary for the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic to the Republic of China concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway.”⁷⁷ Paikes’s partial powers actually helped Moscow, since all subsequent Sino-Soviet negotiations on Outer Mongolia were technically unofficial. Since Paikes’s credentials did not specify that he could discuss Outer Mongolia, all of his proposals and promises could be denied by Moscow at a later date. However, during his very first meeting with the Chinese attaché, Paikes suggested that a conference be convened among representatives from China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia to resolve all outstanding problems. Since Paikes’s suggestion exactly followed the format of the 1915 Tsarist-imposed tripartite treaty, the Chinese official responded that the Chinese government could not tolerate a “second party” interfering in China’s affairs, and they especially “could not tolerate an ambitious country carrying out an aggressive policy,” a direct reference to Tsarist Russia’s earlier imperialism on Outer Mongolia.⁷⁸

Although the Bolsheviks had repeatedly announced the abolition of all former Russo-Chinese treaties, on 26 April 1922, Paikes clarified the Soviet position on the former Russo-Chinese treaties:

My government formerly announced that all of the prior Tsarist treaties were abolished, it did not say that the basis for these treaties was abolished. These matters have to be studied. But your government mistakenly thought that the 1919 [Karakhan] manifesto unconditionally cancelled the 1915 [Outer Mongolia] treaty ... On these matters your government is mistaken.⁷⁹

A letter from Paikes from 3 August 1922 further revealed that Moscow considered that the terms of all former treaties remained valid until they were revised.

With regard to the 1915 Russo-Chinese-Mongolia treaty, Paikes argued that its terms were still valid, since the treaty “has not yet been revised, and that the revision of the agreement could take place by the participation of the contracting parties.”⁸⁰ As a result, Paikes explained, just because Soviet declarations offered to return all annexed lands to China, this did not mean that Outer Mongolia’s autonomy was abolished. Paikes then suggested that a tripartite conference convene with representatives from Moscow, Beijing, and Urga in attendance, so that the 1915 tripartite treaty could be revised. This suggestion was unacceptable to Chinese officials, however, since admitting an Outer Mongolian representative into the negotiations was tantamount to recognizing that it was autonomous, which was exactly the section of the 1915 tripartite treaty that China disputed.

In addition, according to Paikes, the Bolsheviks' repeated promises to annul other Tsarist unequal treaties also had no long-term impact so long as China could be convinced to agree to the old terms. In other words, the treaties might have been canceled, but not the terms of these treaties. But, of course, that really meant that the Bolsheviks were arguing that these unequal Tsarist treaties still existed.

Following Paikes's failure to convince Beijing to adopt the terms of the 1915 tripartite agreement, he was replaced by Adolf Joffe, who traveled to China during August 1922. Upon arriving in Beijing, Joffe publicly announced that it was Moscow's intention to forbear from the "aggressive imperialist policy of the tsar's government," and that he hoped to open relations with China based on the "full political and economic equality of both parties."⁸¹ Joffe explained why Russian troops had occupied Outer Mongolia when hosting a dinner in Beijing for the Chinese press on 19 August 1922. Joffe stated:

Although the Mongolian question cannot be taken out from many other questions, Russia will be most pleased to withdraw the few troops that are now there when the proper moment in the interest of the whole Chinese nation really comes. Accept my assurances that when all of us agree that the moment has come, Russia will not retain her Red Army in Mongolia even one second longer.

Joffe furthermore assured his audience: "As regards Mongolia, it is only natural that Russia herself cannot have any imperialistic aims."⁸²

But the Red Army's occupation of Outer Mongolia threatened the Soviet negotiations with China, since Beijing—which now realized that Moscow did not plan to abide by its own propaganda—insisted that an estimated 1,200 Red Army troops had to be withdrawn from Outer Mongolia prior to the beginning of official talks.⁸³ Moscow's goal was to begin talks, during which a timetable for withdrawal would be discussed, but only after the basic terms of the 1915 tripartite treaty were once again adopted. To get Beijing to accept the Soviet terms, Moscow needed Sun Yat-sen's help.

Forming a Pro-Soviet United Front

To exert public pressure on Beijing to come to terms, during August 1922, the Soviet government ordered the CCP to join the Nationalists in a United Front. After meeting with the Soviet envoy Joffe, Sun Yat-sen agreed that the Red Army did not have to withdraw from Outer Mongolia and he supported Sino-Soviet joint management of the CER, but with a Soviet majority on the board of directors. To repay Sun for his support, on 1 May 1923, Adolf Joffe sent a telegram authorizing Maring to offer

Sun Yat-sen “ideological and political” help, a loan of up to two million gold rubles, and then Soviet assistance in organizing a military unit to be trained in northwest China and provided with 8,000 Japanese rifles, 15 machine-guns, 4 Oriska guns, plus 2 armored cars.⁸⁴ After receiving these Soviet weapons, Sun Yat-sen then sent a delegation to Manchuria to convince Zhang Zuolin to allow the Soviet government to regain seven of the ten seats on the managing board of directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway.⁸⁵

When Paikes and Joffe failed to convince Beijing to adopt the terms of the former Tsarist treaties, Lev Karakhan was sent to negotiate. On 27 February 1924, Karakhan appeared to be standing firm by his former manifesto when he told the Beijing government that China could buy back the railway from the Soviet Union in exchange for continued Soviet use of the CER to transport goods from Manzhouli to Vladivostok. Until the terms of the sale were decided, however, Karakhan suggested temporary joint management of the railway with China, with a managing board composed of five Russian and five Chinese members. Karakhan further proposed that the price and the terms of the sale and return of the CER to China should be decided at a Sino-Soviet conference that would follow one month after official relations were opened.

As part of the 31 May 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty, a secret agreement was also signed that stated: “It is agreed that pending the conclusion of such new Treaties, Agreements, etcetera, all the old Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etcetera, will not be enforced.”⁸⁶ (See Treaty 14) This secret protocol was never previously published by China, but the original signed copy is included with the other treaty provisions located in Taiwan. Beijing agreed to sign this secret protocol to make sure that the former treaties were no longer active. But instead, this secret protocol tacitly recognized all of these former treaties, since it stated that they existed, but were unenforced; therefore, Beijing actually agreed that they were still valid. Simply by refusing to convene the promised conference, which Karakhan did for the next year through August 1925, the Soviet Union had time to consolidate full control over Outer Mongolia and block the sale of the CER back to China.

To out-manuever Beijing, Soviet diplomats next signed a second secret agreement with the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin to take a majority of the administrative positions on the CER. Soviet officials greatly outnumbered their Chinese counterparts, since there was a total of 120 Soviet officials to 80 Chinese officials in the railway administration.⁸⁷ A second secret protocol also clarified that the railway was under the joint control of Moscow and Mukden, not Moscow and Beijing. (See Treaty 15) This meant that all profits from running the railway theoretically went into Mukden’s pockets, not Beijing’s.

The Soviet diplomats used similar methods to ensure that Outer Mongolia would remain “autonomous” from China, since even though the Soviet Union publicly recognized that Outer Mongolia was an integral part of China, it refused to negotiate a timetable to withdraw the Red Army. During November 1924, the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) was created. In reality, it remained a Soviet puppet state, and was dominated by the Soviet Union through 1991. Once the Soviet Union had fully asserted its political, military, and economic authority over Outer Mongolia, Karakhan announced on 6 March 1925 that Moscow had decided to withdraw its troops and that the Red Army had already left Outer Mongolia. But about five hundred Soviet troops secretly remained in Outer Mongolia, and they helped train an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Mongolian troops.⁸⁸

By late 1924 and early 1925, the USSR successfully used secret diplomacy with China to renew Tsarist Russia’s spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. That the Soviet Union had no intention of returning Outer Mongolia to China’s control was confirmed by its warning to Beijing that it would intervene with troops if necessary. During a 7 May 1925 meeting between Chicherin and the Chinese consul in Moscow, Chicherin warned him that if China sent troops into Outer Mongolia, the “Mongolian people would certainly resist and the Soviet Union would not just sit by and watch but would immediately support them.”⁸⁹

This Soviet threat was completely at odds with Moscow’s public propaganda supporting China’s liberation from imperialism. The Soviet diplomatic victory also put enormous pressure on Japan to reassert its sphere of influence, since Japan’s economic interests were located mainly in southern Manchuria, immediately adjacent to the USSR’s concessions in northern Manchuria. During 1924, Tokyo agreed to carry out secret negotiations with Moscow to re-divide Manchuria into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence.

The Soviet-Japanese secret negotiations

Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations remained deadlocked through 1924. The March 1920 Nikolaievsk massacre of 600 Japanese by a detachment of Red Army troops provoked Japan’s occupation of the northern half of Sakhalin Island and indemnity claims. This contributed to the almost five-year delay in opening Soviet-Japanese relations, until Tokyo agreed to evacuate North Sakhalin in exchange for economic concessions and Moscow’s apology for the Nikolaievsk massacre. The announcement of improving Soviet-Japanese relations came as a shock to some. The Soviet-Japanese convention on 20 January 1925 even spurred the American press to talk of a new alliance between the Soviet Union and Japan.

In fact, the Bolsheviks were actively engaged in turning the major powers in Asia against the United States. When Soviet envoy Adolf Joffe arrived in China, he noted that world hegemony had been transferred from Europe to the United States, which put important questions concerning the Pacific and the Far East problems on the agenda, converting the struggle for Soviet supremacy from a “European character to a world character.”⁹⁰ If the Soviet Union sparked a conflict between the capitalist nations, it would increase opportunities to expand Soviet power into the Far East. During 1923, Karakhan publicly acknowledged that East Asia was the theater where the next international struggle would be fought. On 1 June 1924, the day after the USSR and China formally opened diplomatic relations, Soviet Foreign Minister Gregori Chicherin explained that the Pacific Ocean now had the largest share of political and economic interests in the world.⁹¹

Opening friendly relations with Japan, therefore, was a top Soviet priority. Although the Bolsheviks denounced secret diplomacy in public, on 5 May 1924, Karakhan wrote a letter to the Japanese envoy in Beijing, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, implying that Japan had asked that all negotiations be secret: “Notwithstanding the fact that Soviet Government is opposed to secret negotiations and holds that negotiations between Soviet Government and Japan should be conducted at open and formal conference, [it has] nevertheless agreed to first two points of Japanese proposal.”⁹² But Yoshizawa’s original letter, dated 22 March 1924, did not show that Japan wanted secret negotiations. On 5 May 1924, Yoshizawa vocally denied it: “as I verbally pointed out to you at our interview on the 5th, the first two of these so-called conditions were not proposed by the Japanese Government nor did I mention them as condition precedent to the negotiation.”⁹³

Although Yoshizawa agreed to Karakhan’s suggestion that all negotiations be carried out secretly, it is important to clarify that it was the USSR that was responsible for drawing Japan away from public negotiations, as advocated by the United States. It was also the Soviet Union’s increased influence within Outer Mongolia and over the CER that persuaded Japan to sign a treaty on 20 January 1925 that, among other important articles, recognized the validity of the 1905 Portsmouth Peace Treaty, plus the continued existence of the other Russo-Japanese secret treaties. By recognizing that these agreements existed, the USSR and Japan actually reaffirmed the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria. While they agreed publicly to renegotiate all of the former Russo-Japanese secret treaties from 1907–1916 at some vague future conference (that was never held), they actually recognized the terms of these treaties as still valid. This had the same end result as acknowledging the validity of these treaties. (See Treaty 16)

After World War II, the Japanese Foreign Ministry collected and published in 1951, a list of all of Japan’s pre-war treaties with various countries.

Under the heading Russia/USSR, the secret treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916 were not listed. This publication noted, however, that in 1925 the Soviet and Japanese governments agreed that all treaties “prior to Nov. 7, 1917, shall be re-examined at a conference to be subsequently held between the two governments,” but then added that “no such conference was held between Japan and the USSR nor was any measure taken by either party to revise or denounce these treaties.”⁹⁴ This document tacitly admitted that since a Soviet-Japanese conference had never denounced these earlier agreements, they remained valid.

In fact, soon after sponsoring the formation of Manchukuo in 1931–1932, Tokyo and Moscow agreed to convene a conference, and during 1935, they negotiated the terms of sale of the CER to Japan. Following the sale of the CER, a 1937 Foreign Ministry publication reprinted the 1907–1916 treaties, and the 1907 secret treaty was reprinted with substantial alterations, since a crucial section on the CER was eliminated. The presence of this alteration in 1937 confirms that the 1925 article renewing all Russo-Japanese treaties did recognize that they were once again considered valid; otherwise, the results of the 1935 CER conference could not have resulted in textual changes to the 1907 treaty.

By 1925, therefore, the USSR and Japan had not only renewed their pre-World War I spheres of influence in China, they had also renewed their 1916 anti-American alliance. American journalists noted this possibility with concern. One article in the *Oregon Journal* even warned that the 1925 convention was “tantamount to a league of the East facing an unleagued West across the Pacific.”⁹⁵ Another that appeared in the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* called this agreement the final brick in the USSR’s “Far Eastern ‘bloc’,” turning China and Japan against the United States.⁹⁶ When tensions later erupted in Manchuria in 1931, Savitri Vishwanathan concluded that as a direct result of the 1925 Convention Japan obtained the “neutrality of the USSR during the Manchurian Incident.”⁹⁷ Finally, George Lensen also discussed how odd it was that when the Soviet government proposed that the two countries sign a non-aggression pact, the “Japanese declined, stating that there was no need for a nonaggression pact.”⁹⁸ This makes perfect sense if they were referring to the secret renewal of the 1916 agreement.

The Soviet Union also hoped to draw Japan into the struggle against the world’s strongest capitalist country, the United States, a goal Lenin had enunciated soon after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. As early as 24 December 1920, Lenin had warned that the Soviet Union could not fight Japan, and so would have to accommodate her: “We cannot wage a war against Japan and must do everything in our power to avoid it, for such a war is beyond our strength.” During the same year, however, Lenin had expressed hope that Japan would soon go to war with the United States: “America and Japan are on the eve of a war and there is no possibility

of preventing this war, in which there will again be 10 million killed and 20 million mutilated.”⁹⁹

Moscow's hopes of forming a Soviet-German bloc was directed mainly against the United States and Great Britain, while Soviet-Japanese secret negotiations reveal that Moscow hoped Japan would also join this bloc. Early in 1925, right after signing its convention with Japan, Chicherin spoke confidently of Japan's coming war with the United States.¹⁰⁰ On 3 March 1925, A. I. Rykov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, declared that Japan's decision to recognize the Soviet Union undermined the United States' policy of isolating the Bolsheviks, and that it was the United States policy towards the USSR that “turns out to be isolated.”¹⁰¹ During November 1925, the Russian manager of the CER was quoted as saying that if the United States invaded Japan, Russia would intervene on the US side by building a Siberian railway to transport American troops into battle.¹⁰²

Moscow's ultimate goal was to help promote a war between the United States and Japan. This Soviet foreign policy helps explain a speech presented by Stalin during May 1925, when he announced that the Bolshevik revolution had entered a new stage between two opposing camps: “the camp of capitalism under the leadership of Anglo-American capital, and the camp of socialism under the leadership of the Soviet Union.”¹⁰³ But the Soviet government was not just focused on the Pacific. It also had territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe. In addition to its impact on East Asia, therefore, the 1925 Soviet-Japanese Convention included a secret agreement influencing Eastern European affairs by discussing the status of Bessarabia.

The Soviet-Japanese secret agreement on Bessarabia

Moscow also used its negotiations with Tokyo to influence events in Eastern Europe by signing a secret agreement on Bessarabia. On 18 August 1916, Rumania declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary in exchange for a secret agreement with the Allies that it would receive not only the largely Rumanian-populated Transylvania, but also Bucovina, at that point part of Austria-Hungary, as well as Banat, which was simultaneously claimed by Serbia.¹⁰⁴ During March 1918, the Rumanian government justified its decision to accept back Bessarabia by arguing that 70.25% of the population were Rumanians and 10.75% were Ukrainians, with the rest divided among Jews, Germans, and Turks.¹⁰⁵ Rumania's new borders were recognized by Austria in the Treaty of Saint-Germain in September 1919, by Bulgaria in the Treaty of Neuilly in November 1919, and by Hungary in the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920.¹⁰⁶ Thereafter, on 28 October 1920, Rumania signed the Treaty of Paris with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, reaffirming that Bessarabia was part of Rumania; Great Britain and Rumania ratified this agreement soon afterwards.

The sole impediment to a unified Rumania reabsorbing Bessarabia was the Bolshevik government, which harshly criticized the annexation of 17,500 square kilometers of what it claimed had formerly been Tsarist Russian territory. As a result, Soviet Russia immediately broke relations with Rumania and impounded its gold reserve in Moscow. The Soviet government then worked through Comintern propaganda to accuse the Rumanian government of “enslaving” a “great many Hungarians and Bessarabians.”¹⁰⁷ Later, the Rumanian Communists adopted a Comintern resolution that declared that Rumania was an artificial creation of Western imperialism and so refused to recognize that Bessarabia was part of Rumania.

By 1924, it was becoming clear that Rumania’s claim to Bessarabia would remain a point of international friction, since only Great Britain and Rumania had ratified the Paris Treaty. Without the additional ratification of France, Italy, and Japan, this agreement would not become internationally recognized or legally binding. In an attempt to negotiate an acceptable settlement, the League of Nations sponsored a conference in Vienna between Rumania and the Soviet Union during the spring of 1924. To exert pressure on the USSR to come to terms, the British government sent a letter to France, Italy, and Japan on 24 November 1923, asking whether these governments could see “their way to ratify the [Paris] treaty in question at an early date.”¹⁰⁸ While Japan and Italy did not comply, France did, voting for ratification on 9 April 1924.

When the Vienna conference failed to resolve this conflict, the Soviet Union also turned to Japan to try to convince Tokyo not to ratify the Paris Treaty. On 16 April 1924, Karakhan initially raised the Bessarabian question with Yoshizawa.¹⁰⁹ As mentioned above, it was the Soviet Union that proposed carrying out secret diplomacy with Japan, and when Yoshizawa agreed, Karakhan tried to convince him to sign a comprehensive secret agreement stating that the Soviet Union and Japan would not interfere with each other’s sovereignty.¹¹⁰ This draft secret protocol was worded as follows:¹¹¹

The undersigned, the Plenipotentiaries of the empire of Japan and the U.S.S.R., in proceeding to sign the Basic Agreement relative to the Establishment of Friendly Relations between the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R., hereby severally declare on behalf and in the name of the Empire of Japan and the U.S.S.R. that there exists on the part of their respective Governments no treaty or agreement of military alliance, nor any secret agreement entered into with any third party, which is calculated to infringe upon the sovereignty or territorial rights of or to menace the safety of the other.

That this draft's use of the word "sovereignty" was specifically being used to include Bessarabia was clarified in a 3 June 1924 telegram from Yoshizawa to Tokyo.¹¹²

Since the wording of this draft looked too much like a treaty of alliance, negotiations soon turned to writing a secret agreement whereby Japan would specifically promise not to ratify the 1920 Paris Treaty. This agreement went through many drafts. On 9 January 1925, less than two weeks before the formal signing of the Soviet-Japanese convention, Karakhan addressed the following confidential message to Yoshizawa: "I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge that the ratification of the said [Paris] Treaty by Japan could not be construed by my Government otherwise than an unfriendly act."¹¹³ On the same day, Yoshizawa responded in a note, also marked "confidential," stating:

I beg to inform Your Excellency in accordance with instructions from my Government that they would refrain from recommending to the throne to ratify the said Treaty so long as it is not ratified by all the European signatory Powers, as they deem it to be dealing with a purely European question.¹¹⁴

These terms remained essentially the same through the treaty signing. (See Treaty 17)

By wording the Soviet-Japanese secret agreement in such a way, Tokyo tied its own decision to Italy's. If Mussolini decided to ratify the Paris Treaty, then Japan, as the fourth and final signatory, would presumably go along. So long as Italy continued to refuse to ratify the Paris Treaty, however, then Japan was also pledged to support the Soviet Union. Although this solution did not give Moscow the concrete guarantee that it wanted, it did mean that the Paris Treaty could not become official until Italy decided to ratify it. By adopting this method, Japan threw responsibility for the Bessarabian affair back to Europe, where Great Britain and France were even then pressuring Italy to ratify the Paris Treaty over the Soviet Union's firm opposition. Meanwhile, back in China, the Soviet-funded Comintern operatives were trying to destroy the last remnants of the Open Door Policy.

The final destruction of the Open Door Policy in China

The Soviet Union's secret diplomacy with China and Japan proves that all Soviet propaganda undermining the Open Door Policy was merely a ploy to expand the USSR's influence in China. By canceling its secret treaties in public, but keeping the former unequal terms the same in private, the Bolsheviks could win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people even

while retaining the former unequal treaties intact. Because the Chinese people thought that the Soviet Union really had renounced its unequal treaties, they supported an anti-capitalist movement during 1925 called the May Thirtieth Movement demanding that the capitalist countries end all interference in China's internal affairs. This period of Chinese history was actually one of the first Soviet-backed anti-colonial conflicts, a type of conflict that has usually been associated only with the post-World War II period of the Cold War.

On 30 May 1925, students rallied outside the Louza police station in the Shanghai foreign concession to protest the accidental death of a worker.¹¹⁵ The student demonstrators in Shanghai ignited anti-foreign agitation throughout the rest of China. Demonstrations quickly spread to Guangzhou, where a strike at the British concession on Shameen Island began on 20 June 1925. A crowd composed of thousands of Chinese students, workers, and ordinary citizens marched on Shameen Island on 23 June 1925. The British claimed that gunshots from both sides killed two British citizens and an unspecified number of Chinese; one account later claimed that approximately fifty Chinese were killed and one hundred wounded.¹¹⁶

The demonstration in many ways was a Comintern-inspired diversion. Unbeknownst to the Chinese revolutionaries, at almost the exact same time, Karakhan secretly informed Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin on 21 May 1925 in Beijing that the entire CER territorial concession had to remain in the hands of the Soviet-managed railway company and that China could not send troops to the Soviet puppet state of Outer Mongolia.¹¹⁷ The demonstrations in the south helped divert attention away from the Soviet land grab in the north. A comparison between the railway's 250,000 acres and the 60-acre British concession on Shameen island shows that this Soviet concession was more than 4,000 times larger, which merely highlights the vast scale of the Soviet concessions in northern China compared to the much smaller British ones to the south.

One major difference was that Britain's concessions were public while the Soviet Union's were secret. The USSR continued to enjoy great prestige among the Chinese people, therefore, while the May Thirtieth Movement undermined the other foreigners' standing in China, since the "foreigners—representatives of Western democracies—were playing directly into the hands of Communist specialists in force, maneuver, and deceit."¹¹⁸ As a result of the Shameen massacre, a Chinese boycott of British goods continued throughout the rest of 1925. According to one estimate, Hong Kong's imports and exports fell by 60%, making British losses equal to £250,000 sterling per day. Meanwhile, the USSR took advantage of the boycott to bring its own goods directly to Guangzhou by sea, including petroleum, weapons, and even disassembled airplanes.¹¹⁹

Since the Beijing government did not publicly denounce the USSR for using secret diplomacy to retain the terms of its unequal treaties, public opinion in the United States generally supported the Chinese demonstrators.¹²⁰ For example, when US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg met with the Chinese minister in Washington on 30 June 1925, he promised that the United States would not only support returning full tariff autonomy to China, but would also eliminate all extraterritoriality rights. At China's request, the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty convened once again, and on 19 November 1925, promised to grant China full tariff autonomy. This decision actually gave Moscow preferential tariffs, since on 10 January 1926, Beijing secretly protested—to no effect—a Soviet proposal to retain lower tariffs on all border trade.

When the Washington Conference powers granted China the right to tariff autonomy, it was tantamount to pulling down the last economic pillar sustaining the Open Door Policy. During December 1925, a Hungarian Comintern official named E. Varga even announced that the final struggle between the world bourgeoisie and proletariat would soon take place under the “leadership of the United States and the Union of Socialist Republics.”¹²¹ Even the Cold War division of the world into opposing camps under the US and the USSR can be traced to these tumultuous events in China.

The Soviet Union's temporary setback in China

The Soviet Union almost succeeded in sparking a successful anti-colonial revolution in China. However, Great Britain's decision to switch official recognition from Beijing to the Nationalist government in Nanjing divided the revolutionary ranks. This switch directly threatened China's political stability, especially if all the other major powers renewed their economic and territorial spheres of influence, a situation that seemed likely following Washington's failure to ensure cooperation through mutual security. Meanwhile, since the USSR carried out all of its diplomacy in secret, the myth of Sino-Soviet equality continued to be at the core of the Cold War conflict.

Washington's attempts to guarantee China's future development through international cooperation and collective security all failed. By the middle of the 1920s, the Open Door was no longer a viable mechanism to oppose foreign expansionism, since the Chinese people demanded that this policy be ended in the vain hope of eliminating the unwanted economic imperialism that Soviet propaganda accused the Open Door Policy of supporting. If there was any moment in 20th century history when it can truly be said that the United States “lost China,” it was in late 1925–early 1926, with the destruction of the Open Door Policy. Akira Iriye has concluded

that it was Russian officials and Comintern agitators who were instrumental in tearing apart the Washington Conference's policy of protecting China's territorial integrity and bringing China gradually into the global economic order.¹²²

Between 1900 and 1928, when the Open Door Policy was largely being respected, an estimated 737,000 Chinese people died in the turmoil associated with the end of the Qing dynasty, warlordism, and the Republican governments. Although this was not a number to be ignored lightly, from 1928 to 1987, casualties increased fifty-fold, as an estimated 115,700,000 Chinese people died in the political, economic, and military turmoil that characterized not only the factional struggles between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, but that also included the Soviet Union and Japan's competition to enlarge their spheres of influence in China, not to mention Communist purges.¹²³

The Soviet goal of forcing the Great Powers to back down in China appeared to be working. Great Britain's enormous financial losses due to the ongoing Hong Kong strikes meant that it was no longer considered to be Moscow's main adversary in China. Faced with its rapidly deteriorating position, the British Foreign Office issued a statement on 30 September 1926 warning that Great Britain was prepared to defend its economic interests in China from "pirates and robbers" who, by their actions, posed an existential threat to the "lives and property of British subjects."¹²⁴

Great Britain also urged the US government to intervene in China as well. But, convinced of the moral correctness of the Chinese people's claim for equal treatment, Kellogg telegraphed the American consulate in Beijing on 29 November 1926, denying their request that American naval forces be used to protect the foreign customs house in Hankou from attack:

If that Government should desire the destruction of the Customs Administration, or if the desire of the Chinese people is to destroy the Government of China and the Customs Administration it has created, the basis of right upon which this Government may intervene in order to prevent either purpose from being accomplished is difficult to see.¹²⁵

Instead of fighting the Soviet-backed Communist-Nationalist forces, the US government agreed to dismantle the Open Door Policy, even though American intervention was intended to guarantee China's territorial integrity and sovereignty from Soviet encroachment. Kellogg's decision not to interfere was based on his belief that the Chinese people were exercising their inherent right to revolt and even overthrow their own government. Unlike the US government, however, Great Britain had no such scruples against fighting a proxy war, and its conflict with the Soviet Union intensified. One article in the British press in early 1927 denounced

the Bolsheviks for turning China into a proxy war between Soviet Russia and the British Empire: the weapons used are “the Chinese people; the scene of the conflict is China; the retaliation, the reprisal must be against China.”¹²⁶

During 1926, the Comintern in turn blamed Great Britain for fomenting war: “The English pirates are leading, in such a way, a direct war against the Chinese people and they are preparing with incredible speed a war against the USSR.”¹²⁷ The Soviet press saw these revolutionary events as the culmination not only of revolution in China, but as the beginning of the long-awaited world revolution, since the collapse of British influence in China could precipitate similar revolutions in Europe.¹²⁸ But Moscow was premature in predicting that Great Britain’s power had already collapsed in China, since in early 1927, Great Britain backed down and promised to place the British concessions under Chinese authorities, as well as to prohibit British missionaries from buying land in China.¹²⁹ These concessions largely mollified the Chinese people.

During the spring of 1927, the British evacuated their Hankou concession and negotiated its permanent return to the Nationalists, in the process breaking diplomatic relations with Beijing. Satisfied by the return of the foreign concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang, the Chinese were tempted to break their alliance with the Soviet Union. During March 1927, the foreign powers also retaliated for the unprovoked massacre of defenseless foreigners by the retreating Nationalist army; the US government’s determination not to intervene in China finally wavered, as British, American, French, Italian, and Japanese warships bombarded Nanjing on 24 March 1927. The Beijing government also turned on the Soviet diplomats: on 6 April 1927, the foreign diplomatic corps gave the Beijing municipal police permission to violate foreign treaty rights by raiding the Soviet legation. Soviet dispatches and propaganda were discovered purporting to show that the USSR was trying to undermine China’s sovereignty. Beijing immediately broke diplomatic relations with Moscow and, on 12 April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek also turned on his Soviet advisers and led a coup in Shanghai that resulted in the massacre of thousands of Chinese Communists.

By keeping all of their diplomatic negotiations secret, the Bolsheviks not only misled the Chinese revolutionaries, they also played on America’s traditional support for national self-determination to exert moral pressure on the United States to retreat. While the Soviet-supported anti-colonial revolution in China may have been defeated, the Open Door Policy was also destroyed. Rather than helping the Chinese, the destruction of the Open Door reignited the Russo-Japanese struggle to partition China. Instead of leaving China for good, the Soviet officials merely retreated into northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, which they continued to dominate as a Russian exclusive sphere of influence. Meanwhile, further to

the south, the Japanese controlled much of southern Manchuria by means of the SMR. The Soviet-Japanese competition to divide full control over Manchuria once again heated up, resulting in a Sino-Soviet border war in 1929, and eventually culminating in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

The Soviet-Japanese spheres of influence conflict over Manchuria

It was Moscow's very success in using secret diplomacy to consolidate power in Outer Mongolia and to regain majority control over the CER in Manchuria that pushed Japan into returning to the former Russo-Japanese spheres of influence. By summer 1927, the Soviet political advance into China may have been halted, but the Soviets and the Japanese continued to divide up China in secret. Because the Soviet Union had succeeded in regaining Tsarist Russia's concessions throughout China, Japan felt compelled to ignore its promises at the Washington Conference not to create spheres of influence in China. Changes in China's tariff structure also increased uncertainty for foreign investment and trade. Over time, these new, higher tariffs, resulted in an overall decrease in Chinese trade with the United States and Great Britain.

Although Soviet propaganda had supported tariff autonomy so that China could raise its tariffs, during secret negotiations the Soviet government renewed Russia's old tariff agreements, giving Russia lower tariffs for land trade than any other foreign power received. By taking advantage of its lower border tariffs, Sino-Soviet trade boomed. Between 1924 and 1930, for example, Soviet exports to China more than tripled, from 31 million rubles to 99 million rubles, while China's total trade with other nations stagnated and gradually dropped by 50% through 1934.¹³⁰

Chinese exports were also adversely impacted by ongoing Communist-inspired social turmoil resulting in civil war, as China's total share of world trade hit a record high of 2.3% during the early 1930s before dropping again; China's 2% share of world trade in 1992 had yet to match its peak in the 1930s. For example, by 1933, only 2.5% of Britain's total exports were sold in China and this number decreased even more during the rest of the 1930s.¹³¹ According to Nicholas R. Lardy, a professor of the Chinese economy at Washington University, even at China's much higher levels of total global trade, in 1993, China's share was lower than in the 1930s: "What we are seeing is a recovery."¹³²

Events in Eastern Europe were also impacted by Moscow. Due to the 1925 Soviet-Japanese secret agreement, Rumania's claim to Bessarabia remained unrecognized throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This was especially true after the Italian cabinet voted to ratify the Paris Treaty on 8 March 1927,

which put Japan in an extremely difficult position since Tokyo alone now blocked the Paris Treaty from taking effect. On 19 March 1927, Moscow threatened that if the Paris Treaty were given “legal force,” then it would perceive Tokyo’s action as “decidedly hostile.” Moscow furthermore warned:

The friendly relations now existing between the two countries, as well as the prospects of their further development and consolidation will allow public opinion in the U.S.S.R. to hope that the Japanese Government will not follow the example of the Italian Government.¹³³

On 23 March 1927, a Japanese newspaper, *The Japan Advertiser*, succinctly outlined Japan’s options:

If she ratifies it, she [Japan] offends Soviet Russia, if she withholds ratification she nullifies the action of Britain, France, and Italy. Whichever step she takes, therefore—ratification or non-ratification—she is bound to hurt the feelings of one country or another, while she herself stands to gain nothing either way; so it only remains for her to decide which of the two conflicting parties she can least afford to offend.”¹³⁴

To exert maximum pressure on Japan, the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo secretly informed the Foreign Ministry that ongoing negotiations on a Soviet-Japanese fishing treaty would surely be disrupted if Japan ratified the Paris Treaty.¹³⁵

Tokyo was right to be concerned. Japan gained nothing by ratifying the Paris Treaty, but losing these fishing rights would have been a major blow to Japan, since an estimated 20,000 Japanese fishermen were employed in Siberian waters, with an annual catch in excess of \$24,000,000.¹³⁶ The newly renegotiated 23 January 1928 Soviet-Japanese fishery agreement permitted Japanese nationals to fish in Pacific Ocean waters adjacent to the Soviet coastline. Salmon was the most important product, making up 90% of the total catch. Ratifications were exchanged in Tokyo on 23 May 1928.¹³⁷ This treaty included 37 different bays and inlets along Russia’s coast and at various river mouths, which added greatly to Japan’s fishing totals.

Meanwhile, the Soviet-Japanese economic competition in Manchuria revolved around railways, as the Soviet-managed CER slashed its freight charges and gave “secret rebates” in an attempt to put the Japanese-managed SMR out of business. During January 1928, thousands of railway cars full of grain backed up at the Ussuri docks, where the Soviet export company—Dalgostorg—raised prices and tried to force shippers to buy at a loss. One newspaper reported that Russo-Japanese competition

to export Manchurian grains and produce had always been one of long standing rivalry, but “never before has it affected the exporters so disastrously.”¹³⁸ By 1929, a Soviet-Japanese trade treaty agreed that 45% of the grain in Manchuria would be shipped by the USSR, while Japanese companies would ship 55%. This agreement may have temporarily settled their economic spheres of influence, but there were ongoing and bitter disputes over territorial control of Manchuria.

China’s failed attempts to halt Soviet-Japanese Expansion

The Nationalists tried their best to halt the Soviet-Japanese spheres of influence division of Manchuria. During May 1929, the Chinese took control of the CER by force, demanding the Soviet government sell the railway to China as it had promised to do in 1924. Tensions increased until war erupted. The Nanjing government proposed a four-point joint declaration to end hostilities that not only called for the USSR to sell the CER to China, but to choose a new manager and a new assistant manager as well. If acceptable to Moscow, Nanjing proposed that all prisoners arrested by either party during or after 1 May 1929, should then be immediately released. On 29 August 1929, the Soviet government responded to China’s proposals, formally agreeing to hold an official Sino-Soviet conference to “settle the conditions for the redemption of the C.E.R. in accordance with article 9 of the (1924) Peking Agreement.” But, instead of agreeing to appoint a new manager and assistant manager, the Soviets called for China to approve “immediately” whichever candidates the Soviet government proposed.¹³⁹

Fighting continued throughout the fall. The Soviet troops were successful, and by December 1929, the Red Army had taken the Manchurian cities of Hailar and Manzhouli.¹⁴⁰ On 22 November 1929, Tsai Yun-shen, the Diplomatic Commissar of Harbin, was given the following three Soviet conditions for ending the conflict: 1) Official consent by China to restore the CER to its position prior to the conflict on the basis of the 1924 Beijing and Mukden Agreements; 2) Immediate reinstatement of the manager and assistant manager of the CER in accordance with the 1924 Beijing and Mukden Agreements; and 3) The release of all Soviet citizens arrested in connection with the conflict.¹⁴¹ On 26 November 1929, the Mukden government accepted these conditions, prompting Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to telegraph on 29 November his expectation that Emshanov and Eismont be reinstated and that the Nanjing government transmit its “official confirmation” of this fact.¹⁴² Only after this took place, did Litvinov propose that China send a representative to meet with Mr Simanovsky at Khabarovsk to settle when and where the official Sino-Soviet conference should take place.

The Nanjing government opposed these separate negotiations with Mukden. On 3 December 1929, for example, the Nanjing foreign minister, C. T. Wang, sent a note to the Japanese chargé d'affaires accusing the Soviet Union of reverting to force to resolve the CER dispute, a clear violation of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact renouncing war. Wang described the Soviet policy as "waging undeclared but actual war on China," and then went on to describe how the Soviet "armed invasion" of Manchuria had resulted in the occupation of northern Manchuria during the middle of November.¹⁴³ Nanjing felt trapped. If they refused to negotiate, then Moscow and Mukden would simply split Manchuria between them. This forced Nanjing to back down. The resulting Sino-Soviet Khabarovsk agreement was signed on 22 December 1929, and the Great Power balance returned to the status quo ante. (See Treaty 18)

The *Japan Advertiser* claimed that in a pattern that exactly followed the 1924 Beijing and Mukden treaties, this treaty agreed that a formal Sino-Soviet conference would meet within a month after the agreement was signed and that all outstanding points would be decided within six months. This very same condition had appeared in both the Beijing and Mukden agreements five years before, and yet the most important points were still to be resolved. While the Soviet government now agreed it would pick new men to fill the posts of manager and assistant manager, Emshanov and Eismont could be appointed by the Soviet government to fill other posts on the railway. Both governments also promised to run the railway on the "principle of reciprocity and equality," to release their prisoners, not permit political activities, restore consulates and commerce, and to withdraw their troops back to their original positions along the Sino-Soviet border. Finally, a joint committee would determine losses claimed by each party.¹⁴⁴

The Khabarovsk treaty ended the conflict on Soviet terms, with Japanese newspapers describing it as enhancing "Russian prestige and influence in Manchuria."¹⁴⁵ When the final version of this treaty was announced a week later, even the pretense of fixing a six-month time limit was dropped, although the official Sino-Soviet conference was announced as being scheduled to convene in Moscow on 25 January 1930, almost the five-year anniversary of the Russo-Japanese Convention. Unlike the treaty of the week before, even the reassurance that the railway would be run as an equal joint venture was eliminated, as it specified: "Restoration of the former proportion of offices held by Soviet and Chinese citizens," including the reinstatement of "Soviet citizens, officers, chiefs and assistant chiefs of departments." Since Soviet citizens had formerly filled 70% of the top positions on the railway, this agreement merely returned to the unequal status quo. Furthermore, even though the Soviet Union had formally agreed to abolish extraterritoriality rights in 1924, the treaty reasserted that its consulates in Manchuria would enjoy full inviolability and

all privileges to which international law and custom entitled them; in other words, extraterritoriality.¹⁴⁶

Talks soon opened between Moscow and the Nationalist government in Nanjing to return the CER to China. Eight months of Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow proved fruitless, however, since China wanted to discuss only the sale of the railway, while the Soviet Union insisted that a wider agenda be accepted.¹⁴⁷ A breakthrough in the Sino-Soviet negotiations seemed imminent during June 1931, when it was reported that Soviet and Chinese diplomats had decided that China would be able to purchase the CER by allowing all Soviet goods into Manchuria duty-free. This meant that no money would actually change hands, while Soviet goods could now undersell the Japanese goods.

The Soviet Union was already getting preferential tariffs on its border trade with China. One newspaper noted the implications of this plan: "This agreement, if it is completed, will probably arouse protests from the principal trading nations, particularly Japan. But its inventors believe the formula is air-tight, and that protests will be ineffective."¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, to retain important fishing rights in Russian waters, the Japanese government decided to continue delaying ratification of the Paris Treaty. On 3 February 1931, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives, Kaju Nakamura, discussed how "Japan alone is burdened by this very great problem, and is in a serious dilemma," advising the government to ratify the Paris Treaty before the constant delays injured Japan's "international honor."¹⁴⁹ The treaty was never ratified.

But as a direct result of the Soviet action in Manchuria, the "Red Army victory compelled Japan to reorient its defenses toward Northeastern China and Soviet Russia," which meant not only that Japan "reoriented its military policy away from the United States," but more importantly meant that Manchuria "would remain the flash point of the Far East."¹⁵⁰ Instead of protesting, Japan invaded, consolidating its control during the winter of 1931–1932. It then created the puppet state of Manchukuo, with the former Manchu emperor Xuantong (Henry Puyi) as leader. Japanese forces even conducted a special operation to kidnap the last Qing emperor from his retirement in Tianjin. During August 1932, Japan formally recognized Manchukuo as an independent country, but Great Britain, most of the European countries, and the US government refused to go along. On 7 January 1932, Washington announced the Non-Recognition Doctrine, stating it would not recognize any new situation in China resulting from Japanese aggression.

Even though Japan had supported a mutual security pact at the Washington Conference, Tokyo made it quite clear that if changes in China directly threatened her economic interests, then Japan was prepared to "protect to the utmost her legitimate and important rights and interests in

China through reasonable means.”¹⁵¹ The Chinese government turned to the League of Nations for help, and a commission was sent to China to investigate. During March 1932, Lord Lytton bluntly criticized the Chinese for their role in the Manchurian affair, warning them that it is not possible for any nation to cultivate hatred and hostility toward other countries and then “expect the League of Nations to step in and save it from the consequences of that attitude.”¹⁵²

Early in the 1930s, China had no choice but to turn back to the Soviet Union for help. The resumption of relations between Moscow and Beijing during December 1932 led one American newspaper to conclude: “By her conquest of Manchuria, Japan has driven China into the arms of Russia.” It further warned:

Divided by Civil War, its central provinces in the hands of the communists, the authority of its government extending weakly only over the northern and central provinces, China is in no condition to prevent gradual spread of Russian influence until she may ultimately be dominated by Russia.¹⁵³

Concerned by Japan’s aggression in Manchuria, the Soviet government once again turned for assistance to the United States government.

The Opening of US-Soviet diplomatic relations

Japan’s very success in taking control of Manchuria once again threatened the Soviet Union’s security, and, characteristically, Moscow turned to the United States for support. Even a harsh critic of the Open Door Policy admitted that Stalin turned to Washington in desperation in 1933 to “‘give pause to those in authority’ in Tokyo.”¹⁵⁴ Washington’s goal was to inhibit further Japanese expansion in mainland Asia, which confirms that the Open Door Policy did not only benefit US economic expansion in Asia, but also benefited the Soviet Union in its territorial conflict *vis-à-vis* Japan.

Moscow’s attempt to play Washington against Tokyo largely paralleled Soviet policy during the 1918–1921 Japanese intervention in Siberia. In fact, on 13 January 1920, Trotsky had ordered Smirnov, Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, to contact the local American representative and tell him that Japan’s absorption of Siberian territories ran counter to America’s economic interests.¹⁵⁵ Trotsky’s strategy worked, since President Wilson responded to Japan’s deployment of 75,000 men to Siberia by sending a small contingent of American troops to Vladivostok in order to try to thwart Japan’s “imperialist designs.”¹⁵⁶ Wilson clearly never intended to overthrow the Soviet government.¹⁵⁷ One historian characterized America’s goals as follows: “Wilson’s justification for this policy

was his belief that it preserved the Open Door in Siberia and Manchuria, preserved Russia's territorial integrity, and aided him in establishing his League of Nations."¹⁵⁸

Moscow later admitted that Washington's role in the Siberian intervention actually halted Japanese expansionism. When Cordell Hull carried out negotiations with Foreign Minister Litvinov during 1933, negotiations that resulted in Washington's recognition of Moscow, Hull described the following results:

A statement by Litvinov waiving any claims arising out of the activities of United States military forces in Siberia subsequent to 1 January 1918, following his examination of certain documents of the years 1918 to 1921. These latter documents made clear to Litvinov that American forces had not been in Siberia to wrest territory from Russia, but to ensure the withdrawal of the Japanese, who had a far larger force in Siberia with the intent to occupy it permanently.¹⁵⁹

The USSR's 1933 decision to drop its claims against the United States was a final admission that the Bolsheviks turned to the Open Door Policy for help between 1918 and 1921.

In the end, Nanjing's strategy of trying to play the USSR and Japan off each other backfired, just as Soviet attempts to use the United States against Japan during the 1930s proved singularly ineffective at stopping Tokyo's aggression. Instead, the US government adopted a non-recognition policy that merely stated it would not recognize Japan's most recent aggression. This was a far cry from the Open Door Policy's territorial and economic protection for China. Stanley K. Hornbeck even believed that the United States had no choice but "to 'speak softly' with Japan because it did not have 'a big stick'—the US Navy was not ready to back up a strong diplomacy of confrontation with Japan."¹⁶⁰ When Tokyo was condemned for its aggression against China, the Japanese government even withdrew from the League of Nations. Japan's success in Manchuria led to yet another pre-World War II division of China into Soviet and Japanese spheres of influence. The first step was the Soviet sale of the CER to Japan.

The Sale of the CER and the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact

Although the Bolsheviks undoubtedly thought that they would profit from the destruction of the Open Door Policy during the 1920s, it was Japan that initially gained the most in the struggle to divide up China. The Soviet

Union's very success during the 1920s in undermining the Open Door Policy in China meant that the US government could now do very little to halt Japanese expansionism. After sponsoring the formation of Manchukuo in 1932, Tokyo later justified its 1937 invasion into central China as necessary to oppose Moscow's parallel efforts in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang. Throughout the rest of the 1930s, the Soviet-Japanese struggle continued unabated and, by the middle of the 1930s, Moscow and Tokyo had once again delimited their spheres of influence in China, with the Soviet Union retaining control over Outer Mongolia and Japan gaining total control over Manchuria; the USSR's sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan in 1935 helped consolidate this control. The Soviets initially demanded 250 million gold rubles, while Japan offered only 40 million. Although the negotiations stalled numerous times, Manchukuo eventually agreed to pay 140 million paper yen—approximately 112 million gold rubles—for the CER.¹⁶¹

The USSR's decision to sell the CER to Manchukuo helped consolidate Japan's control over Manchuria. According to the 1896 contract, after the first 36 years from the date of completion, the railway could be repurchased by China. This point helps explain the CER's purchase by Manchukuo, although really by Japan, in 1935. This treaty also included a secret protocol designed to keep China from claiming control over the CER. (See Treaty 18) Japan later used its control over the combined 1,782 mile-long CER and SMR to support a massive invasion of Eastern China in 1937, which Japan claimed was necessary to stop the Soviet-backed communist expansion. On 28 December 1937, Tokyo demanded Nanjing cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in the execution of their anti-Communist policy.¹⁶²

It is often overlooked that Chinese Communist support was critical to Soviet success. During the early 1920s, the CCP agreed to support the renewal of the terms of the 1915 Tsarist tripartite treaty, but only on condition that Outer Mongolia was returned to China after the success of the communist revolution.¹⁶³ On 19 August 1922, Adolf Joffe promised China that Russia would withdraw its troops when the proper moment in the interest of the whole Chinese nation arrived, and that “when all of us agree that the moment has come, Russia will not retain her Red Army in Mongolia even one second longer.”¹⁶⁴ Once the Chinese people overthrew the militarists and were able to establish a true republic, then the next priority would be to reunite China Proper, including Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and to establish them as “the United States of China, a Republic.”¹⁶⁵ The Comintern agreed to this proposal.

Mao Zedong referred to this secret arrangement in a 1936 conversation with Edgar Snow. Mao had been a member of the CCP since the first party congress in 1921, and so was aware of the resolutions passed at

the second party congress. Therefore, Mao repeated the 1922 resolution almost word for word:

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation.

In the meantime, however, Outer Mongolia was already “definitely under the Red banner,” even though China's suzerainty was still “nominally recognized, even by Russia.”¹⁶⁶

On 15 May 1943, right in the middle of World War II, the Comintern was disbanded, thereby canceling all of its many promises to the CCP. This upset Mao and the other Chinese Communists, since it turned out they had been fighting to add to the Soviet Union's territory. Many referred to this as “red imperialism.” In 1945, Stalin would defend his decision to retain full control over Outer Mongolia, citing its strategic position, since if an adversary were to attack through Mongolia and cut the Trans-Siberian Railway, the USSR would be finished.

Once Japan invaded on 7 July 1937, Nanjing had little choice but to turn yet again to Moscow for support. On 21 August 1937, the Chinese and Soviet negotiators signed a non-aggression treaty. Rather than forming an alliance, the two parties agreed that:

In the event that either of the High Contracting Parties should be subjected to aggression on the part of one or more third Powers, the other High Contracting Party obligates itself not to render assistance of any kind, either directly or indirectly, to such third Power or Powers at any time during the entire conflict, and also to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the Party subjected to aggression. (See Treaty 20)

This agreement actually left China to buffer Japanese aggression in the Far East alone. Meanwhile, Russia could focus fully on the threat from Germany. Tokyo's delaying tactics on Bessarabia in the 1930s gave Moscow the time it needed to negotiate a second secret agreement with Berlin on 23 August 1939. The Nazi-Soviet Pact's secret protocols, signed by the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, agreed that Germany would not oppose the USSR's annexation of Bessarabia. (See Treaty 21)

After May 1940, Germany's military victory over France left Rumania without support. Thereafter, when Stalin demanded on 26 June 1940 that Bessarabia and northern Bucovina be handed over to the Soviet Union, Carol II, the king of Rumania, was forced to concede.¹⁶⁷

Because the Paris Treaty was never ratified, international support for Rumania was ineffectual. Moscow held a mock plebiscite in Bessarabia to make this action official. On 4 July 1940, the Soviet government requested that Japan recognize Bessarabia as an integral part of the USSR and Tokyo quickly complied.¹⁶⁸ Bessarabia was thereafter renamed Moldavia and remained an integral part of the Soviet Union until the 1991 dissolution. The Soviet Union's efforts to block the ratification of the 1920 Paris Treaty would not have been possible without the secret agreement that it signed with Japan on 20 January 1925. As a result of this secret agreement, Bessarabia's international status remained unresolved throughout the 1920s and 1930s, until a second secret agreement with Germany gave the Soviet Union the opportunity it had been waiting for to retake Bessarabia.

Stalin thought that he had outmaneuvered Germany. Not only did he get what he wanted in Bessarabia, he pushed Germany into attacking to the west, not the east. Military clashes at Changkufeng in 1938, and then at Nomonhan in 1939, had ended in stalemate, and Tokyo and Moscow decided instead to negotiate a non-aggression treaty.¹⁶⁹ The Soviet-Japanese division of China into spheres of influence, as well as the USSR's secret agreement with Japan on Bessarabia, left Stalin free to turn to Japan once again to negotiate a neutrality pact. Japan and the Soviet Union opened negotiations during fall 1939 to determine their respective spheres of interest in Asia.

Soviet efforts to stay neutral in China

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Soviet Union rapidly expanded its sphere of influence in both the Far East and in Eastern Europe. During secret Soviet-Japanese negotiations leading up to the signing of a non-aggression pact in 1941, however, the two countries made many other important decisions not discussed in the treaty. For example, in return for the USSR recognizing the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, Japan agreed to recognize that Outer Mongolia was a Soviet puppet state. Tokyo also acknowledged all new Soviet acquisitions in Eastern Europe, such as Bessarabia. In addition to the main text, a secret protocol was attached announcing that Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo would continue negotiations on their mutual borders. (See Treaty 22)

Secret diplomacy was critical to carrying out the expansionist goals of Moscow and Tokyo. Top secret documents from the Japanese Foreign

Ministry archives in Tokyo reveal that on 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese diplomats agreed that:

The USSR will abandon its active support for Chiang [Kai-shek regime] and will repress the Chinese Communist Party's anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist Party will retain as a base the three [Chinese] northwest provinces (Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia).¹⁷⁰

The USSR further agreed not to interfere when Japan invaded Vietnam and Indonesia, while Japan would stand aside when Moscow moved into Afghanistan.¹⁷¹ Although these points were not detailed in the final treaty, they appear in the negotiating records that preceded the final Soviet-Japanese non-aggression treaty that was signed on 13 April 1941.¹⁷²

Backed with these Soviet guarantees, Tokyo authorized continued southward expansion in July 1941, and soon occupied Indochina. From this position, Japanese troops were able to make further advances into Southeast Asia, a rich source of rubber, tin, oil, quinine, lumber, and other raw materials. Most importantly, the agreement stated that for the next five years, the two parties agreed "Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." This agreement reassured Stalin that he would not have to fight a two-front war simultaneously against Germany and Japan.

Meanwhile, about half of the US Lend-Lease aid to fight Germany came in through Siberian ports, such as Vladivostok, right under Japan's nose. As late as the spring of 1944, however, the Soviet government was secretly supporting Japan, which violated its 1937 treaty with China. For example, in the Soviet-Japanese agreement of 30 March 1944, the Japanese surrendered their coal and oil concessions in northern Sakhalin, but Russia "extended for five years Japan's fishing rights off Siberia."¹⁷³ Russia's neutrality continued through early 1945, when the major Allied powers met at Yalta and Stalin negotiated better terms with Roosevelt and Churchill in return for denouncing the Soviet-Japanese pact one year early.

The Yalta Agreement's impact on Outer Mongolia and the CER

Historians have attributed Chiang Kai-shek's 14 August 1945 decision to hold a plebiscite granting Outer Mongolia full independence from China to the 11 February 1945 Yalta agreement, in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin decided: "The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved."¹⁷⁴ The Yalta agreement also gave

Russia “preeminent” rights in Manchuria. (See Treaty 23) In fact, President Roosevelt never intended to push China into granting Outer Mongolia its independence, or granting Russia sole rights over the CER. According to international law, the juridical status quo was still based on the 31 May 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty, in which Moscow publicly recognized that Outer Mongolia was an integral part of China and that the CER belonged to China. Roosevelt did not know about the 1924 secret protocol tacitly recognizing the terms of the former Tsarist treaties.

Historians have not been kind to Roosevelt. Since Outer Mongolia was widely acknowledged to be a Soviet protectorate, the Outer Mongolians’ 1946 vote for independence was later portrayed as upholding this status quo; for example, according to Adam Ulam: “The *status quo*, i.e., virtual Soviet possession of Outer Mongolia, was also to be included in the future Soviet-Chinese treaty.”¹⁷⁵ Immanuel Hsü blamed Roosevelt for weakening China: “Roosevelt did not drive a hard bargain at Yalta.”¹⁷⁶ Taiwanese historians have gone even further, criticizing Roosevelt for providing Stalin with a “powerful pretext” for encroaching on Chinese national interests.¹⁷⁷

By backing the status quo at Yalta, Roosevelt actually sought to preserve Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and in Manchuria. But he was undermined in achieving this goal by China’s own secret diplomacy, in which China’s sovereignty over Outer Mongolia was compromised by the 31 May 1924 secret protocol with the USSR recognizing the terms of the former Tsarist treaties. Although both Beijing and Moscow acknowledged that the 1915 Tsarist tripartite treaty on Outer Mongolia was suspended after 31 May 1924, the secret protocol not to enforce the 1915 treaty did not abolish it. While the distinction between “abolished” and “unenforced” may seem minor, all Moscow had to do was to keep postponing revising the 1915 agreement in order to continue occupying Outer Mongolia under the terms of the 1915 treaty terms. Until new agreements were negotiated, this secret protocol actually recognized Russia’s *de facto* control over Outer Mongolia and the CER in Manchuria.¹⁷⁸

Before the true extent of Sino-Soviet secret diplomacy during the 1920s became clear, it was commonly accepted that the status quo in Outer Mongolia was determined by the USSR’s 31 May 1924 public acknowledgment that: “The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China’s sovereignty therein.”¹⁷⁹ In addition, Moscow agreed in 1924 to withdraw its troops, sent to Outer Mongolia in 1921 to oppose White Russians, once a timetable was set at an official Sino-Soviet conference to convene one month later. However, this conference was repeatedly delayed, and during November 1924, Moscow sponsored the formation of the autonomous Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR). The timetable for withdrawing the Red Army was never even discussed at the summer 1925

Sino-Soviet conference when the USSR falsely declared that it had already removed all of its troops. Thereafter, Outer Mongolia tacitly remained a Soviet protectorate from 1925 through 1945.

Moscow had outmaneuvered Beijing by convincing the Chinese diplomats to recognize the 1915 Tsarist tripartite treaty at the same time that both countries agreed not to enforce it. When the USSR then refused to negotiate new terms, China had little choice but to accept that Outer Mongolia had regained its autonomy under the terms of the 1915 unequal treaty. In fact, Outer Mongolia remained little more than a Soviet protectorate, whose strategic importance prompted Stalin to explain on 2 July 1945, at the first Sino-Soviet meeting: “Outer Mongolia has a geographical position from where one can overthrow Soviet Union[’s] position in Far East.”¹⁸⁰ These negotiating records not only undermine the myth that Roosevelt advocated Outer Mongolian independence at Yalta, but they also provide compelling evidence that it was China’s own secret diplomacy during the 1920s that forced Chiang to recognize Outer Mongolian independence.¹⁸¹

When Roosevelt promised to uphold the status quo at Yalta, therefore, he unwittingly provided Stalin with important leverage during the secret Sino-Soviet negotiations that followed the Yalta conference. Five months later, during the June–August 1945 Sino-Soviet talks, Stalin relied on his alternative interpretation of the status quo to demand that Chiang Kai-shek recognize Outer Mongolia’s full independence from China.¹⁸² Stalin’s actions actually continued Tsarist Russia’s ongoing efforts to make Outer Mongolia’s *de facto* autonomy from China official. To consolidate this diplomatic victory, however, Stalin had to force China’s Nationalist government to recognize this new status quo, a challenge that Stalin sought to accomplish by means of the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement.

Negotiating the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty

Nationalist China went in to the Sino-Soviet negotiations knowing in advance that it would have to cut a deal with the USSR. On 2 July 1945, the very first day of Sino-Soviet talks, Soong began to negotiate just such an understanding by confiding to Stalin that the Nationalists’ real political goal was one united army and one central government. This admission then led Soong to tell Stalin that the “Kuomintang wants to be leading part in Government. Therefore does not want coalition government which may be upset when other parties withdraw.” When Stalin asked what other parties he meant, Soong replied: “To be brutally frank, no other party ... So-called democratic front: communists, national socialists, youth is only a fiction to set up in juxtaposition to central government.” Later, when Soong attempted to ascertain whether Stalin would agree to support only

the Nationalists, Stalin responded: “There is the Kuomintang. Other forces are communists. Can communists overthrow Kuomintang? If China makes alliance with Soviet Union nobody will overthrow government.”¹⁸³

The Chinese delegation hoped that Outer Mongolia would not come up. Even before Dr T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law and the Nationalist Foreign Minister, traveled to Moscow, however, one of his advisers recommended that Soong negotiate a secret agreement with Stalin to ensure that the Chinese Communists would be excluded from power in postwar China. In a letter dated 30 May 1945, Lee Wei-kuo, a member of China’s delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, suggested that Soong quickly pay a visit to Moscow, since the Soviet government

will either make a deal with the National Government, or enter into some kind of arrangement with the Communist regime in Yen-an. In the light of the friendly gesture made to you by Molotov, however, I have the feeling that Russia is now ready for a deal with us.

According to Lee, therefore, the Nationalists’ best hope of defeating the Communists was to sign a secret pact with Moscow: “If we are able to come to an understanding with Russia, we shall be able also to solve the Communist problem, at least to a large extent, but never vice versa.”¹⁸⁴

China initially backed the terms of the Yalta agreement. Soong explained to Stalin that Outer Mongolia “is not a question that can be solved now. Time will solve. Put in abeyance. We will not raise it.” Specifically, Soong explained:

We cannot tell our people that we are giving up any part of our territory. Stalin said that these are part of strategic importance against Japan. We do not raise question now. Let sleeping dog lie. If we are to recognize *status quo* in Mongolia which has many times been recognized by Soviet Union as integral part of China our position as a government will be badly shaken before our people. Stalin said he wanted to see stable united China. Surely best thing is not to create difficulty on questions which are not essential.

Later in the discussions, Soong appealed to Stalin not to force the question of Outer Mongolia’s independence from China. According to Soong, it was a matter that the Chinese people had been concerned about ever since “Sun Yat-sen brought up integrity of Chinese territory.” Therefore, it was an issue which: “We cannot present to Chinese people.”¹⁸⁵

Soong’s proposal to delay discussions over Outer Mongolia did not satisfy Stalin, however, who presented two reasons why the USSR’s

predominant position in Outer Mongolia should be confirmed by treaty: to strengthen the Soviet “strategic position against Japan,” and to justify Stalin’s decision before the Soviet people to attack Japan, an action that he claimed was particularly difficult, considering that the Japanese government had already made substantial offers to the USSR to stay out of the war. Stalin further stated:

But it will come up and give rise to frictions. We are concluding pact before, so that all reasons of conflict should be eliminated. Soviet Union recognized Outer Mongolia as a part of China. True. But lesson of war changes our views. It will be better for China and Russia if Outer Mongolia is independent with right of passage for Russian troop in case threat from Japan.

Stalin then emphasized that the Outer Mongolian question was really a question of defense, because the geographical position was so important. Since the USSR could not legally station troops on Chinese territory, it was especially important to Stalin that Russian troops be stationed in Mongolia.¹⁸⁶

Soong repeated that it was not the question of stationing Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia that worried China’s nationalist government, but the question of interfering with China’s “territorial integrity.” China’s interpretation of the term “status quo” was to leave the situation in Outer Mongolia unchanged:

I reported how important Stalin considers the question. He [Chiang Kai-shek] has given his reply. Agrees with Yalta formula signed by the Three, i.e., preserve *status quo* of Outer Mongolia. We cannot recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. Reason simple: self preservation is first law of nature. No Chinese government can last if it signs agreement amputating Outer Mongolia. But we agree to *status quo*.

Soong then cited Chinese public opinion, warning Stalin that “Chiang and his advisers” had concluded: “My Government cannot recognize independence and remain in power.” Soong then repeated that the Yalta agreement clearly called for “preservation of *status quo*,” not for China’s formal recognition of Outer Mongolia, and that Chiang Kai-shek “cannot recognize independence of Outer Mongolia.”¹⁸⁷

Unlike Soong referring to Yalta, Moscow appeared to be referring back to the 1924 secret protocol so as to interpret the term “status quo” to mean Chiang Kai-shek’s formal recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence from China. According to Molotov, leaving Outer Mongolia’s

status undetermined will “hamper and spoil the Sino-Soviet relations,” while Stalin bluntly stated: “*Status quo* is formal recognition of independence.” Stalin and Molotov furthermore insisted that the Yalta agreement had decided that China must recognize Outer Mongolia’s independence; for example, according to Stalin: “It’s our formula. They signed. I am prepared to repeat that.” Molotov then chimed in: “That’s how the matter stood. Independence was meant.”¹⁸⁸

Clearly, China did not agree to grant Outer Mongolia its independence merely because of the Yalta agreement. Averell Harriman’s later testimony confirms this important point, since Harriman explained that Soong told him during July 1945, that China “was prepared to make concessions which we [the United States government] considered went beyond the Yalta understanding.” Harriman further testified:

At no time did Soong give me any indication that he felt the Yalta understanding was a handicap in his negotiations. I repeatedly urged him not to give in to Stalin’s demands. At the same time, during this period, I had several talks with Stalin and Molotov in which I insisted that the Soviet position was not justified. This action I took on instructions from Washington. Also, on instructions, I informed Soong that the United States would consider any concessions which went beyond our interpretation of the Yalta understanding, would be made because Soong believed they would be of value in obtaining Soviet support in other directions. Soong told me that he thoroughly understood and accepted the correctness of this position.

Although he warned Soong not to try to make a separate deal with Stalin, Harriman later indicated that his advice went unheeded: “The fact is that, in spite of the position I took, Soong gave in on several points to achieve his objectives.”¹⁸⁹ In his 10 July 1945 conversation with Molotov, Soong admitted as much: “Yalta is not sacred. On Outer Mongolia it said quite a different thing. We made a sacrifice.”¹⁹⁰

Stalin tried to rationalize his position by referring to Outer Mongolia’s long-term strategic importance to the Soviet Union:

I think of future. Japan will be crushed but she will restore her might in 20, 30 years. Whole plan of our relations with China is based on this. Now our preparations in Far East in case Japan restore might is inadequate ... Therefore we want alliance. Mongolia is part of this plan. We cannot send troops to Chinese territory. ... Strange to maintain garrison in China but to maintain it in a small state is natural.

But, when Soong challenged Stalin's point, insisting that China's position on retaining Outer Mongolia was merely "self preservation," Stalin claimed that this position was "not realistic."¹⁹¹ To convince Chiang Kai-shek to accept Outer Mongolian independence, Stalin had to first agree to China's demands regarding excluding the Chinese Communists from power. These demands formed the basis of a secret Chiang-Stalin pact.

The secret Chiang-Stalin pact

Minutes from the Sino-Soviet talks show that Washington's and Moscow's definitions of *status quo* were diametrically opposed to each other. Based on the American understanding, Washington actively supported the continuation of Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. But, unbeknownst to the US government, the pressure that Stalin could exert on Chiang Kai-shek came not just from the Yalta agreement, but from the 1924 secret protocol recognizing Outer Mongolia's *de facto* autonomy from China. This situation, when added to the USSR's absolute control over Outer Mongolia and the Nationalists' military weakness, helps explain why Chiang was willing to use Outer Mongolian independence as a bargaining chip in his private negotiations with Stalin. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek granted Outer Mongolia its independence from China, plus giving majority control over the CER to Russia, in return for a Soviet concession he considered of even greater value: Stalin's promise of full Soviet support for the Nationalists against the Chinese Communists.

The USSR's greatest diplomatic victories in China after World War II resulted from its policy of playing the Nationalists and the Communists off each other. There is no better example of this policy than Chiang Kai-shek's decision to grant Outer Mongolia its independence in return for Stalin's pledge that all future Soviet aid would be given only to the Nationalists. As soon as Stalin obtained what he wanted from the Nationalists, however, he broke his promise to Chiang and threw his support behind the Chinese Communists. This tactic later led the United Nations to condemn Moscow on 1 February 1952 for violating the USSR's 1945 friendship treaty with the Nationalist government.

Faced with a deadlock over the status of Outer Mongolia, negotiations were suspended on 7 July 1945, in order to give Dr Soong time to communicate the situation to Chiang Kai-shek. Cornered by China's own secret diplomacy, Chiang reluctantly agreed.¹⁹² By 9 July 1945, Soong had received Chiang's telegraphed reply and he read the complete text of this telegram to Stalin and Molotov.¹⁹³

Chinese government now willing make greatest sacrifice
in the utmost sincerity to find fundamental solution of
Chinese/Soviet relations, removing all possible disagreement
and rankling unpleasantness so as to secure fundamental

co-operation between the two countries in order to complete the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen which was to co-operate with Soviet Russia. What is the greatest demand for China today: secure administrative integrity and territorial sovereignty and real unity in China. On this there are three items. Anxiously hoping that Soviet Government will give us concrete sympathy and assistance and give concrete and determined reply:

- 1) **Sovereignty and administrative integrity of Manchuria.** Stalin has expressed his respect of this point for which we are very grateful. For common interest of China and Russia, China is ready to afford joint use of Port Arthur. Dairen [Dalian] declared an open port for period 20 years. As to administration of Port Arthur and Dairen [Dalian] this should go to China so that China has real sovereignty and administrative integrity in Manchuria. Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway main lines to be operated jointly by Soviet Union. Profits to be divided equally. Right of the Railways should belong to China. Branch lines, other enterprises not connected with exploitation of railways not included in joint administration. Period also 20 years.
- 2) **Sin-kiang.** In the last year or so there broke out rebellion in Sin-kiang so that communication between China and Sin-kiang broken: trade and commerce cannot be maintained. We are anxious that Soviet Russia, in accordance with previous agreement, co-operate with us to eliminate trouble so that trade, communication could be resumed. Altai range: originally belonged to Sin-kiang, should continue form part of Sin-kiang.
- 3) **Chinese Government.** Because of Chinese communist administration and army, who are not united within the central government, wish Soviet Government to give to central Chinese Government alone all moral and material support. Any assistance given to China should be confined to the central government.
- 4) **Outer Mongolia.** Chinese government regards that since Outer Mongolia question is the stumbling block in Sino-Soviet relations, for common interest of Soviet Union and China and lasting peace, is ready after the defeat of Japan and acceptance of the three points by Soviet Government, to grant Outer Mongolia its independence. On this matter, in order to avoid future disputes, to go through form of plebiscite. After plebiscite Chinese Government will declare independence. As to area of Outer Mongolia should conform former area set out in our maps. Chinese Government deeply hopes Soviet Government can understand the enormous sacrifice and utmost sincerity of the Chinese Government, so as to secure two countries lasting and fundamental co-operation. Will you please communicate to Stalin without any reservation.

This telegram shows that Chiang Kai-shek agreed to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence in return for Soviet territorial guarantees on Manchuria and Xinjiang, as well as an agreement that Stalin would not support the Chinese Communists against the Kuomintang.

In the discussions that followed the reading of Chiang's telegram, Soong emphasized that it was important that Stalin side with the Nationalists against the Chinese Communists. Stalin agreed, stating:

As to communists in China we do not support and don't intend to support. We consider China has one government. If another government calls itself Government it's [a] matter for China. As regards assistance, Chiang told us to send to Central Government. We did so. If we can render help, of course it will be given to government of Chiang. We do not want to play with China. We want to deal honestly with China and allied nations.

But Stalin then restated his own interpretation that status quo meant Outer Mongolian independence in line with the 1924 protocol: "We want that this factual situation should be recognized legally."¹⁹⁴

Thereafter, in the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance, signed on 14 August 1945, Molotov included the following note:

In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the USSR agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China."¹⁹⁵ (See Treaty 24)

Although Molotov's note did not mention Outer Mongolia by name, minutes of the secret Sino-Soviet negotiations provide conclusive evidence that Moscow promised its support only after Chiang agreed to Outer Mongolia's independence.

Stalin, of course, later switched his support to the Chinese Communists. On 31 January 1952, John Sherman Cooper, the American delegate to the UN's Political Committee, accused the USSR of violating Molotov's 14 August promise:

Pledged to friendship and alliance, the Soviet Union was hostile. Pledged to assist, it refused assistance. Pledged to cooperate, it obstructed. Pledged to provide material resources, it gave none, but seized those of China. Pledged to support the legal Government of China, it gave its aid to the Communist armies.¹⁹⁶

Although the United Nations officially condemned Moscow, it had no effect. In the end, by ignoring Averell Harriman's warning not to depart from America's interpretation of the Yalta agreement, as well as by putting their faith in Stalin's empty promises, the Nationalists not only lost Outer Mongolia, they also eventually lost all of mainland China. One reason this debacle happened was Chiang's determination not to "lose face" by creating the illusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent country.

A matter of form

While Soong now acknowledged that Chiang Kai-shek was willing to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence from China, he emphasized that it was important for the Nationalists not to lose face in the process. For the sake of "form" it was necessary to carry out a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia, similar to the one in Bessarabia: "It is more convenient for Chinese Government to confront Chinese people if there is a plebiscite." T. V. Soong further explained: "Yes. After defeat of Japan go through plebiscite, then recognition. I want Stalin believe me in this: matter of substance is decided now. We can explore the form. We have no intention to evade or be tricky." This exchange clarifies that the Nationalist government knew from the very beginning that the plebiscite in Outer Mongolia could only have one outcome, the separation of Outer Mongolia from China. Soong even emphasized that the plebiscite was: "Only a matter of form. The matter is settled."¹⁹⁷

In discussions carried out the following day, Soong once again repeated that the form of the final agreement was all-important. For example, even though it was understood that the Soviet Union dominated Outer Mongolia, Soong wanted to ensure that it would technically be portrayed as an independent country. For this reason, he stressed:

It is a question of form and I am sure Soviet government will meet our views re form. Stalin said also Outer Mongolia will not join Soviet Union either. For home consumption, it would be good if Soviet Union say that after independence Soviet Union will respect its territorial integrity.

Molotov was amiable to this suggestion, although he repeated that he would prefer it if China would recognize Outer Mongolia's independence immediately, without waiting for a plebiscite. To this, Soong responded that the Soviet government did not have to worry about the results of the plebiscite: "I assure you there is no catch."¹⁹⁸

Soong's secret negotiations with Stalin prove that the Outer Mongolian plebiscite was merely for form's sake, which helps explain why China did

not dispute the results when it was later reported that 98.14% of Outer Mongolia's electorate (many of them nomadic herdsmen) voted in the hastily-arranged plebiscite, all of them for independence.¹⁹⁹ The Nationalist government thereafter officially recognized Outer Mongolia's complete independence from China on 1 January 1946. But Chiang's decision to exchange Outer Mongolian independence for Stalin's promise of support was risky, since news of this decision might actually push Chinese public opinion towards the Communists. Soong later expressed his surprise: "Chiang made concession on Outer Mongolia which I did not dare believe he would."²⁰⁰

Although Outer Mongolia has always been portrayed by the USSR and China as a separate country, the minutes of the Sino-Soviet negotiations indicate that this portrayal was merely a means to protect China's national honor; in other words, a way to save China from "losing face." Not only did Outer Mongolia apparently not have any voice in the ongoing Sino-Soviet negotiations over its independence—for example, there was no Mongolian representative present at the meetings—but the minutes quote Stalin as joking: "In our letter we will respect independence and territorial integrity so that you don't think that we will annex (he laughs)," to which Soong responded: "You don't need to, you are on such good terms."²⁰¹ Negotiations over the future status of the CER, plus control of the port facilities at Port Arthur and Dalian, would prove to be equally contentious.

The USSR's pre-eminent position in Manchuria

At Yalta, Stalin had convinced Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to grant the USSR a "pre-eminent" position in Manchuria, emphasizing Russia's control over the CER and SMR that traversed the region and to the naval base at Port Arthur. A term similar to "pre-eminent" had also appeared in the Lansing-Ishi notes in 1917, and, like that document, was widely understood to mean at Yalta "in regard to other powers, not to China." During Sino-Soviet talks held in July–August 1945, however, Stalin claimed that this also meant greater power than China. Stalin demanded Port Arthur become a Soviet concession area for thirty years, and in times of war the USSR would also administer the nearby civilian port of Dalian.²⁰²

The resulting 14 August 1945 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty put the USSR in a position to dominate most of Manchuria's littoral, including sea control over much of the Bo Hai Gulf and the Yellow Sea. The USSR, upon entering the war against Japan during August 1945, quickly consolidated its gains in Manchuria, militarizing Port Arthur and the nearby civilian port at Dalian. Beginning in August 1945, the Soviet Navy also helped

move Communists into Manchuria by land and sea. With Soviet assistance, tens of thousands of Communist troops entered southern Manchuria by ship from Shandong, where Communist forces were reportedly also being supplied by Soviet ships from Dalian.²⁰³ Once in Manchuria, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) used the Soviet-controlled railways to move quickly into the major cities.

As early as November 1945, Chinese Nationalist officials told Foreign Secretary Bevin that Soviet sea control over Manchuria's ports was a key problem, even complaining that the Russian refusal to allow them to use Dalian meant there would be considerable difficulty carrying out a total occupation of Manchuria.²⁰⁴ By November 1948, the Nationalists had concluded that "the most fundamental factor in the general deterioration of the military situation [in Manchuria] was the nonobservance by the Soviet Union of the [August 1945] Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance."²⁰⁵ But Moscow stood firm behind the treaty terms: "This port for reasons independent of the Soviet Union has still not been opened for trade and navigation of all countries."²⁰⁶

This adverse situation also directly impacted the US decision not to intervene in the Chinese Civil War. Since the Nationalists could not access Manchuria by sea, this meant that the Nationalist military forces in Manchuria were almost completely surrounded by the USSR or Soviet allies: to the west by Outer Mongolia, to the north by the USSR, to the east by North Korea, and to the southeast by the Soviet-controlled Liaodong Peninsula. The lack of sea access left Nationalist troops with only a single train line from Beijing to Manchuria, which could be easily cut. American ships attempting to transport Nationalist troops to Manchuria were repeatedly denied permission to offload troops in Dalian. The lack of maritime access severely limited the amount of assistance that US naval forces could provide to the Nationalists.²⁰⁷

To fight the Communists effectively would have required a joint land-sea campaign by Nationalist forces, aided by the US Navy landing troops at Dalian. However, on 3 January 1947 and again on 14 August 1947, the US State Department fruitlessly protested to Moscow that although nearly two years had passed since Japan's surrender, Dalian had not been reopened to world trade.²⁰⁸ According to a 13 May 1947 report by H. Merrell Benninghoff, Consul General at Dalian, Soviet forces were in complete control of Port Arthur and Dalian and this was unlikely to change:

The Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty have given Russia a strong position in the railroad, port, civil administration and exercise of police power even in [Dalian] as long as 'war with Japan' exists. This position is tantamount to extraterritoriality in the Naval Base Area. ... In any event, as long as Russia keeps a large garrison in the Area, controls the local

administration and prevents the entry of Chinese troops or the effective exercise by China of police power, Chinese sovereignty within the Area will be purely nominal.²⁰⁹

Without access to Manchuria's ports, the US Navy could not fully leverage its maritime power. This was one of the most important reasons militating against American intervention in the Chinese Civil War. In addition to allowing the Chinese Communists to use Soviet port and railway concessions to spread throughout Manchuria, Soviet troops also made available many weapons from Japanese arms dumps. Due mainly to Soviet control of all rail transportation, therefore, by fall of 1945, the Communist armies, equipped from Japanese stockpiles and assisted by the Soviets, had already moved with "surprising ease" into the cities of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin, as well into many smaller cities.²¹⁰ When the Soviet Red Army began to withdraw from Manchuria during spring 1946, the Communists were left in control of many important cities. This strategic advantage, however, would have been untenable without the maritime protection afforded by the USSR's sea control off the coast of Manchuria: a secret protocol gave the USSR control over offshore islands, allowing the Soviet Navy to blockade access to Port Arthur and Dalian more easily.

Soviet sea control in the Manchurian littorals

Soviet sea control of the Manchurian coastline meant that the Nationalist Navy could not land troops in Manchuria. It also made US naval intervention too costly to be desirable either militarily or politically. By 1947, Chang's secret diplomacy had largely backfired, since Soviet control over the Manchurian ports of Port Arthur and Dalian foiled all of the Nationalist efforts to consolidate power in Manchuria. The Soviet government claimed that without a signed peace treaty with Japan, Dalian fell under the military administration of the Port Arthur naval base and Moscow "sees no basis for a change of the regime."²¹¹ The Nationalist government in Nanjing angrily denounced the Soviet Union's interpretation of the Sino-Soviet treaty, stating that Dalian should fall under Port Arthur "only in event of war against Japan not as TASS [Russian News Agency] alleges until a signature of peace treaty with Japan."²¹²

Most importantly, a secret protocol attached to the treaty specified the territory under Soviet control and stated:

All the islands situated in the waters adjoining the west side of the area on Liaotung Peninsula established by the Agreement, and south of the line passing through the points 39°00' North latitude, 120°49' East longitude; 39°20' North latitude, 121°31' East longitude, and beyond in a general northeasterly direction along the axis of the

fairway leading to port Pulantien to the initial point on land, are included in the area of the naval base.

A separate article added:

All the islands situated within the waters adjoining the eastern part of the area on Liaotung Peninsula and south of the line passing from the terminal point on land in an easterly direction towards the point 39°20' North latitude, 123°08' East longitude, and farther southeast through the point 39°00' North latitude, 123°16' East longitude, are included in the area.

That this secret protocol was not shown to the US government is confirmed by visiting the papers of John F. Melby, US representative to the Nationalists, held in the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, which has a copy of the Sino-Soviet Treaty minus this critical protocol.²¹³ What this secret protocol meant was that the US Navy could not safely access Manchuria's littoral waters, which prevented American intervention.

Both the Nationalists and the US government protested Russia's actions. On 29 August 1947, TASS published a Soviet communiqué specifically citing Article 4 of the Sino-Soviet Agreement: in accordance with that agreement, Dalian

during the existence of a state of war with Japan falls under the regime which has been set up in the Naval base of Port Arthur. Inasmuch as the state of war with Japan is not terminated because there is as yet no peace treaty with Japan, naturally, the regime of the naval base continues to prevail.²¹⁴

Meanwhile, Soviet ships were free to enter Dalian, and used this important port to deliver much-needed armaments, oil, and other supplies to their Communist allies.

The Chinese Nationalists argued these provisions were originally conceived as two allies taking precautions against the possible re-emergence of a militarized Japan and "not as means of fostering aggressive competition between them."²¹⁵ When the Nationalist Navy tried to use the alternate port of Newchwang, the Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom told Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin how the USSR was able to foil this plan:

When, however, the Chinese troops were already on the way, the Russians withdrew from Newchwang, which was thereupon occupied by [Chinese Communist] guerilla forces and the Russian authorities had notified the Chinese Government that they could not guarantee a safe arrival for the Chinese [Nationalist] troops.²¹⁶

Thus, by either denying Nationalist ships direct access, or by allowing selected ports to fall into Communist hands, the Soviets could effectively stop Nationalist troops landing at the most strategic areas in Manchuria. During fall 1947, a British observer in China, A. L. Scott, wrote:

The Soviet Government will not permit Chinese troops to enter [Dalian], and the Chinese Government say they [the Nationalists] cannot take over the administration of the port until that is conceded. Chinese occupation of [Dalian] would much strengthen their [the Nationalist's] position in Manchuria and this is not likely to be welcome to the Soviet Government ... the situation is therefore at a deadlock.²¹⁷

As Chiang himself pointed out to British officials during May 1947, the Soviet position on Dalian was completely “dis-ingenuous.”²¹⁸ Soviet secret diplomacy was also used to retain the former borders negotiated with Japan.

Determining the Sino-Soviet border

By early August 1945, only one major issue was left unresolved, a detailed agreement as to where exactly the Sino-Mongolian boundary ran. With Japan's surrender imminent, it was important to Chiang Kai-shek that the agreement on Outer Mongolia be announced soon, so that the Chinese people could be convinced that China's loss of Outer Mongolia was a necessity of war. But on 11 July 1945, Soong had expressed his concern that the joint Sino-Soviet declaration on Outer Mongolia should not mention the border, since there were still many disagreements about the disposition of the boundary line. Stalin agreed, suggesting that they retain the border's “*status quo*,” but Soong retorted: “These is dispute about *status quo*.”²¹⁹

Negotiations were broken off after 12 July 1945, so that Stalin and Molotov could attend the conference at Potsdam, but talks resumed once again on 7 August. During this almost four-week break, Soong had the opportunity to travel back to Chongqing to consult personally with Chiang Kai-shek. After returning from China, he presented two maps to Stalin, one Russian and one Chinese, which outlined the Sino-Mongolian border. T. V. Soong insisted: “We must recognize something and settle boundary so as to avoid friction.” But, on 10 August, Stalin disputed the maps that Soong had presented: “Re frontiers Chinese map is not well founded. Existing frontiers should be recognized.”²²⁰

Stalin stuck to this proposal because the existing borders actually included extensive Manchurian territories that Tokyo had ceded to Moscow during Outer Mongolia-Manchukuo border negotiations in the 1930s. Stalin clearly hoped to retain the largest amount of Chinese territory possible.

The Chinese delegation, on the other hand, pleaded with Stalin to draw a clear border between Outer Mongolia and China, even suggesting that the two countries use a Chinese college atlas as their guide.

Negotiations were also under a tight time limit, and Soong was especially anxious to complete an agreement before the war ended:

- Soong:* Anxious to agree before surrender. After we will have more difficulties with our people. Eight years of war. People will say why do you make such concessions.
- Stalin:* People will understand and will like an alliance with USSR.
- Soong:* Yes, but we have made many concessions, Outer Mongolia, etc.
- Stalin:* Outer Mongolia was lost any way – [We] declared war on Japan.
- Soong:* Almost one half of China.
- Stalin:* It is a desert.
- Soong:* Does not look so on map.
- Stalin:* Smallest piece of land of Kwangtung is twenty times more valuable.
- Soong:* Schoolchildren look at map and see size of Outer Mongolia.

But Stalin likewise insisted that the current borders, which had been partly set by the Soviets and Japanese, be respected:

Frontiers existing for 26 years was established without any disputes with China. Our topographers went there and drew on map a line which separated Chinese and Mongolian guards. That's west and south. Re east there were disputes with Japanese. Then there was an agreement concluded. If we re-examine, it will take time, certain pieces will be taken, others given. Your Russian map is not valid.

After an intense debate, the Chinese delegation insisted again that all they wanted was “clarity,” and: “We want to know where the line is.” But Stalin was determined not to discuss the border, pointing out that China had never challenged the border before, to which Soong replied: “We always considered Outer Mongolia as Chinese and there was no need to challenge.”²²¹

Stalin was aided enormously by the fact that all Sino-Soviet negotiations had to end quickly, since once Japan surrendered, it would be more difficult to convince the Chinese people that these concessions were necessary. On 13 August 1945, Soong finally backed down, therefore, and resolved the issue of borders in a haphazard fashion: “Chiang wanted [to] agree on boundaries first, but Stalin said it would take too much time. So Chiang accepts existing boundaries. That question is therefore excluded from questions to be settled.”²²²

With Soong's concession on Sino-Mongolian borders, the Sino-Soviet secret negotiations on Outer Mongolian independence were complete. Not only did Stalin gain China's official recognition of the USSR's long-standing stranglehold over Outer Mongolia, but the expanded borders, which the Soviets had formerly negotiated with Japan during the 1930s, remained unchanged. This territorial victory undoubtedly helped Stalin in his negotiations with Harry Truman over the exact limits of the Soviet occupation of Japan, prompting Stalin to demand that Soviet troops be allowed to occupy "all" of the Kurile islands plus the northern half of the island of Hokkaido. In order to stop Stalin from doing so, Truman ceded to Stalin temporary occupation authority over the southernmost islands of the Kurile chain.

Negotiating the fate of the Kuriles at Yalta

Historians have criticized Roosevelt for ceding all the Kurile Islands to Stalin at Yalta. Through a lengthy series of negotiations and agreements—including the Cairo Declaration, the Tehran Conference, and the Yalta Agreement—the Soviet Union wove a diplomatic web that allowed the Russians to occupy the islands. According to the State Department's interpretation, Roosevelt's signature at Yalta did not really cede any territory to the USSR, but merely granted American acceptance of Stalin's wish to negotiate directly with Japan for the transfer of the Kurile Islands. Although this distinction may appear slight, by extension, Washington believed that until the transfer of the Kurile Islands was made official by a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, all such disputed territory technically remained Japanese property. In reality, only at the very last moment in late August 1945 did Stalin convince Truman to add the word "all" before "Kuriles" in revised editions of General Order No. 1. (See Treaty 25) Stalin's determination to make this change, plus his apparent satisfaction once Truman agreed to go along with him, suggests that this was a new concession that went far beyond Yalta.

The Kurile chain consists of 36 islands stretching from the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula to the northeastern edge of Hokkaido Island.²²³ The two most southern of these—Kunashiri and Etorofu (or in Russian: Kunashir and Iturup)—were traditionally thought by the Japanese to be part of Hokkaido Island. Since the 18th century, both Japan and Russia have laid claim to the Kurile Islands. Through a series of 19th century Russo-Japanese treaties, the Kuriles fell under the ownership of Japan. In the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and the Treaty of St Petersburg (1875), Japan handed over her interests in Sakhalin Island to Russia in return for total control of the Kurile Islands. These treaties effectively settled the dispute for the next 30 years. Following the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, the

5 September 1905 Portsmouth Peace Treaty helped set the stage for the future Soviet-Japanese territorial conflict following World War II, since Japan not only retained the Kuriles, but also regained sovereignty over the southern half of Sakhalin. This established a new balance of power in northeast Asia, which remained in Japan's favor until World War II.

With the opening of Soviet-American negotiations for Soviet entry into the Pacific War, the 19th century dispute over the Kurile Islands re-emerged. The October 1943 Cairo Conference, which the USSR did not attend, first raised the question of postwar territorial acquisitions. On 27 November 1943, the Allies issued the following declaration:

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that ... Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.²²⁴

It has been argued that at the later Tehran Conference, President Roosevelt was persuaded that the Kurile chain had been awarded to Japan in 1905, following the Russo-Japanese War, rather than by peaceful negotiations in 1875, and that therefore he was receptive to Stalin's claim that to fortify the USSR's national defense, both the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should become part of the Soviet Union.²²⁵

Upon returning to Washington, Roosevelt informed the Pacific War Council of Stalin's desires. Prior to the Yalta Conference, special committees within the State Department prepared detailed memoranda concerning both the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Professor George H. Blakeslee of Clark University made three recommendations on the Kuriles: (1) the southern Kuriles should be retained by Japan subject to the principles of disarmament to be applied to the entire Japanese Empire; (2) the northern and central Kuriles should be placed under the projected international organization which should designate the Soviet Union as administering authority; and (3) in any case, the retention by Japan of fishing rights in the waters of the northern group should be given consideration.²²⁶

This memorandum was not included in the Yalta Briefing Book, however, and Roosevelt reportedly went to Yalta with his prior misconception unchanged.²²⁷ On 11 February 1945, at the second day of meetings, Roosevelt held a closed session with Stalin and quickly concluded the fate of the Kuriles. The resulting agreement, signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, appeared to support the USSR's claim to the entire island chain. It stated that "the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that ... the Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union."²²⁸ But it is significant that the

Yalta agreement did not specify that “all” of the Kurile Islands would go to the USSR. This important point was left vague, perhaps because Roosevelt intended that the USSR negotiate a new Kurile treaty with Japan to decide this very question. In the absence of any such Soviet-Japanese agreement, however, Washington insisted that these disputed islands remained Japanese.

Even though the Yalta agreement did not specify which islands were included in the Kurile chain, almost without exception Roosevelt has been blamed by scholars for granting Stalin all of the Kuriles. For example, John Stephan described Roosevelt’s action as “a grievous error for which Japan paid dearly,” and suggested that it could be due to the president’s “simple ignorance and indifference.”²²⁹ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa commented that “it is surprising how easily Roosevelt agreed to Stalin’s demands.”²³⁰ Joachim Glaubitz concluded: “Carelessness is too lenient a word to describe Roosevelt’s unquestioning acceptance of the Soviet claims ... to the four islands at the south end of the archipelago.”²³¹ Gilbert Rozman attributed Roosevelt’s mistakes to his “bad health,” and so in “a hurry to conclude the negotiations,” he “swallowed Stalin’s demand for territory belonging to Japan.”²³² Meanwhile, David Rees concluded that granting the Kuriles to the USSR “may well have been the most significant clause of the Agreement Regarding Japan,” because it “partly legitimized the complete Soviet occupation of the archipelago.”²³³ As recently as 2006, Russian brochures arguing “undisputed ownership” over the Kuriles pointed to Yalta as proof.²³⁴ These conclusions overlooked the importance of General Order No. 1 on the Soviet occupation of the Kuriles.

Negotiating General Order No. 1

Western scholars have condemned Yalta for ceding the Kuriles to Russia. The State Department’s interpretation of the Yalta agreement undermines all such criticisms, however, because while the United States agreed that the USSR and Japan could discuss the transfer of the Kuriles, Washington denied that it had the authority to authorize such a transfer. This interpretation first became apparent after 15 August 1945, when Truman issued General Order No. 1 detailing the surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces. In this order, Truman did not specify to whom Japanese troops on the Kurile Islands would surrender, but mentioned only Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin: “The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude and Karafuto [Sakhalin] shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.”²³⁵

The next day, Stalin sent Truman an urgent message reminding him that according to Yalta “all the Kurile Islands” must be included in the

region of surrender to Soviet troops. But, Stalin also made a new demand that was never decided at Yalta:

To include in the region of surrender of the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops the northern part of the island of Hokkaido ... on the line leading from the city of Kushiro on the eastern coast of the island to the city Rumoe on the western coast of the island, including the named cities into the northern half of the island.

Although Stalin called this demand “modest,” he warned that “Russian public opinion would be seriously offended if the Russian troops would not have an occupation region in some part of the Japanese proper territory.”²³⁶

Because this claim went far beyond Yalta, Truman refused to consider Stalin’s new demand that the Red Army should occupy northern Hokkaido. But Truman did agree to allow a revised General Order No. 1 to state that Soviet troops could occupy the Kurile Islands: “The Senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude, Karafuto [Sakhalin] and the Kurile Islands shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.”²³⁷

But this revised General Order No. 1, issued on 19 August 1945, still did not satisfy Stalin. On 22 August, Stalin informed Truman that: “I and my colleagues did not expect ... you [to] refuse to satisfy the request of the Soviet Union for the inclusion of the Northern part of the Island Hokkaido.” In a final attempt to placate Stalin, therefore, Truman agreed to revise General Order No. 1 for the third time. In its final form, this order read: “The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude, Karafuto, and all of the Kurile Islands shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.”²³⁸

Truman undoubtedly hoped that by adding the word “all,” he could dissuade Stalin from insisting on occupying northern Hokkaido. But his one-word revision was destined to have enormous consequences, since, based on the final wording of General Order No. 1, Stalin now claimed that the two southernmost islands in the Kurile Island chain—Kunashiri and Etorofu—had also been ceded to Russia, even though the Yalta agreement did not actually specify that these islands were part of the Kuriles. Soviet troops occupied Etorofu on 29 August 1945 and Kunashiri on 1 September 1945. While Truman’s change makes it appear that he ceded all of the Kurile Islands to Stalin, it is important to emphasize that General Order No. 1 merely discussed the occupation of Japanese territory, not its permanent cession. What Truman did, therefore, was to grant Stalin’s 16 August request to allow Soviet forces to occupy Japanese proper territory.

Truman drew the line between Hokkaido and the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu, however, and he refused to allow Soviet troops to occupy territory on the main Japanese islands. On 27 August, Truman made it absolutely clear to Stalin that Soviet troops occupied the Kuriles only temporarily and that they were not yet Soviet property. Truman concisely summarized the State Department's interpretation of the Yalta agreement when he informed Stalin,

You evidently misunderstood my message [about the Kurile Islands]. ... I was not speaking about any territory of the Soviet Republic. I was speaking of the Kurile Islands, Japanese territory, disposition of which must be made at a peace settlement. I was advised that my predecessor agreed to support in the peace settlement the Soviet acquisition of those islands.²³⁹

Whereas all previous Soviet-American correspondence had been vague as to the actual status of the Kurile Islands, Truman's 27 August letter reconfirms that General Order No. 1 did not hand over all the Kurile Islands to the USSR, but merely granted Soviet forces the right to occupy Kunashiri and Etorofu temporarily, pending a peace treaty. Truman's statement also disproves Soviet claims that they already held full sovereignty over the Kuriles. Only an official agreement between the USSR and Japan could transfer this sovereignty. Prior to the completion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty transferring the Kuriles to the USSR, therefore, Washington concluded that the islands remained Japanese territory. Control over this strategic territory, however, when added to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, assisted Soviet intervention in the Chinese Civil War.

Soviet intervention in the Chinese Civil War

After 1945, the USSR fully fortified Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and the Kuriles, and furthermore administered Manchuria's premier ports plus littoral waters, as well as the extensive railway networks that linked them with the interior. Proclaiming that the 1945 treaty forbade use of these ports for military purposes, Moscow continued to refuse to allow Nationalist ships landing rights. In addition to the port of Dalian itself, the USSR soon declared the nearby Nanshan Island part of an exclusion zone patrolled by Soviet forces. To make the Soviet military position in Dalian and Port Arthur unassailable, by the end of 1946, the hills surrounding Port Arthur were reportedly "completely covered" with anti-aircraft guns and searchlights, while anywhere from 30,000–45,000 troops were stationed at the base.²⁴⁰ Russians and Chinese Communists closely guarded the railway link to central Manchuria, and had orders to shoot anyone within three miles of the track.²⁴¹ Thus, the USSR actively intervened in the Chinese

Civil War. Its control over Manchuria's ports and railways, when added to command of the sea, helped tip the military balance in Manchuria in favor of the Communists.

Sea power played an important role. To patrol the surrounding waters, the USSR also deployed at the neighboring Port Arthur naval base four destroyers, eighty-three PT boats, and nine landing ships of various sizes, manned by 3,000 sailors and some 2,000 marines.²⁴² More than ten Soviet submarines were also present. In addition to carrying out gunnery practice, the "warships and submarines leave Port Arthur periodically for two or three day maneuvers on the high seas."²⁴³ An estimated 70,000 Soviet troops were stationed throughout the area. They also oversaw 135,000 Japanese POWs assigned to build coastal defense works, including tunnels and an airfield between Dalian and Port Arthur which is "large enough for heavy bombers."²⁴⁴

This Soviet assistance helped protect Manchuria for the CCP, foiling all Nationalist attempts to access the ports by force. During April 1947, the Soviet Ambassador went so far as to intimate verbally to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that a landing of Chinese troops at Dalian "would be resisted." Since any Nationalist strategy to take Dalian by force would necessarily "involve joint land and naval action," the Soviet threat to defend this area risked a wider war.²⁴⁵ To show their determination, 20,000 additional Chinese Communist troops were stationed in the area around Dalian. They were described as "completely supplied with Japanese weapons" while "some of their middle grade officers are Russian."²⁴⁶ One US War Department report even estimated that if the Soviets left, the CCP had been given enough Japanese ammunition to last "for five years."²⁴⁷

Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists during the Civil War took many forms, and sea denial was just one of them. But these maritime factors proved to be extremely important to the Communist victory in Manchuria. Soviet sea denial protected the Communists by stopping not only the Nationalist Navy, but also its ally the US Navy from intervening. In short, the failure of the Chinese Nationalist Government to take over Port Arthur and Dalian was due to two factors: 1) The refusal of the Soviet government to agree to the stationing of Nationalist troops in Port Arthur and Dalian; and 2) the Chinese Communist concentration of armed forces in the vicinity of Port Arthur and Dalian to hinder the takeover of these regions by the Nationalist government. The existence of Communist armed forces in these ports resulted from Moscow's refusal in October 1945 to let Chinese troops land in Dalian.²⁴⁸ But in August 1948, British officials were already reporting that Russian officials in Dalian had begun to exclude not just Nationalist forces from the port facilities, but also "the armed forces of the Chinese Communists."²⁴⁹ Clearly, the Soviet

government intended to keep these territorial concessions for itself, and did not intend to share them with their Chinese Communists allies.

Only on 21 September 1949, long after the CCP victory in Manchuria, did Mao first proclaim the need to build a Communist Navy, largely in reaction to the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan.²⁵⁰ In the early 1950s, Stalin's success in retaining control of Dalian and Port Arthur over Beijing's heated opposition exacerbated political tensions. After Stalin's death, the final Soviet forces evacuated the Manchurian ports only during May 1955, some 31 years after the signing of the 31 May 1924 treaty that was supposed to result in the return of these Tsarist-era concessions to China, as per the terms of the 1919 Karakhan Manifesto.

The friction these examples of Soviet "red imperialism" created with China should not be underestimated. During a face-to-face meeting with Mao in 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, in what proved to be a vain attempt to convince Mao of the value of retaining the floundering Sino-Soviet alliance, even reminded Mao that the Chinese Communists might not have come to power without this sea denial strategy: "On the issue of Port Arthur ... it was advantageous for you that the Soviet Army was in Port Arthur and Manchuria."²⁵¹ But such a statement, even if true, did not negate the anger created by the Soviet land grab. Such behavior on the part of the Soviet Union merely confirms the importance of secret diplomacy to the beginning of the Cold War.

Soviet secret diplomacy and the beginning of the Cold War

Scholars who have concluded that the Cold War originated only after the end of World War II have generally not considered the Soviet Union's secret diplomacy in the Far East and in Eastern Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, this secret diplomacy is an important backdrop explaining the postwar victories by the USSR, including taking important territorial bridgeheads in Bessarabia, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and the Kurile Islands. In particular, the 1941 Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact in the Far East remained valid up until the last few days of the war, until 8 August 1945, when Stalin betrayed Japan. But Stalin needed the support of the Allies to secure his territorial gains in both Eastern Europe and in the Far East. Stalin then turned again to secret diplomacy to obtain his objectives.

Meanwhile, the United States sorely needed Russia to help defeat Germany and Japan. During January 1945, the American deputy director of the Office of European Affairs, John D. Hickerson, even recommended that the United States agree to the Soviet Union's re-incorporation of Bessarabia in order to convince Stalin to declare war on Japan.²⁵² Since the 1925 secret agreement with Japan was no longer necessary, Stalin agreed to turn on his former ally. Only 13 days after the Yalta Conference,

the Soviet Union ordered the elected Rumanian government to resign and forced Rumania to accept a pro-communist government instead.²⁵³ This hand-picked Rumanian government then acquiesced to the Soviet Union's annexation of Bessarabia.

Stalin carried out similarly devious tactics in China. For example, it was widely believed that the Soviet government had already given up its unequal treaties in China. To match Moscow, on 11 January 1943, the United States and Great Britain completely eliminated all of their remaining extraterritorial rights and special privileges in China. But during the same year, Chiang Kai-shek for the first time confirmed that "the Sino-Soviet Agreement concluded [in 1924] on the basis of equality was not fully carried out."²⁵⁴ Meanwhile, during 1944 the USSR completely absorbed Tannu Tuva, which it had split away from Outer Mongolia in 1921. Only in 1945 did Russia achieve its ultimate goal, when Stalin's secret negotiations with Chiang resulted in China's recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence. After World War II, the Soviet government did not, in fact, renegotiate its unequal treaties with China, but instead used secret diplomacy to help the Chinese Communists overthrow the Nationalists.

Sino-Soviet negotiating records from 1945 are especially important because they prove that the Soviet government relied on secret diplomacy to fulfill Russia's long-term goal of separating Outer Mongolia from China, and to secure a foothold in Manchuria. Few American scholars understood the deep divisions that existed between Moscow and Beijing, because the secret agreements were never published. More importantly, the Chinese government had never exposed the Soviet Union's duplicity during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1949, the myth of Sino-Soviet equality was so strong that it was taken for granted that the new Sino-Soviet bloc would continue. Thus, it was the myth of Sino-Soviet equality that was also largely responsible for creating such enormous fear of the Sino-Soviet monolith. This then led one eminent historian, writing in 1950, to conclude: "While all the nuances in the Soviet-Chinese partnership should be borne in mind, they afford no grounds for believing that Soviet-Chinese unity as it developed in this period was likely to be a superficial and transient phenomenon."²⁵⁵

It was this conviction that the Sino-Soviet alliance was a permanent fixture that helped determine many of the Cold War policies adopted by the United States government and its allies during the 1950s and 1960s. During the height of the Cold War, it was belief in the myth of Sino-Soviet equality that may have influenced the United States government's actions in Korea and Vietnam, and that actively undermined early suggestions that the United States government should support Sino-American rapprochement. But, in fact, as became apparent almost immediately, Sino-Soviet antagonism was strong. The USSR's failure to reopen border negotiations

and return Outer Mongolia to the PRC after they signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty on 14 February 1950 led to serious Chinese recriminations, as well as to a series of border disputes with China during the 1950s and the 1960s.²⁵⁶ According to Zhou Enlai, the real date of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty should have been 15 February, but Stalin predated it to 14 February to imply that Beijing agreed with the Yalta decision concerning Outer Mongolia, which of course it did not.

While the Chinese wanted Soviet specialists to come to China to aid its development, their 22 March 1950 draft of a secret agreement did not grant Soviet citizens special rights including extraterritoriality (see Treaty 26). The final secret treaty almost certainly granted this privilege. Mao later pressed Khrushchev to eliminate extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity, but the Soviet government used its own definition of “socialist internationalism” to justify the expansion of this privilege to include all Soviet citizens in China. Between 1950–1960, the USSR sent over 10,000 advisers, all of whom enjoyed some form of extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity. This treatment, in combination with Chinese diplomatic isolation from the West, meant that the privileges enjoyed by Soviet specialists were far more comprehensive than had been the case during the age of Western imperialism. Moscow retained these privileges until the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, when it withdrew its last 1,390 advisers.

An additional agreement that included the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalian was also signed at this time, in which Russia agreed to return them to China by 1952. While the railways were transferred to China on 31 December 1952, the port cities remained under Soviet control through the spring of 1955, when the naval facilities at Port Arthur were returned to China in the midst of fanfare and daily Chinese press coverage. According to the *Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué on the Withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces from Port Arthur*, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw all Soviet forces from Port Arthur by 31 May 1955, and also agreed to transfer all installations in the area of the Port Arthur naval base to the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

Even after numerous border conflicts and obvious diplomatic tension between the USSR and the PRC during the late 1950s and early 1960s, western scholars generally refused to go back, re-examine old material, and re-evaluate old assumptions; one noted scholar even warned: “Western hopes to exploit such strains tend to overlook the fact that the camp is bound together by a combination of power and ideology, and one cannot promote a heresy within a church to which one does not belong.”²⁵⁷ But a long list of border disputes remained unresolved. Zhou Enlai later explained that in January 1957, he had unsuccessfully asked Khrushchev to discuss territorial problems: “I could not get a satisfactory answer from him then, but the announcement of the issue was kept secret because the

Sino-Soviet dispute was not public at that time.”²⁵⁸ In an interview during 1964, Mao openly criticized Moscow: “[T]he Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed the country under its domination.”²⁵⁹

Once it became clear that the Soviet Union was unwilling to open talks on Outer Mongolia, the PRC attempted to act alone. In 1960, for example, Zhou Enlai carried out talks with Yurii Tsedenbal, the leader of the Mongolian People’s Republic. One historian has indicated that Zhou’s “goal seemed to be separation of the MPR from the Soviet Union rather than a cooperative three-way deal.” In response, the Soviet Union consolidated its position in Outer Mongolia even more, to the point where: “By the 1970s the Soviet Union had in effect enclosed the MPR completely within its own defense system and extended the de-facto strategic border of the USSR southward to the border between the MPR and China.”²⁶⁰

Outer Mongolia had been, in effect, a Soviet puppet state since the 1920s. The USSR’s failure to uphold its 1920s compact with the CCP merely deepened the distrust that already existed between the two nations, distrust that eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. From its position in Outer Mongolia, Soviet troops were only a one-day drive from Beijing. Diplomatic relations remained tense throughout the rest of the Cold War, including the Sino-Soviet border war in 1969, which reportedly almost went nuclear. In this regard, the signing of the 31 May 1924 secret protocol perhaps even explains why, as late as May 1991, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh publicly admitted that 10% of the Sino-Soviet border was still in dispute. The long-term implications of Moscow’s secret diplomacy to expand its sphere of influence has also seriously impacted Russo-Japanese relations.

The northeast territory dispute

In addition to its strategic position in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, Soviet expansion in the Far East depended on controlling the Kurile islands. Geographically, the Kurile Island chain is a natural gateway for greater Russian trade and communications with Japan. Strategically, control of these islands effectively cuts off the Sea of Okhotsk from outsiders. For these reasons, both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union had both coveted complete sovereignty over this island chain. Soviet troops did not stop at Kunashiri and Etorofu, but during September 1945 occupied the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island. Although there was no historical precedent for its claim, Moscow insisted that both the Habomais and Shikotan were part of the Kurile Islands. On 20 September, Moscow unilaterally declared that all the Kuriles, including the Habomais and Shikotan, were now Soviet territory. The final step in this process was the inclusion on 25 February 1947

of the Kuriles in the Soviet Constitution as an “integral component of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.”²⁶¹

Instead of resolving the Kurile Islands controversy, these Soviet actions perpetuated it, making this dispute an important source of friction at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and the Soviet-Japanese Peace negotiations that followed. Prior to the conference, the United States and Japan decided to place Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands under a “trusteeship with the United States as administering authority.”²⁶² Washington undoubtedly hoped that the USSR would do the same with the Kuriles, but Moscow instead continued to claim full sovereignty not only over the Kuriles, but also over the Habomais and Shikotan. During March 1951, Washington acknowledged neither Soviet nor Japanese claims to the Kuriles, but stated that its official position concerning the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island was that they were not part of the Kurile chain.

The final Japanese peace treaty was signed by 49 countries, including Japan. The USSR, however, withdrew from the conference after failing to block the proceedings. Nevertheless, Article II(c) of the treaty appeared to conform to the Yalta agreement by stating that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 Sept. 1905.”²⁶³ But the State Department later clarified that “the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... are properly a part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them.”²⁶⁴ An agreement between the United States and Great Britain specified that territorial rights would not be granted to nations that did not sign the San Francisco peace treaty. Therefore, the Kuriles were not formally recognized as Soviet territory. Until the USSR and Japan resolved the Kurile dispute, “these territories [would] remain in a state of international limbo.”²⁶⁵

On 12 September 1954, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov called for normalization of relations with Japan. According to the 12 September 1954 edition of *Pravda*, Moscow’s only precondition was an expression of willingness from the Japanese. In December 1954, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama responded by announcing that a central goal of his administration would be normalization of ties with the USSR. During June 1955, Soviet-Japanese talks opened in London. Tokyo notified its negotiators that the minimum territorial requirement for a settlement was the unconditional return of the Habomais and Shikotan as integral parts of Japanese territory. Although the negotiators were also to ask for the southern Kuriles for “historic reasons,” their return was not essential to the settlement.

Washington issued an aide-memoire that effectively restated its official position that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri—along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, which are part of Hokkaido—had always

been considered part of Japan proper. This was a restatement of the State Department's position on the Kuriles in effect since 1945. Once the misunderstanding between Japan and the United States was laid to rest, Tokyo announced its willingness to accept an Adenauer-type formula for an interim agreement with Moscow. Signed in October, the 1956 Joint Declaration terminated the state of war between the two countries and called for continued negotiations toward the conclusion of an official peace treaty. In the absence of a formal Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, however, and with the Soviet renunciation of the 1956 Joint Declaration, the two nations remained legally in a state of war, thus ensuring that the "northern territories" would remain occupied indefinitely by, first, Soviet troops, and currently, Russian troops, under the authority of General Order No. 1. All these symbols of Soviet "red imperialism" came into play when President Richard Nixon decided to open diplomatic relations with China.

Richard Nixon's success at flipping China

While Soviet secret diplomacy allowed Moscow to put pressure on Beijing to yield to its demands, it also gave an opening for the US government, and later Japan, to begin talks with China leading to the opening of official diplomatic relations. Following the 1969 border conflicts, China secretly contacted Washington to say it wanted to open diplomatic relations with the United States, and then later with Japan. In 1971, Henry Kissinger made the first of what would become six secret trips to Beijing in order to prepare for Nixon's historic visit the next year to meet with Mao Zedong.

Rather than just remain neutral, discussion focused on active cooperation against Moscow. For example, on 9 July 1971, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai talked about cooperating against the real threat, the USSR:

PM Chou: I understand. There is another super-power.

Dr. Kissinger: Here? To the North? PM Chou: Yes. We don't believe that super-power will be able to control the world. It will also be defeated as it stretches out its hand so far. You are feeling difficulties now, and they too will also feel difficulties. They are just following after you. Dr. Kissinger: With all respect, I think they triggered us, they caused our actions. Even today their constant probing makes it very hard to have a real settlement with them.²⁶⁶

As an immediate concession to Beijing, the US embargo on strategic goods, which had been adopted on 8 December 1950, was finally terminated on 10 June 1971.²⁶⁷ The PRC also wanted to reunify with Taiwan, but during February 1971, Washington publicly reiterated that America's commitment to Taiwan's defense remained unchanged. US Navy ships still

visited Taiwanese ports, and combined exercises between the US Navy and Nationalist ships continued to be conducted throughout the 1970s. Intermittent patrols were still being conducted by the Taiwan Patrol Force, but the new “Commander US Taiwan Patrol Force is largely a planning function” whose job was to plan and provide “designated forces as the Naval Component Commander of the Taiwan Defense Command, in the event that wide ranging hostilities break out between the Communist and Nationalist Chinese.”²⁶⁸ Ceding Taiwan was not part of the deal.

Richard Nixon’s visit to China resulted in a rapid change in US foreign policy toward Taiwan. During Sino-US meetings from 21–28 February 1972, the US acknowledged that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. This led to the PRC obtaining Taiwan’s seat at the United Nations. Nixon next visited Moscow, where he warned General Secretary Brezhnev that attacking China would adversely affect US interests. Prior to President Nixon’s visit to China, Kissinger was even told that the United States had “a major role to play in shaping the future rivalry between the two giants of the Communist world.”²⁶⁹

China’s “geopolitical interests” included “the central question of how to contain the influence of the Soviet Union in the region.”²⁷⁰ For example, Mao Zedong bitterly complained to Kissinger about Russia’s land grabs after World War II, including in Outer Mongolia and over the Kuriles. (See Figure 0.2) There were also valid concerns that if the USSR established a naval base in Vietnam, as it later did at Cam Ranh Bay in 1979, this might block China’s access to the Malacca Strait. While in China, therefore, Nixon signed the *Shanghai Communiqué*, backing China against the USSR, by agreeing that it would be against global interests for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

Chairman Mao: It could be said that they didn't fire a single shot and yet they were able to grab so many places (Prime Minister Chou chuckles). They grabbed the People's Republic of Mongolia. They grabbed half of Sinkiang. It was called a sphere of influence. And Manchuko, on the northeast, was also called their sphere of influence.

Dr. Kissinger: And they took all the industry out of it.

Chairman Mao: Yes. And they grabbed also the islands of Sakhalin and the Kuriles Island. (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou discuss among themselves.) Sakhalin is the southern part of the Kuriles Island. I will look it up in the dictionary to see what its Chinese translation is.


Figure 0.2 Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong discuss Soviet secret diplomacy

Source: 17 February 1973, Henry A. Kissinger, NSC Papers, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Box 98

As a result of these talks, between January 1972 and February 1973, the US government promised Beijing to use its resources to “neutralize Soviet threats and deter threats against PRC,” “oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to engage in any aggressive action against China,” and in any US-Soviet meetings, Washington would not “discuss its relations with the PRC without the PRC’s knowledge or approval.” Regarding Taiwan, the US government agreed not to “support any Taiwan independence movement,” it said it would remove two-thirds of its troops on Taiwan “as the problem in Southeast Asia is resolved,” and the final one-third of US troops would be removed “as progress is made on the peaceful resolution of the problem.”²⁷¹ As for the use of nuclear weapons, Washington promised Beijing that it “Will never make secret arrangement. PRC will be informed. Anything will be public.”²⁷²

During November 1973, Secretary of State Kissinger and Chairman Mao also agreed to cooperate to hold in place as many Soviet troops as possible. (See Figure 0.3) This agreement implied that the United States would help China reform its military. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the US and Chinese militaries began to cooperate actively against the USSR. Increased military and naval cooperation enabled China and the US to encircle the USSR on the east and the west, forcing higher rates of Soviet militarization than its woefully inefficient economy could support.

During secret talks between Kissinger and Mao Zedong in January 1973, the parallels of the US being bogged down in Vietnam were compared to China’s serious border problems with the USSR. Mao even asked Kissinger if the United States would back the Soviet Union against China: “Because since in being bogged down in Vietnam you met so many



retary: That will not happen. I agree with the Chairman that if Europe and Japan and the U.S. hold together -- and we are doing in the Middle East what the Chairman discussed with me last time -- then the danger of an attack on China will be very low.

Mao: We are also holding down a portion of their troops which is favorable to you in Europe and the Middle East. For instance, they have troops stationed in Outer Mongolia, and that had not happened as late as Krushchev's time. At that time they had still not stationed troops in Outer Mongolia, because the Chienpao Island incident occurred after Krushchev. It occurred in Brezhnev's time.

Figure 0.3 Kissinger and Mao agree to hold in place as many Soviet troops as possible, November 1973

Source: 12 November 1973, Henry A. Kissinger, NSC Papers, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Box 100

difficulties, do you think they [the Soviets] would feel good if they were bogged down in China?" To this, Kissinger responded: "Mr. Chairman, it is really very important that we understand each other's motives. We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China."²⁷³ This was, in effect, a non-aggression pact between the United States and China. (See Figure 0.4)

With Jimmy Carter's and Deng Xiaoping's 1 January 1979 mutual recognition, in the document entitled *Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, 16 December 1978*, the US's 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan was unilaterally terminated. This elicited an angry Nationalist statement on 2 January 1979.²⁷⁴ The USS *Midway* was the last US Navy aircraft carrier to visit Taiwan as part of the BLUESKY combined exercise on 18 November 1978, less than six weeks before the US officially recognized the PRC.²⁷⁵ Meanwhile, combined Shark Hunt exercises between US and Taiwanese naval vessels also continued through November 1978. However, all future combined exercises between the US Navy and the Nationalist Navy were cancelled, marking 1 January 1979 as the termination date of the Taiwan Patrol Force.²⁷⁶ After this point, the US government and the PRC secretly cooperated to undermine and destroy the Soviet Union, ultimately resulting in the end of the Cold War.




Figure 0.4 Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong discuss cooperation against the USSR, 17 February 1973

Source: 17 February 1973, Henry A. Kissinger, NSC Papers, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Box 98

Secret diplomacy and the Cold War

One can only speculate how the United States government's reaction to the creation of the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1949 might have differed if the secret treaties determining Sino-Soviet relations during the 1920s had been known. One recognized historian of the Cold War, William Taubman, has concluded that the "Cold War proper" did not start until 1949, following the success of the Chinese communist revolution.²⁷⁷ Without the myth of Sino-Soviet equality, which was only possible because the diplomatic records were all kept secret, many scholars and foreign policy specialists might have had a very different impression of the USSR's relations with China.

Formerly closed archives located in Russia, China, Taiwan, and Japan, not to mention relevant documentation located in the United States, have gradually revealed this secret diplomacy. These documents have clarified just how far Soviet propaganda differed from Soviet reality. As David Dallin stated as early as 1960:

The methods of Soviet penetration of Outer Mongolia [during the 1920s] and the technique applied are the more remarkable in that they represent the first instance of extension of Soviet control over a neighboring non-Russian area. All the slogans and devices employed two decades later in other parts of the Eurasian continent were present in this first experiment.²⁷⁸

Barrington Moore Jr had even earlier concluded that the Bolsheviks' tactics in China during the 1920s "foreshadowed their policy in Europe after World War II, nearly a quarter of a century later."²⁷⁹ The simple fact that the secret diplomacy that the USSR used in China occurred at the same time as similar methods used in Bessarabia, and then throughout Eastern Europe after World War II, indicates that many of the diplomatic characteristics that later became associated with the Cold War in Europe were already in play in China during the 1920s. Secret diplomacy was at the heart of this struggle.

Knowledge of these secret treaties also conforms exactly to the USSR's own definition of the Cold War, as published in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, describing the Cold War as including the

formation of a system of military and political alliances ... the establishment of an extensive network of military bases ... the use of force, the threat of force ... the application of economic pressure ... increased subversive activity on the part of the intelligence services ... the encouragement of putsches and coups d'état ... propaganda and ideologically diversionary activities ... and the attempt to obstruct the establishment and implementation of political, economic, and cultural ties among states.²⁸⁰

These secret treaties furthermore prove that the Cold War was a Soviet creation that was consciously and systematically developed in the Far East during the 1920s. Scholars who posit the beginning of the Cold War only after the end of World War II, therefore, are overlooking the USSR's secret diplomacy in the Far East and Eastern Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet territorial gains due to secret diplomacy were enormous. As a result of the 1945 secret diplomacy leading to Outer Mongolian independence, the USSR acquired an estimated 600,000 square miles of territory from China. It also took extensive territory claimed by Japan, including the southern Kurile Islands, which are still disputed to this day. This diplomatic victory rivaled the heyday of Tsarist Russia's 19th century territorial expansion, when China ceded approximately 665,000 square miles of territory to Russia.²⁸¹ Not including Outer Mongolia, the amount of territory secured by Russia was approximately five times the area of Japan and more than seven times that of Great Britain; including Outer Mongolia, this territory exceeded that of India and was more than one-third the size of the United States.²⁸² Stalin also used his secret diplomacy with Japan and Germany to secure strategic territory in Eastern Europe.

Finally, Soviet secret diplomacy leading up to Outer Mongolia's separation from China used methods similar to the Tsarist diplomats, taking *de facto* control of Outer Mongolia during 1921–1925, and only 20 years later signing an official treaty with China in 1945 to legitimize this fact. Furthermore, this Soviet diplomatic victory was made possible only by resorting to secret diplomacy, a return to the same tactics that Tsarist Russia had employed so successfully almost a century before. The secret diplomacy that Moscow used to separate Outer Mongolia from China shows that the Cold War was, in many ways, simply a continuation of the great power geopolitical struggles which had existed prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917.

During 1950, the Chinese intellectual and diplomat, Hu Shih, the Nationalist government's ambassador to the United States during the 1940s, pointed to these historical parallels when he wrote in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* that the USSR's postwar victories in Eastern Europe and Asia were simply one more episode in the long history of Russian expansionism. As such, it was "no more and no less than a strategy of naked militarism aided from time to time by the most unscrupulous use of all possible forms of trickery and deceit." Hu Shih attributed Stalin's enormous success in China mainly to secret diplomacy: "What seems to differentiate China from the seemingly much easier conquests in Central Europe and Eastern Europe had been the much greater complexity and difficulty of the conquest, which made it necessary for Stalin to resort to the most cunning forms of secret diplomacy in order to overcome the resistance that Nationalist China had been able to summon for over two decades." An essential part of this secret

diplomacy was the Yalta agreement, where Stalin was responsible for “deliberately deceiving and blackmailing Roosevelt,” a transgression that Hu Shih condemned: “History will not forgive the man who played such deliberate tricks on the generous idealism of a great humanitarian.”²⁸³

Hu Shih was not the only person to paint Soviet expansionism on a broader canvas. In a memorandum written by Maxwell Hamilton and Nelson T. Johnson on 16 February 1950, these two State Department Far Eastern experts also warned:

The record of the facts in relations between Russia and China makes clear the persistent efforts of the Czarist Russian Government and the Communist Russian Government to expand at the expense of China and neighboring countries. The formulas used in Russian formal documents throughout this period bear striking similarities and show that, no matter what the words, the effort persists.

With regard to Outer Mongolia, Hamilton and Johnson concluded that since 1912, Russia had been attempting to take possession of Outer Mongolia and that the “1945 and 1950 alliances between China and Russia fulfill the Russian objective of detaching Outer Mongolia.”²⁸⁴

Bolshevik propaganda had already announced as early as 1917–1918 that its goal was global supremacy between the capitalist and the socialist camps. This came decades prior to the end of World War II. Stalin promised to uphold the Yalta Conference’s “Declaration on Liberated Europe,” which guaranteed that open elections would be held in the Eastern European countries under his control, but only 13 days after the Yalta Conference ended, the Soviet Union ordered the elected Rumanian government to resign and forced Rumania to accept a pro-communist government instead.²⁸⁵ This hand-picked Rumanian government then acquiesced to the Soviet Union’s annexation of Bessarabia.

Following the end of World War II, the Soviet government also did not renegotiate its unequal treaties with China. Because the Chinese government never exposed the Soviet Union’s duplicity during the 1920s and 1930s, by 1949, the myth of Sino-Soviet equality was so strong that it was taken for granted that the new Sino-Soviet bloc would continue. It was the myth of Sino-Soviet equality, more than anything else, which was responsible for creating such enormous fear of the Sino-Soviet monolith. Reputable scholars even warned that Soviet-Chinese unity was not likely to be “transient.”²⁸⁶ It was this conviction that the Sino-Soviet alliance was a permanent fixture of the Cold War that helped determine many of the military policies adopted by the United States government and her allies during the 1950s and 1960s. The Cold War was, in short, a huge mistake.

During the height of the Cold War, the myth of Sino-Soviet equality continued to support the United States government's actions in Korea and Vietnam, and actively undermined early suggestions that the United States government should support a Sino-American rapprochement. Even after numerous border conflicts and obvious diplomatic tension between the USSR and the PRC during the late 1950s, Western scholars generally refused to reevaluate old assumptions; one noted scholar even warned that, while Sino-Soviet conflicts might occur repeatedly and may force readjustments, such readjustments would most likely take place within the "framework of the camp." Western hopes of exploiting such strains were tempered by warnings that it would be impossible to impact the Sino-Soviet alliance from the outside.²⁸⁷ The misguided belief in the myth of Sino-Soviet equality delayed rapprochement between the United States and China until President Richard Nixon decided to break the impasse.

Secret diplomacy was at the heart of the USSR's international expansion. An evaluation of the USSR's arsenal of methods to add Outer Mongolia, Bessarabia, and the Kuriles to the Communist bloc suggests that the Cold War was not a phenomenon that first appeared in Europe. The geopolitical framework of the Cold War in postwar Asia can be traced back to the four secret treaties signed by Russia in Japan in 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916, and to their subsequent renewal and alterations by the USSR and Japan in 1925 and 1935, and with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact in 1941. For this reason, an exposition of the USSR's secret diplomacy following the 1917 October Revolution will help our understanding of the still murky events leading up to both the Pacific War during the late 1930s, and to the Cold War struggle in Europe, and particularly over East Asia, during the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and beyond.

Notes

- 1 Some well-known examples include Victor A. Yakhontoff, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1931), 139; Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 63–64; Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), Vol. II, 54; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 568; Edmond O. Clubb, *China and Russia, the "Great Game"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 210; Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 254; James E. Sheridan, *China in Disintegration The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 142; Roberta Allbert Dayer, *Bankers and Diplomats in China 1917–1925 The Anglo-American Relationship* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 183; Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 515; Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 307. Two books have qualified this myth, but have not destroyed it altogether: Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (New York: Columbia University

- Press, 1954), 251; Sow-theng Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1926* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976), 176.
- 2 C. Martin Wilbur, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920–1927*. (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
 - 3 Examples of books from the diplomatic group include Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), and Sow-theng Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1926* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976). Examples of the propaganda group include books by Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China* (New York: Norton, 1958) and Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).
 - 4 Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814–1914* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), 293.
 - 5 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Nerchinsk#/media/File:Treaty_of_Nerchinsk_\(1689\).jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Nerchinsk#/media/File:Treaty_of_Nerchinsk_(1689).jpg).
 - 6 http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/hist/eia/documents_archive/nerchinsk.php.
 - 7 [https://la.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kyakhta_\(1727\)](https://la.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kyakhta_(1727)).
 - 8 V. S. Myasnikov (Ed.), *Russko-kitayskiye dogovorno-pravovyye akty, (1689–1916)*, Moscow 2004, Doc. No. 5, 43–44; cited in http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-970f6940-b5fe-4339-8787-803427e0de6b/c/michal_wanner_35-49.pdf
 - 9 Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism, The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).
 - 10 Yang Lien-shang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in John King Fairbank, ed., *On The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 33.
 - 11 R. K. I. Quested, *Sino-Russian Relations A Short History* (Sydney, Australia: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 7.
 - 12 Sarah C. M. Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
 - 13 Thomas Wiltam Atkinson, *Travels in the Regions of the Upper and Lower Amoor and the Russian Acquisitions on the Confines of India and China* (New York: Harper, 1860), 335; quoted in Paine, 153.
 - 14 Paine, *Imperial Rivals*, 91.
 - 15 Thomas Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 1911–1921* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1980), 19.
 - 16 “Britain’s Duty in the Far East,” *The Daily Graphic*, 5 November 1895.
 - 17 “The Lands and Land Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and the Incident of August 1, 1923.” Foreign Ministry Archives, Taiwan, known as *Waijiao Dangan* (WJDA below), 03-32, 263, 4.
 - 18 Chi-ming Hou, *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840–1937* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 65.
 - 19 Ralph William Huenemann, “The Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics of Railroads in China, 1876–1937” (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 1982), 111.
 - 20 Irwin Jay Schulman, “China’s Response to Imperialism, 1895–1900” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1967), 298.
 - 21 Paul S. Reinsch, *Secret Diplomacy How Far Can It Be Eliminated?* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922), 119–120, 195.
 - 22 Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 358–359.

- 23 Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper, 1967), 10; from Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la Démocratie en Amérique* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005).
- 24 Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 16; citing Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), 699.
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- 239 27 August 1945 letter from Truman to Stalin (declassified on 21 August 1986), W. Averell Harriman collection, Library of Congress; *FRUS*, 1945, vol. 6. The published document is an early draft from 25 August 1945, although the main points appear to be the same.
- 240 "Extract from WSFE 39 dated 20 January 1947," British National Archives, WO 208 4737.
- 241 "U.S.S.R. Russian Activities in Manchuria," 23 April 1946, British National Archives, WO 208 4737.
- 242 "Russian Activities in the Port Arthur-Dairen Area," Strategic Services Unit, US War Department, 9 August 1946, British National Archive, WO 208 4737.
- 243 Ibid., 17 June 1946.
- 244 "U.S.S.R. Russian Activities in Manchuria," 23 April 1946, British National Archives, WO 208 4737.
- 245 Telegram from Nanking to Foreign Office, 16 April 1947, British National Archives, FO 371 63333.
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- 249 Letter from British Embassy in Nanking to Foreign Office, 13 August 1948, British National Archives, WO 208 4571.
- 250 An electronic search through Mao’s collected writings for references to maritime affairs indicates that he completely overlooked the need to form a Chinese Communist navy prior to his 21 September 1949 speech, entitled “The Chinese People Have Stood Up!” www.marx2mao.org/Mao/Mao_Search.html.
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- 253 Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians The Yalta Conference* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), 275.
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- 255 Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East*, 258; although this book was published in 1953, the author explains in the preface that it was written during 1950.
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- 257 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 370.
- 258 “An Interview with Zhou Enlai,” 1 August 1964, Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Studies, 7, 1965), 45.
- 259 “Mao’s Statement to the Japanese Socialist Delegation,” 11 August 1964. Ibid., 43.
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- 261 Stephan, *Kuril Islands*, 166–170.
- 262 23 October 1950 meeting of the “Group on Japanese Peace Treaty Problems,” John Foster Dulles Collection, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University Library.
- 263 United States, Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952, HI*, Part 3 (Washington, DC: 1952), 3172.
- 264 United States, Department of State, *Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific* (Washington, DC: 1952), 9.
- 265 Rees, “Soviet Border Problems,” 23.
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- 267 Robert B. Semple, Jr., “President Ends 21-Year Embargo on Peking Trade,” *The New York Times*, 11 June 1971.
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- 269 “Mao Tse-tung and the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” 7 December 1971, Classified Memorandum from Richard H. Solomon to Henry Kissinger, National Security Council—Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Box 91.

- 270 Lo Chi-kin, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands* (London: Routledge, 1989), 189.
- 271 Kissinger's discussion with Mao Zedong, NSC-HAK files, 17 February 1973, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Box 98.
- 272 Ibid.
- 273 Ibid.
- 274 "Document 33: ROC Statement on US Termination of Mutual Defense Treaty, January 2, 1979," Chiu, 264–265.
- 275 "Taiwan Strait: 21 July 1995 to 23 March 1996," www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan_strait.htm; *Turner Joy* may have been one of the last USN ships to transit the Taiwan Strait, see *USS Turner Joy (DD-951)*, www.hullnumber.com/DD-951.
- 276 Although the US-ROC treaty officially ended on 1 January 1980, all US-ROC exercises ended on 1 January 1979. Edward Marolda has stated: "I completely agree with the 1979 date . . . even if patrols were infrequent during the 1970s, we still had a treaty obligation to defend the island." E-mail exchange, 12 December 2010.
- 277 William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy From Entente to Détente to Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 9.
- 278 Alexander Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 189.
- 279 Barrington Moore Jr, *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 211.
- 280 *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (New York, 1978), Vol. 28, 203; A Translation of the Third Edition of the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (New York: Macmillan, 1978).
- 281 Alan J. Day, ed., *Border and Territorial Disputes*, Keesings Reference Publication (Detroit, MI: Gale Research Co., 1982), 259–261.
- 282 *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol.10, 34; vol.18, 864; vol.9, 276; vol.18, 905.
- 283 Hu Shih "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1950, 11–40; Hu Shih's opinion is particularly important because after acting as the Nationalists' Ambassador to the United States from 1945–1949, he was appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1949, but never actually assumed office because of the Nationalists' defeat. Either one of these positions would have allowed Hu Shih access to, or at least a general understanding of, the Soviet Union's secret diplomacy with China.
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- 285 Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians The Yalta Conference*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), 275.
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3 June 1896—Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance

Throughout the 19th century, Russian expansion in the Far East revolved around finding ways to increase its influence in China. Japan's victory in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) gave Russia the opportunity it was looking for. A major breakthrough took place in 1896, when Russian diplomats bribed Qing government officials to permit the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. This treaty was signed in Moscow on 3 June 1896 by the Russian Foreign Minister Alexey Lobanov-Rostovskii and the Chinese Viceroy Li Hongzhang. It is variously called the Li-Lobanov Treaty or the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896. Its contents were first published in 1922 (See Figure 1.1a, 1.1b, and 1.1c)

The proposed railway was the largest foreign territorial concession in China. When the Chinese Eastern Railway was completed at the turn of the century, it accounted for over half of all railway mileage in all of China. As simply one point of comparison, Great Britain's 22 mile railway from Canton to Kowloon represented only 1% of the foreign-run railways in China, while France's 289 mile railway in Yunnan province accounted for just over 12%, as did Germany's railway in Shandong. On 6 July 1898, a second agreement allowed a branch line, called the Southern Manchurian Branch, to be built to connect with the port cities of Dalian and Port Arthur (Lüshun).

Prior to the construction of a modern road system and the growth of commercial airlines, railways were undeniably one of the most important components of China's internal transportation and commercial network. This was especially true in Manchuria, where river navigation into the interior was cut off every winter by ice. Both in terms of foreign-owned railway mileage and China's total railway mileage, therefore, the Chinese Eastern




Figure 1.1a 3 June 1896 Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance, as supplied by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow




Figure 1.1b (Continued)




Figure 1.1c (Continued)

Railway was arguably the most important foreign concession in China. While the 1896 Treaty originally said that the railway would be handed over to the Chinese government in 15 years, this was later changed to 60 years. In 1924, when negotiating a secret agreement with Zhang Zuolin (see Treaty 15), it was set at 30 years or, in other words, by the year 1954 (or 1956 if the original treaty is used). While the South Manchurian Railway was handed over in 1952, Soviet troops remained in Port Arthur (Lüshun) through 1955, finally withdrawing on 31 May 1955, the 31st anniversary of the signing of the 31 May 1924 Treaty. However, at least one source says Lüshun was not reincorporated into China until 11 October 1955, or 59-and-a-half years after the 3 June 1896 treaty was signed.¹

Twentieth-century Asian history has shown that control of the Manchurian railways also had strategic importance. Russia's control of both the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway allowed it to transport huge numbers of troops into Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. After the war, Russia retained the former railway line, while it was forced to cede the latter to Japan. When Moscow won back control of this railway in 1924, it still made up 14% of all of China's railway mileage, and when joined with Japan's railway, the two accounted for 22.5%.²

During the next 30 years, the struggle between Russia and Japan to take full control of the Manchurian railway system continued unabated. During 1921, China's preeminent railway expert, Chin-chun Wang, wrote a letter to Foreign Minister W. W. Yen warning that further conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway might arise in the near future:

Manchuria has twice been the battle field in recent years, and will be the bone of contention for more international conflicts, unless the statesmen of today can arrange matters in such a way as will ameliorate the situation. The Chinese Eastern [Railway] plays a most important part and constitutes a most important factor in the Manchuria question.

Wang further explained why China had to make its move soon if it wished to take total control over the Chinese Eastern Railway:

Today presents the only and most unexpected opportunity for some solution of the problem, for it is the first time for many years that Russia and Japan are really at loggerheads, while other Powers are in no position to interfere as they used to do.³

Secret Sino-Russian treaty of 1896⁴

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China and His Imperial Majesty the Tsar of Russia, desiring to maintain the present situation of peace in the Far East, and to prevent future aggression by other powers upon the territory of Asia, have determined to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance. Therefore, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China has specially appointed His Excellency Li Hung-chang, Imperial Commissioner and Plenipotentiary of the first class, Grand Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Grand Secretary of the Wen-hua Place, Stern-and-resolute Earl of the first rank, and Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports; and His Imperial Majesty the Tsar of Russia has specially appointed Prince Lobanov, Imperial Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, Finance Minister, member of the Cabinet and of the Imperial Council and Privy Councillor, as their respective plenipotentiaries, who, having exchanged and examined their credentials and found them in proper form, agree to the following stipulations:

Article I

In the event of a Japanese invasion of the territory of Russia in Eastern Asia, or the territory of China, or the territory of Korea, the present treaty shall be

considered as having been involved, and measures shall be taken according to the treaty. In such an event both contracting powers promise to dispatch all the military and naval forces that can be mobilized for mutual assistance; they shall also supply each other with munitions and provisions as far as possible.

Article II

Having entered into the present treaty of mutual defense, neither contracting power can conclude a separate peace agreement with the enemy without mutual consultation.

Article III

Should an emergency arise during the war, Russian warships shall be allowed to enter all ports on the coast of China; in case of need, the local authorities shall give aid to the best of their ability.

Article IV

In order in the future to facilitate the rapid and safe transportation of Russian troops for opposing the enemy, and for the supply of munitions and provisions, the Chinese Government agrees to let Russia construct a railway through the territory of Heilungkiang and Kirin to connect with Vladivostok. However, the construction of this railway is not to be used as a pretext for the infringement of Chinese territory, or for encroachment on the lawful rights and privileges of H.I.M. the Emperor of China. The Chinese Government will entrust the Russo-Chinese Bank with the management of the (railway) matter. The Chinese Minister to Russia and the Bank shall consult on the spot and decide upon the terms of the contract.

Article V

When Russia is engaged in the defensive measures against the enemy provided for in Article I, she may use the railway as provided in Article IV for the transportation of troops, provisions, and munitions. In peacetime, Russia may also use this railway for troops and provisions in transit. Apart from temporary stops due to changes of trains, they shall not be allowed to stop over for any other reason.

Article VI

The agreement shall be effective for fifteen years, beginning with the date on which the contract mentioned in Article IV shall have been ratified and

put into effect. Six months before the expiration of this treaty, the two contracting powers shall negotiate for its extension.

Special provision

The plenipotentiaries of both contracting parties agree that the Sino-Russian treaty concluded on this day shall be rendered into the Chinese and French languages in duplicate copies, to be signed and have seals affixed. The Chinese and French copies have been compared and found to be without error. In case of dispute the French text shall be the decisive version.

Concluded on the 22nd day, 4th month, and 22nd year of Kuang-Hsü, which is May 22nd, 1896 (o.s.) [June 3, 1896], at Moscow.

Notes

- 1 www.worldstatesmen.org/China_Foreign_colonies.html.
- 2 Ralph William Huenemann, "The Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics of Railroads in China, 1876-1937" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1982), 111.
- 3 C. C. Wang received his education through the doctorate level at Peking University, Yale University, and the University of Illinois, and in January 1920, was appointed Director-General of the Chinese Eastern Railway. English-language letter from C. C. Wang to W. W. Yen, 3 May 1921, WJDA, 03-32, 242(2).
- 4 The full terms of this treaty appear at www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/237; A second version, with slightly different wording and without the special provision at the end, appears in John V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919, Volume 1: Manchu Period (1894-1911)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 81.

28 April 1899—Anglo-Russian agreement

While Japanese, Russian, and German interests were primarily in northern China, British and French interests were primarily in southern and central China. This demarcation was even spelled out in an 1899 agreement between Great Britain and Russia, in which Great Britain promised not to seek railway concessions north of the Great Wall, while Russia likewise promised not to move into the Yangzi River basin. Great Britain promised not to interfere if Russia demanded additional “concessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a southwesterly direction.”

This agreement was part of an ongoing process of dividing up China into competing spheres of influence. For example, Germany used the murder of several of its citizens to move into Shandong province, consolidating control over a concession in Qingdao. Other European countries made similar demands. Great Britain later formed an alliance with Japan in 1902, which had a similar effect to the Anglo-Russian agreement of dividing China into northern and southern spheres of influence.

The dismembering of China into foreign territorial concessions had a profound effect on the Chinese government. In 1898, the Qing dynasty attempted to adopt a series of internal government reforms, along the lines first taken by Japan during the Meiji restoration. These reforms failed, however, and were followed in 1900 by a disastrous anti-foreign outburst, called the Boxer Uprising, in which the Chinese government turned to bands of martial arts experts—the Boxers—to try to force the foreigners out of China. The failure of both movements was additional proof that the Qing dynasty was incapable of responding effectively to the threat of foreign intervention.

The Russian-English agreement regarding railway interests in China 28 April 1899¹

Russia and Great Britain, animated by the sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows:

1. Russia engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tsze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government.
2. Great Britain, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, and on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concession to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government.

The two contracting parties, having nowise in view to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or of existing treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the present arrangement, which, by averting all cause of complication between them, is of a nature to consolidate peace in the East, and to serve the primordial interest of China herself.

Second note

In order to complete the notes exchanged this day respecting the partition of spheres for concessions for the construction and working of railways in China, it has been agreed to record in the present additional note the arrangement arrived at with regard to the line Shanghai-Kuan-Newchwang, for the construction of which a loan has been already contracted by the Chinese Government with the Shanghai-Hongkong Bank, acting on behalf of the British and Chinese corporation.

The general arrangement established by the above-mentioned notes is not to infringe in any way the rights acquired under the said loan contract, and the Chinese Government may appoint both an English engineer and a European accountant to supervise the construction of the line in question, and the money appropriated to it.

But it remains understood that this fact not be taken as constituting a right of property or foreign control, and that the line in question is to remain a Chinese line under the control of the Chinese Government, and cannot be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese Company.

As regards the branch line from Siaoheichan to Sinminting, in addition to the aforesaid restrictions, it has been agreed that it is to be constructed by China herself, which may permit European—not necessarily British—engineers to periodically inspect it, and to verify and certify that the work is being properly executed.

The present special agreement is naturally not to interfere in any way with the right of the Russian Government to support, if it thinks fit, applications of Russian subjects or establishments for concessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a southwesterly direction, would traverse the region in which the Chinese line terminating at Sinminting and Newchwang is to be constructed.

The above agreements are signed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

[This is a copy of the agreement signed April 28, 1899, by representatives of the Russian and English Governments, regarding their respective railway interests in China. It is officially published by the British Government, under the title of Treaty Series, No. 11, 1899, Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Russia with regard to their respective railway interests in China.]

Note

- 1 United States, Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department: "Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1899," New Series, Vol. VI, Part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), 25–26.

6 September 1899— Open Door Policy notes

At the turn of the century, President Theodore Roosevelt acknowledged the American acquisition of the Philippines from Spain and the construction of the Panama Canal by observing that the history of mankind had started with a Mediterranean era, moved into an Atlantic period, and was at that point entering upon a Pacific epoch.¹ In the case of the United States and Russia, the most fundamental difference was that while America relied primarily on her economic strength, Russia relied mainly on her military might.

One of the main areas of potential conflict between the United States and Russia was in the Far East, since it was in the Pacific that the westward-expanding American economic interests met with the eastward-expanding Russian, and then Soviet, land empires. On 6 September 1899, US Secretary of State John Hay sent the three Open Door Policy principles to London, Berlin, and St Petersburg, followed by notes to Japan on 13 November, Italy on 17 November, and to France on 21 November. In his personal letter to Andrew Dickson White, the US ambassador to Germany, Hay said that the commercial interests of Great Britain and Japan would “be so clearly served by the desired declaration of intentions,” that their full cooperation could be “confidently expected.”²

Although Hay sought positive responses to his policy, the lack of clearly stated opposition was taken as an affirmation of his basic points. By March 1900, Hay had received positive replies from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Rather than accepting the notes completely, Britain exempted Kowloon, right across from Hong Kong Island, just as Russia exempted Port Arthur, its main port on the Liaodong peninsula.³

Some replies were “evasive” and Russia’s reply was “more nearly a blunt refusal than an acceptance.” But Hay chose to interpret them as “unqualified acceptance of an Open Door policy.” On 20 March 1900, Hay reported

that in each case, the response was “final and definitive.”⁴ Russia, in particular, was not enthusiastic about the American proposal. In April 1900, Hay wrote to Ambassador White in Berlin that “he thought Russia only agreed to the open door because it believed that the other nations would decline and thus the whole declaration would come to nothing.”⁵

With Secretary of State Hay’s declaration of the Open Door Policy, America’s foreign policy goal of turning China into a free trade zone struck a direct blow at Russia’s hope of expanding her land empire into China’s periphery, and, most importantly, into Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. While the United States already had one of the most developed economies in the world by 1900, Russia’s commercial sector was comparatively backwards and the Tsarist government depended on high tariffs and exclusive spheres of influence to protect her markets from foreign competition. By contrast, the United States preferred free economic competition to concessions.

The American Secretary of State, John Hay, hoped to limit foreign rivalry by calling for the preservation of China’s territorial and administrative unity.

On 6 September 1899, Hay sent the following three principles specifying that each country within its respective sphere of influence:

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called ‘sphere of interest,’ or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such parts as are within said ‘sphere of interest’ (unless they be ‘free ports’) no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such ‘sphere’ than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its ‘sphere’ on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such ‘sphere’ than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.⁶

Notes

- 1 André Fontaine, *History of the Cold War, From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917–1950* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 15; paraphrasing a

quote from Fernand L'Huillier, *De la Sainte-Alliance* (Neuchatel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1954), 266.

- 2 Perry E. Gianakos and Albert Karson, *American Diplomacy and the Sense of Destiny: Volume II, In the World Arena, 1901–1918* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), 10–11; citing 6 September 1899. *Senate Documents*, XLVII (61st Congress, 2nd Session, 1909–1910), 246–247.
- 3 David L. Anderson, “To the Open Door: America’s Search for a Policy in China, 1861–1900” (University of Virginia Dissertation, 1974), 280.
- 4 Foster Dulles, *Prelude to World Power: American Diplomatic History, 1860–1900* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1971), 212–213.
- 5 Anderson, “To the Open Door: America’s Search for a Policy in China, 1861–1900,” 282.
- 6 Paul Hibbert Clyde, “The Open-Door Policy of John Hay,” 210–214; also Paul A. Varg, *Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill* (University of Illinois Press, 1952), 50.

5 September 1905— Portsmouth Peace Treaty

The struggle to partition Manchuria ended in war between Russia and Japan. After Russia's defeat in 1905, Washington offered its services to negotiate a peace treaty. Taking advantage of its role as broker, the US convinced Russia to declare that "they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."¹ Although the Portsmouth Treaty publicly supported the Open Door Policy, it reaffirmed that Russia retained the Chinese Eastern Railway, while Japan acquired the South Manchurian Railway.

In practical terms, therefore, Manchuria was still divided into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence. The United States tried to use this 1905 Russo-Japanese treaty to promote the Open Door Policy. But by tacitly reaffirming that Russia controlled the Chinese Eastern Railway concession in northern Manchuria, while Japan gained control over the South Manchurian Railway in southeast Manchuria, this treaty continued to divide Manchuria into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence.

In addition to gaining control of Russia's railway line, Japan also received Russia's former territorial concessions in Kwangtung as war reparations. Furthermore, Russia agreed that Japan had "paramount political, military and economic interests" in Korea. In effect, Portsmouth drew a line between the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence throughout the Far East, a line that merely engendered further struggle between the two countries to expand their power.

The Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905—5 September 1905²

The Emperor of Japan on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for this purpose named their

plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Excellency Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and concluded the following articles:

Article I

There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their respective States and subjects.

Article II

The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favored nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

Article III

Japan and Russia mutually engage:

First.—To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the additional article I annexed to this treaty, and,

Second.—To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in occupation, or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

Article IV

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.

Article V

The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien [Dalian] and the adjacent territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above-mentioned lease.

The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

Article VI

The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-chunfu and Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches, together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

Article VII

Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

Article VIII

The imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.

Article IX

The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Saghalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the additional article II annexed to this treaty.

Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Saghalin or the adjacent islands any fortification or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.

Article X

It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

Article XI

Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.

It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

Article XII

The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia

engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favored nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.

Article XIII

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.

The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoner from the date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay as soon as possible after the exchange of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

Article XIV

The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokio and the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg, and from the date of the latter of such announcements shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

Article XV

The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall prevail.

Sub-articles

In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of the peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:

Sub-article to article III

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.

The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer and within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements.

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

Sub-article to article IX

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force a committee of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed by the two high contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalin. The commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties.

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, one thousand nine hundred and five, (September 5, 1905).

Notes

- 1 “Treaty of Peace—Russia and Japan,” 5 September 1905, commonly called the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. John V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China* (New York, 1921), 522–525.
- 2 Text taken from Sydney Tyler, *The Japan-Russia War* (Harrisburg, PA: The Minter Company, 1905), 564–568, quoted in Peter E. Randall, *There Are No Victors Here!: A Local Perspective on The Treaty of Portsmouth* (Portsmouth, NH: Portsmouth Marine Society, Peter E. Randall, Publisher, 1985), #8, 95–100; https://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Portsmouth_ending_the_Russo-Japanese_War.

30 July 1907—Russo-Japanese secret protocol

Between 1907 and 1912, Russia and Japan signed no fewer than three secret agreements in order to define their respective spheres of interest in China. By the secret agreement of 30 July 1907, an east–west line was drawn from Korea through the heart of Manchuria, with Japan promising not to interfere north of this line and Russia promising not to interfere south. This secret treaty granted Japan a free hand in Korea in return for Russia receiving a free hand in Outer Mongolia; a special article delineated the two spheres and was called the Motono-Iswolsky line. (See Figure 5.1a, 5.1b, and 5.1c)

As reprinted by Ernest Batson Price, this line ran westward from the most northwestern point of the Russo-Korean border to the 122° meridian, passing “by way of Hunshun and the northern extremity of Lake Priteng, to Hsiushuichan; thence it follows the Sungari to the mouth of the Nunkiang, thereupon ascending the course of that river to the confluence of the Tola River.”¹ Russia’s and Japan’s 1907 secret agreement was intended to “obviate for the future all cause of friction or misunderstanding with respect to certain questions relating to Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia.”²

In Article I of the treaty, Russia promised not to obtain “any concession in the way of railways or telegraphs” south of that line and Japan promised not to interfere north of that line. Furthermore, each country promised not to obstruct the other in their attempts to increase concessions in their respective spheres of interests. Of even greater importance was that in Article II of the 1907 treaty, Russia promised not to “interfere with nor to place any obstacle in the way of the further development” of Japan’s special relations with Korea, in exchange for being granted “most-favored-nation” status there. Article III then stated: “The Imperial




Figure 5.1a 30 July 1907 Russo-Japanese secret protocol, as supplied by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow




Figure 5.1b (Continued)

Government of Japan, recognizing the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests.” In effect, Russia and Japan had already divided the Chinese empire, with Japan receiving Korea and Russia gaining Outer Mongolia.³

Article additionnel.

La ligne de démarcation entre la Manchourie du Nord et la Manchourie du Sud mentionnée dans l'article I de la présente Convention est établie comme suit:

Partant du point nord-ouest de la frontière russo-coréenne et formant une succession de lignes droites, la ligne va, en passant par Hunchun et la pointe de l'extrémité nord du lac de Pirteng, à Hsienshuichan; de là elle suit le Soungari jusqu'à l'embouchure du Nunkiang, pour remonter ensuite le cours de ce fleuve jusqu'à l'embouchure du fleuve Tolaho. A partir de ce point, la ligne suit le cours de ce fleuve jusqu'à son intersection avec le 122 méridien est de Greenwich.

Swordy *M. K.*

Figure 5.1c (Continued)

Secret Convention of July 17/30, 1907⁴

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to obviate for the future all causes of friction or misunderstanding with respect to certain questions relating to Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

Having in view the natural gravitation of interests and of political and economic activity in Manchuria, and desiring to avoid all complications which might arise from competition, Japan undertakes not to seek to obtain on its own account, or for the benefit of Japanese or other subjects, any concession in the way of railways or telegraphs in Manchuria to the north of a line defined in the Additional Article of the present Convention, and not to obstruct, either directly or indirectly, any initiatives supported by the Russian Government with a view to concessions of that sort in those regions; and Russia, on its part, inspired by the same pacific motive, undertakes not to seek to obtain on its own account, or for the benefit of Russian or other subjects, any concession in the way of railways or telegraphs in Manchuria to the south of the above-mentioned line, and not to obstruct, either directly or indirectly, any initiatives supported by the Japanese Government with a view to concessions of that sort in those regions.

It is fully understood that all the rights and privileges belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company by virtue of the contracts for the construction of this railway, dated August 16/28, 1896, and June 13/25, 1898, will remain in force on the section of the railway lying to the south of the line of demarcation defined in the Additional Article.

Article II

Russia, recognizing the relations of political solidarity between Japan and Korea resulting from the conventions and arrangements at present in force between them, copies of which have been communicated to the Russian Government by the Japanese Government, undertakes not to interfere with nor to place any obstacle in the way of the further development of those relations; and Japan, on its part, undertakes to extend in all respects most-favored-nation treatment to the Russian Government, consular officers, subjects, commerce, industry and navigation in Korea, pending the conclusion of a definitive treaty.

Article III

The Imperial Government of Japan, recognizing the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests.

Article IV

The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith of which, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg, July 17/30, 1907, corresponding to the thirtieth day of the seventh month of the fortieth year of Meiji.

[Signed] Iswolsky
[seal]

[Signed] Motono
[seal]

Additional article

The line of demarcation between North Manchuria and South Manchuria mentioned in Article I of the present Convention is established as follows:

Starting from the northwestern point of the Russo-Korean frontier, and forming a succession of straight lines, the line runs, by way of Hunchun and the northern extremity of Lake Pirteng, to Hsiushuichan; thence it follows the Sungari to the mouth of the Nunkiang, thereupon ascending the course of that river to the confluence of the Tola River. From that point, the line follows the course of that river to its intersection with Meridian 122° East of Greenwich.

[Signed] Iswolsky
[seal]

[Signed] Motono
[seal]

Notes

- 1 Ernest Batson Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1933), 36.
- 2 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 107.
- 3 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 107–108.
- 4 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 107–108.

4 July 1910—Russo-Japanese secret protocol

When Russo-Japanese friction over railway concessions in Manchuria continued to increase, the United States sponsored a railway consortium in 1910 made up of British, French, German, and American interests, in order to try to internationalize the economic development of Manchuria. This plan threatened the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria.

This American effort to internationalize China's development was undercut by a second Russo-Japanese secret treaty, signed on 4 July 1910, which was dated in such a way as to imply that the United States was the intended target. It stated:

In the event that these special interests should come to be threatened, the two High Contracting Parties will agree upon the measures to be taken with a view to common action or to the support to be accorded for the safeguarding and the defense of those interests.¹ (See Figure 6.1a and 6.1b).

This 1910 treaty went further than the 1907 agreement, when they promised not only not to interfere in the other's sphere of influence, but actively to support these spheres against outside interference. The 1910 spheres of influence were recognized by Russia and Japan, and the two sides agreed "not to hinder in any way the consolidation and further development of the special interests of the other Party within the limits of the above-mentioned spheres."²

Secret convention of June 21/July 4, 1910³

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, desiring to consolidate and develop the provisions of the secret Convention signed at St. Petersburg July 17/30, 1907, have agreed upon the following:




Figure 6.1a 4 July 1910 Russo-Japanese secret protocol, as supplied by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

Article I

Russia and Japan recognize the line of demarcation fixed by the Additional Article of the secret Convention of 1907 as delimiting the respective spheres of their special interests in Manchuria.

Article II

The two High Contracting Parties undertake to respect reciprocally their special interests in the spheres above indicated. They consequently recognize the right of each, within its own spheres, freely to take all measures necessary for the safeguarding and the defense of those interests.

Article III

Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes not to hinder in any way the consolidation and further development of the special interests of the other Party within the limits of the above-mentioned spheres.




Figure 6.1b (Continued)

Article IV

Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from all political activity within the sphere of special interests of the other in Manchuria. It is furthermore understood that Russia will not seek in the Japanese sphere—and Japan will not seek in the Russian sphere—any privilege or any concession of a nature to prejudice their reciprocal special interests, and that both the Russian and Japanese Governments will respect all the rights acquired by each of them within its sphere by virtue of the treaties, conventions or other arrangements mentioned in Article II of the public Convention of today's date.

Article V

In order to insure the good working of their reciprocal engagements, the two High Contracting Parties will at all times frankly and loyally enter into communication with regard to anything that concerns matters affecting in common their special interests in Manchuria.

In the event that these special interests should come to be threatened, the two High Contracting Parties will agree upon the measures to be taken with a view to common action or to the support to be accorded for the safeguarding and the defense of those interests.

Article VI

The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith of which, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg, June 21/July 4, 1910, corresponding to the fourth day of the seventh month of the forty-third year of Meiji.

[Signed] Iswolsky
[Seal]

[Signed] Motono
[Seal]

Notes

- 1 Ernest Batson Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1933), 113–114.
- 2 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 113.
- 3 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 113–114.

25 June 1912—Russo-Japanese secret protocol

In the secret agreement of 1912, the line demarcating Russia and Japan's spheres of influence was lengthened to include Inner Mongolia, with Russia taking the western portion of Inner Mongolia, while Japan took the eastern portion, based on the meridian of Beijing. The Motono-Iswolsky line was extended

from the point of intersection of the Tolaho River and Meridian 122° East of Greenwich, ... [and] follows the course of the Oulountchourh River and the Moushisha River up to the line of the watershed between the Moushisha River and the Haldaitai River.¹

As a result of this demarcation, Inner Mongolia was divided into a Russian section, west of the 116°27' meridian, and the Japanese section east of this meridian. (See Figure 7.1a and 7.1b).

This line ran right through China's capital of Beijing, which implied that Russia and Japan were taking equal responsibility for directing the actions of the Chinese government.

Once again, completely ignoring all attempts by the United States to protect China from being partitioned, Russia and Japan continued to secretly carve up China into their respective spheres of influence. In the secret convention of 8 July 1912, both parties also promised to "recognize and respect" the other party's "special interests" within its own sphere.²

Secret convention of June 25/July 8, 1912³

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, desirous of making precise and completing the provisions of




Figure 7.1a 8 July 1912 Russo-Japanese secret protocol, as supplied by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow




Figure 7.1b (Continued)

the secret Conventions concluded between them July 17/30, 1907, and June 21/July 4, 1910, in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding concerning their special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, have decided to prolong the line of demarcation fixed by the additional article to the above-cited Convention of July 17/30, 1907, and to define their spheres of special interests in Inner Mongolia, and have agreed upon the following:

Article I

Starting from the point of intersection of the Tolaho River and Meridian 122° East of Greenwich, the above-mentioned line of demarcation follows the course of the Oulountchourh River and the Moushisha River up to the line of the watershed between the Moushisha River and the Haldaitai River; thence it follows the frontier line between the Province of Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia until reaching the extreme point of the frontier between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia.

Article II

Inner Mongolia is divided into two parts: one to the West, and the other to the East, of the meridian of Peking (116° 27' East of Greenwich).

The Imperial Government of Russia undertakes to recognize and to respect the Japanese special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the East of the meridian above indicated, and the Imperial Government of Japan undertakes to recognize and to respect the Russian special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the West of the said meridian.

Article III

The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith of which, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg, June 25/July 8, 1912, corresponding to the eighth day of the seventh month of the forty-fifth year of Meiji.

[Signed] Sazonow
[Seal]

[Signed] I. Motono
[Seal]

Notes

- 1 Ernest Batson Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1933), 117.
- 2 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 117.
- 3 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 117.

7 June 1915—Sino-Russian-Mongolian tripartite treaty¹

Following the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the formal abdication of the Qing dynasty on 12 February 1912, Sun Yat-sen resigned his position as provisional president of the Republic of China and handed over power to Yuan Shikai, who immediately moved the capital back from Nanjing to Beijing. On 5 April 1912, Beijing was made China's national capital by parliamentary vote and the United States government became the first country to recognize the Republic of China. But, as discussed above, ignoring all attempts by the United States to enforce the Open Door Policy, Russia and Japan continued to carve up China in their secret agreements of 1907, 1910, and 1912, which delimited their respective spheres of influence.

Taking advantage of China's political turmoil after the 1911 Revolution, the Russian government immediately negotiated an advantageous treaty with Outer Mongolia in 1912 and then pressured Yuan to sign an agreement in 1913 limiting China's rights in Outer Mongolia. Later, Russia convinced Beijing to sign a tripartite treaty with Russia and Outer Mongolia in 1915, by which Outer Mongolia recognized the *suzerainty* of China in exchange for China recognizing the *autonomy* of Outer Mongolia. If this treaty had followed the textbook definition of suzerainty, then China would have retained the right to control all of Outer Mongolia's foreign policy, including economic treaties, while recognizing Outer Mongolia's independent control of domestic policy, but China actually lost both rights, which casts doubts on the Russian government's use of the term.²

The immediate effect of this tripartite treaty was that Outer Mongolia, which formerly had been internationally recognized as part of China, fell under the sway of the stronger Russian government. In all questions that pertained to Outer Mongolia's political and territorial questions, these agreements stated that, "the Chinese Government shall come to an agreement with the Russian Government through negotiations in which the

authorities of Outer Mongolia shall take part.” Russia’s predominant influence was shown by the treaty’s recognition that Outer Mongolia retained the right to conclude foreign treaties in which questions of a “commercial” or “industrial” nature were under discussion. In addition, Russia was given the right to garrison troops in Outer Mongolia, although their military presence was to be no more than “one hundred and fifty men as consular guards for its representatives at Urga,” and the Chinese were allowed similar numbers.³

With the European nations already embroiled in World War I, and with the United States’ attention also directed mainly across the Atlantic, Russian expansion prompted Japan to make similar moves into southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and, most importantly, into the former German concessions in Shandong.

Tripartite agreement in regard to Outer Mongolia—7 June 1915⁴

The President of the Republic of China,

His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, and

His Holiness the Bogdo (Great) Cheptsun (Venerable) Damba (Sacred) Hut’ukht’u (Reincarnated) Khan (Ruler) of Outer Mongolia,

Animated by a sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement various questions created by a new state of things in Outer Mongolia, have named for that purpose their Plenipotentiary Delegates, that is to say:

The President of the Republic of China, General Pi Kuei-fang and Monsieur Ch’en Lu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China to Mexico;

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor all the Russias, His Councillor of State Alexandre Miller, Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Mongolia; and

His Holiness the Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hut’ukht’u Khan of Outer Mongolia, E’erh-te-ni Cho-nang Pei-tzu Se-leng-tan, Vice-Chief of Justice, and T’uhsieh-t’u Ch’in Wang Ch’a-k’o-tu-erh-cha-pu, Chief of Finance,

Who having verified their respective full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article I—Outer Mongolia recognizes the Sino-Russian Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23 October 1913) [5 November 1913].

Article II—Outer Mongolia recognizes China’s suzerainty, China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese territory.

Article III—Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude international treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial questions.

As respects questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government engages to conform to Article II of the Note exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd Year of the Republic of China (23 October 1913).

Article IV—The title: “Bogdo Cheptsun Camba Kut’ukht’u Khan of Outer Mongolia” is conferred by the President of the Republic of China. The calendar of the Republic as well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical signs are to be used in official documents.

Article V—China and Russia, conformably to Articles II and III of the Sino-Russian Declaration of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23rd October 1913), recognize the exclusive right of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of its internal administration and to conclude with foreign powers international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia.

Article VI—Conformably to the same Article III of the Declaration, China and Russia engage not to interfere in the system of autonomous internal administration existing in Outer Mongolia.

Article VII—The military escort of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga provided for by Article III of the above-mentioned Declaration is not to exceed two hundred men. The military escorts of his Assistants at Uliassutai, at Kobdo, and at Mongolian-Kiachta are not to exceed fifty men each. If, by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, Assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other localities of Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each.

Article VIII—The Imperial Government of Russia is not to send more than one hundred and fifty men as consular guard for its representative at Urga. The military escorts of the Imperial consulate and vice-consulates of Russia, which have already been established or which may be established by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, are not to exceed fifty men each.

Article IX—On all ceremonial or official occasions the first place of honor is due to the Chinese Dignitary. He has the right, if necessary, to present himself in private audience with His Holiness Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Kut’ukht’u Khan of Outer Mongolia.

The Imperial representative of Russia enjoys the same right of private audience.

Article X—The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his Assistants in the different locations of Outer Mongolia provided for by Article VII of this agreement are to exercise general control lest the acts of the autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia and its subordinate authorities may impair the suzerain rights and the interests of China and her subjects in Autonomous Mongolia.

Article XI—Conformably to Article IV of the Notes exchanges between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd Year of the Republic of China (23rd October 1913), the territory of autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions which were under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban at Urga, of the Tartar-General at Uliassutai and of the Chinese Amban at Kobdo; and connects with the boundary of China by the limits of the banners of the four aimaks of Khalka and of the district of Kobdo, bounded by the district of Houlounboui (i.e. Hailar) on the East, by Inner Mongolia on the South, by the Province of Sinkiang on the South-West, and by the district of Altai on the West.

The formal delimitation between China and autonomous Mongolia is to be carried out by a special commission of delegates of China, Russia and autonomous Outer Mongolia, which shall set itself to the work of delimitation within a period of two years from the date of signature of the present Agreement.

Article XII—It is understood that customs duties are not to be established for goods of whatever origin they may be, imported by Chinese merchants into autonomous Outer Mongolia. Nevertheless, Chinese merchants shall pay all the taxes on internal trade which have been established in autonomous Outer Mongolia and which may be established therein in the future, payable by the Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia. Similarly the merchants of autonomous Outer Mongolia, when importing any kind of goods of local production into Inner China, shall pay all the taxes on trade which have been established in “Inner China” and which may be established therein in the future, payable by Chinese merchants. Goods of foreign origin imported from autonomous Outer Mongolia into “Inner China” shall be subject to the customs duties stipulated in the Regulations for land trade of the 7th year of the Reign of Kuang-Hsü (1881).

Article XIII—Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese subjects residing in autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and adjudicated by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and by his Assistants in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia.

Article XIV—Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia and Chinese subjects residing therein are to be examined and adjudicated conjointly by the Chinese Dignitary

at Urga and his Assistants in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia, or their delegates, and the Mongolian Authorities. If the defendant or the accused is a Chinese subject and the claimant or the complainant is a Mongol of autonomous Outer Mongolia, the joint examination and decision of the case are to be held at the Chinese Dignitary's place at Urga and at that of his Assistants in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia; if the defendant or the accused is a Mongol of autonomous Outer Mongolia and the claimant or the complainant is a Chinese subject, the case is to be examined and decided in the same manner in the Mongolian yamen. The guilty are to be punished according to their own laws. The interested parties are free to arrange their disputes amicably by means of arbiters chosen by themselves.

Article XV—Civil and criminal actions arising between Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia and Russian subjects residing therein are to be examined and decided conformably to the stipulations of Article XVI of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of 21st October 1912.

Article XVI—All civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese and Russian subjects in Autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be examined and decided in the following manner; in an action wherein the claimant or the complainant is a Russian subject and the defendant or the accused is a Chinese subject, the Russian Consul personally or through his delegate participates in the judicial trial, enjoying the same rights as the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or his Assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Russian Consul or his delegate proceeds to the hearing of the claimant and the Russian witnesses in the court in session, and interrogates the defendant and the Chinese witnesses through the medium of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or of his Assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia; the Russian Consul or his delegate examines the evidence presented, demands security for "revindications" and has recourse to the opinion of experts, if he considers such expert opinion necessary for the elucidation of the rights of the parties, etc.; he takes part in deciding and in the drafting of the judgment, which he signs with the Chinese Dignitary in Urga or his delegate or his Assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia. The execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Chinese authorities.

The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his Assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia may likewise personally or through their delegates be present at the hearing of an action in the Consulates of Russia wherein the defendant or the accused is a Russian subject and the claimant or the complainant is a Chinese subject. The execution of the judgment constitutes a duty of the Russian authorities.

Article XVII—Since a section of the Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan telegraph line lies in the territory of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, it is agreed that the said section of the said telegraph line constitutes the complete property of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia.

The details respecting the establishment on the borders of that country and Inner Mongolia of a station to be administered by Chinese and Mongolian employees for the transmission of telegrams, as well as the questions of the tariff for telegrams transmitted and of the appointment of the receipts, etc., are to be examined and settled by a special commission of technical delegates of China, Russia and Autonomous Outer Mongolia.

Article XVIII—The Chinese postal institutions at Urga and Mongolian-Kiachta remain in force on the old basis.

Article XIX—The Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia will place at the disposal of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and of his Assistants at Uliassutai, Kobdo and Mongolian-Kiachta as well as of their staff the necessary houses, which are to constitute the complete property of the Government of the Republic of China. Similarly necessary grounds in the vicinity of the residence of the said staff are to be granted for their escorts.

Article XX—The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his Assistants in the other localities of Autonomous Outer Mongolia and also their staffs are to enjoy the right to use the courier stations of the Autonomous Mongolian Government conformably to the stipulation of Article XI of the Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 21 October 1913.

Article XXI—The stipulations of the Sino-Russian Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (23 October 1913), as well as those of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Protocol of the 21 October 1912, remain in full force.

Article XXII—The present Agreement drawn up in triplicate in Chinese, Russian, Mongolia and French comes into force from the day of its signature. Of the four texts which have been duly compared and found to agree, the French text shall be authoritative in the interpretation of the Present Agreement.

Done at Kiachta the 7th day of the Sixth Month of the Fourth Year of the Republic of China corresponding to the Twenty-Fifth of May (Seventh of June), One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifteen.

Kiachta, May 25/June 7, 1915

The undersigned Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the tripartite negotiations at Kiachta has the honor to acknowledge to their Excellencies

Messieurs Pi Kuei-Fang and Ch'en Lu, Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Kiachta, the receipt of the following note of this day's date:

The undersigned Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Kiachta, duly authorized for this purpose, have the honor, on proceeding to sign the tripartite agreement of this day's date relating to Autonomous Outer Mongolia, to declare in the name of their Government to his Excellency, Mr. Miller, Imperial Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the tripartite negotiations at Kiachta, as follows: From the day of signature of the present Sino-Russo-Mongolian agreement the Government of the Republic of China grants a full amnesty to all the Mongols who submitted to the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia; it leaves to all the Mongols of Outer Mongolia as of Inner Mongolia the freedom as before of residence and travel in the said regions. The Government of the Republic of China will not place any restraint upon Mongols going in pilgrimage to Urga to testify their veneration to His Holiness Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Hut'ukht'u Khan of Outer Mongolia.

The undersigned seizes this occasion to renew to the Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China the assurances of his very high consideration.

(Signed) A. Miller

To

MM. General Pi Kuei Fang

And

Ch'en Lu

Chinese Delegates Plenipotentiary

[Translation]

Kiachta, May 25/June 7, 1915.

The undersigned Imperial Delegate Plenipotentiary of Russia to the tripartite negotiations at Kiachta, duly authorized for this purpose, has the honor, on proceeding to sign the tripartite agreement of this day's date relating to Autonomous Outer Mongolia, to declare in the name of his Government to their Excellencies Messieurs Pi Kuei-Fang and Ch'en-Lu, Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to the tripartite negotiations at Kiachta as follows:*

It is agreed that all the telegraph offices which are situated along that section of the Kalgan-Urga-Kiachta line which lies within Outer Mongolia and of which mention is made in Article XVII of the Agreement of Kiachta,

are to be handed over by the Chinese officials to the Mongolian officials within a period at most of six months after the signing of the Agreement; and that the point of junction of the Chinese and Mongolian lines is to be fixed by the Technical Commission provided for in the aforesaid article.

The above is at the same time brought to the knowledge of the Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia.

The undersigned seizes this occasion to renew to the Delegates Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China the assurances of his very high consideration.

(Signed A. Miller)

To

MM. General Pi Kuei Fang

And

Ch'en Lu

Chinese Delegates Plenipotentiary

- A note of identical tenor was simultaneously addressed to the Mongolian delegates; and replies embodying the same declaration were addressed by both Chinese and Mongolian delegates to the Russian delegate under the same date.

Notes

- 1 Also known as the Treaty of Kyakhta and dated 25 May 1915.
- 2 "Declaration, and accompanying Exchange of Notes, in regard to Outer Mongolia – Russia and China," 5 November 1913; "Tripartite agreement in regard to Outer Mongolia–Russia, Mongolia, and China," 7 June 1915. John V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China* (New York, 1921), 1066–1067, 1240–1245.
- 3 MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1066–1067, 1240.
- 4 MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1066–1067, 1240–1245.

3 July 1916—Russo-Japanese secret treaty of alliance

Keeping the United States' support for the Open Door Policy in mind, it should not be surprising that American protests forced Russia and Japan into an even closer alliance, resulting in a 3 July 1916 secret convention in which Article I stated:

The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that their vital interests demand that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan, will frankly and loyally enter into communication whenever circumstances may demand, and will agree upon the measures to be taken to prevent such a situation being brought about.

This secret convention furthermore agreed that in case of war between one of the “Contracting Parties” and a third party, then “the other Contracting Party will, upon the demand of its ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party.”¹

Although this secret convention is intentionally vague on which country this “third party” was supposed to be, E. B. Price concluded that later Russian explanations led to the conclusion that it was directed against “some power other than those with which Russia was then at war.”² Since Russia was currently at war with Germany and Austria, this tends to rule these two countries out. Furthermore, ever since 1902, Japan had been closely allied to Great Britain, which suggests that Britain was not the “third party” in question. This left the United States as the only remaining great power that this secret convention could have meant in its intentionally vague terms. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the United States

continued to refuse to recognize Japan's Twenty-One Demands and urged China to end diplomatic relations with Germany and join the Allies, as an important first step in having Japan's provisions reversed.

Price concluded that the United States was clearly the target of this alliance, especially "in view of the history of the preceding decade of international relations in the Far East."³ It is important to reiterate that this was a fully functional military alliance. As Rajendra Kumar Jain has further commented, the:

Fourth Russo-Japanese accord extended the spheres of influence of the two countries to the whole of China and contained a provision stipulating that the two Powers would wage war in common against any other Power trespassing on their vital interests. The fourth agreement ... was, to all intents and purposes, a defensive and offensive alliance.⁴

When the Soviet Union and Japan once again recognized this secret agreement in 1925, they were, in effect, recreating this "defensive and offensive" alliance.

Secret convention of June 20/July 3, 1916⁵

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, desiring to consolidate the sincerely friendly relations established by their secret Conventions of July 17/30, 1907, June 21/July 4, 1910, and June 25/July 8, 1912, have agreed on the following clauses designed to complete the above-mentioned agreements:

Article I

The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that their vital interests demand that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan, will frankly and loyally enter into communication whenever circumstances may demand, and will agree upon the measures to be taken to prevent such a situation being brought about.

Article II

In the event that, in consequence of the measures taken by mutual agreement as provided in the preceding article, war should be declared between one of the Contracting Parties and one of the third Powers contemplated by the preceding article, the other Contracting Party will, upon the demand

of its ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party.

Article III

The conditions in which each of the High Contracting Parties will lend its armed cooperation to the other Contracting Party, as stipulated in the preceding article, and the means by which this cooperation will be effected, will be established by the competent authorities of the two High Contracting Parties.

Article IV

It is fully understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting Parties will be bound to lend its ally the armed assistance contemplated by Article II of the present Convention unless it has assured itself of cooperation, on the part of its allies, corresponding to the gravity of the impending conflict.

Article V

The present Convention will come into force immediately after the date of signature, and will continue in effect until July 1/14 1921.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have given notice, twelve months prior to the expiration of that period, of its intention to bring the effectiveness of the Convention to an end, it will continue in force until the expiration of one year from the date on which one or the other of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it.

Article VI

The present Convention shall remain strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith of which, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Petrograd, June 20/July 3, 1916, corresponding to the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of Taisho.

[Signed] Sazonow
[Seal]

[Signed] Motono
[Seal]

Notes

- 1 Ernest Batson Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1933), 121–122.
- 2 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 88.
- 3 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 87.
- 4 Rajendra Kumar Jain, *The USSR and Japan, 1945–1980* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), 5.
- 5 Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties*, 121–122.

2 November 1917— Lansing-Ishii agreement

In March 1917, the so-called “first” Russian revolution broke out, and Tsar Nicholas II abdicated. A Provisional Government was put in charge of the Russian state. This revolution gave China a chance to break away from the ensnaring Russo-Japanese diplomacy. On 14 March 1917, China broke diplomatic relations with Germany, and then declared war on that country on 14 August 1917. By this action China gained a valuable seat at the post-war peace conference, during which she could make her own demands for restitution.

Tokyo foresaw the problems which China’s actions might cause to its position in Shandong, however, and so in early 1917 signed secret agreements with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia guaranteeing its rights to the German concessions in Shandong.¹ On 22 October 1917, Robert Lansing handed Viscount Ishii a copy of a confidential memo in which Japan promised not to “seek special rights and privileges in China.” (See Figure 10.1)

Finally, on 2 November 1917, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the United States recognized Japan’s “geographical propinquity” in China.² In return, Japan stated its “respect” for the Open Door Policy and Chinese territorial integrity. Although this agreement fell far short of recognizing Japan’s Twenty-one Demands, it tacitly admitted that Japan had legitimate economic interests in China. When the Lansing-Ishii Agreement appeared in China, the words “special relations” were translated as “paramount relations,” which upset the Chinese people. Later, during February 1945, the term “pre-eminent” seemed to carry the same meaning.




Figure 10.1 Handed copy of Viscount Ishii at conference, Oct. 22/17 RL.
Confidential memorandum to accompany the reply of the Japanese government

In the preliminary draft note dealing with questions relating to the Republic of China, which are of mutual interest to Japan and the United States and which, on September 26, 1917, was submitted by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan for their consideration, there appeared, following the declaration by the two Governments of their adherence to the so-called "Open Door" policy, a further declaration "that

they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights and privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of other friendly states.”

For certain reasons of expediency, which have been orally explained to the Government of the United States, the Government of Japan considered it to be unwise to include the above-quoted declaration in its proposed note, and it was, therefore, struck out by mutual consent.

In order, however, to avoid misconstruction being placed upon this amendment of the note, the Government of Japan desire to affirm that by doing so there was no purpose on their part to assert a contrary principle or policy, and that the elimination of the declaration has no significance whatsoever in determining the terms of the note as finally agreed upon by the two Governments.³

Note from the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador⁴

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, NOV. 2, 1917.

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our governments relating to the republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two governments with regard to China is advisable.

The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the

principle of the so-called “open door” or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

His EXCELLENCY, VISCOUNT KIKUJIRO ISHII,
*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Japan, on Special Mission.*

Note from the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State

THE SPECIAL MISSION OF JAPAN,
Washington, Nov. 2, 1917

Notes

- 1 Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1960), Volume One, 59–62; Volume Two, 244.
- 2 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1990), 502.
- 3 Text quoted from handed copy to Viscount Ishii at conference, Oct. 22/17 RL. Confidential memorandum to accompany the reply of the Japanese government.
- 4 The Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States, 1917, Appendix B: The Lansing-Ishii Exchange of Notes, 1917; <http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/japanvisit/JapanA2.htm>

24 September 1918— Sino-Japanese Shandong agreement

After the beginning of World War I, Japan sought to fulfill her obligations to Great Britain under their mutual 1902 alliance by demanding that Germany vacate its Shandong concession. Japan's 15 August 1914 ultimatum specifically called for Germany to "unconditionally hand over the territory [of Kiaochow] to Japan which she intended to restore to China."¹ After a two-month siege, Japanese troops occupied Kiaochow on 7 November 1914. Even though Japan had promised to restore Kiaochow to China, the central Chinese government in Beijing retained diplomatic relations with Germany until 1917, as well as protesting Japan's seizure of the Shandong concessions.

In addition to signing the 1915 "21 Demands" with Japan, these arrangements were further complicated on 24 September 1918, when Beijing made a separate secret agreement with Japan. In return for withdrawing the Japanese civil administration from Shandong, and turning this responsibility back over to China, Beijing agreed to manage the former Qingdao-Jinan railway line as a joint Sino-Japanese company. Included in this agreement was the provision that Japanese policemen could patrol this railway. Beijing then accepted a Japanese loan of 20 million yen as an advance on this railway agreement. (See Figure 11.1)

President Woodrow Wilson stood up for China's rights at the Paris Peace Conference. The main Chinese delegate, Dr Wellington Koo, denounced the previous agreements as having been forced on China by Japan. But it proved difficult for China to show that this agreement had been forced on her, since the Chinese Minister to Tokyo, Chang Tsung-hsiang, wrote to the Japanese government at the time: "I beg to acquaint you in reply that the Chinese Government gladly agree to the proposals of the Japanese Government above alluded to."²




Figure 11.1 24 September 1918 secret Sino-Japanese agreement concerning Shandong

24 September 1918 Notes concerning questions in Shandong³

In view of the friendly relations existing between your country and Japan and in pursuance of the spirit of harmony and reconciliation, the Imperial Government considers it proper that the various questions in Shantung [Shandong] should be arranged in the following manner, and has decided to bring the matter to the notice of your Government:

With regard to the Japanese troops stationed along the Kiaochow-Tsinan [Qingdao-Jinan] Railway, all the troops shall be concentrated at Tsingtao [Qingdao] except for the stationing of a detachment at Tsinan. The guarding of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway is to be undertaken by your [Chinese] Government by the organization of a police force for the purpose.

The expenditure required for the maintenance of the police force shall be defrayed by the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway.

Japanese shall be engaged for the headquarters of this police force, at the principal railway stations and at the police training school.

Chinese are to be engaged as employees on the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway. When the status of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway shall have been established, it shall be conjointly worked by Japanese and Chinese.

The Civil Administration now in force shall be abolished.

I shall deem it a great favor if you will let me know your opinion concerning the above matter.

September 24, 1918.

Baron Shimpei Goto
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Empire
To His Excellency Chang Tsung-hsiang,
Minister Plenipotentiary of the Chinese Republic.

Notes

- 1 Gaimushō, File: 2.3.1–3.1.
- 2 John V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China* (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), 1445–1446.
- 3 Ibid.

30 April 1919—US-Japanese Shandong note

On 14 March 1917, China broke with Germany, and then on 14 August 1917, declared war. Tokyo foresaw the problems that China's actions might cause to Japan's position in Shandong, however, and so in early 1917 signed secret agreements with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia.¹ After the war, peace negotiations were held in Paris. Great Britain and France had concluded separate agreements with Japan which supported her rights. As Lloyd George was quick to point out, these obligations could not simply be ignored, since "the war had been partly undertaken in order to establish the sanctity of treaties." This meant that so far as Great Britain was concerned, "they had a definite engagement with Japan, as recorded in the note of the British Ambassador at Tokyo, dated 18th February 1917."²

No Russian delegate appeared in Paris, while President Wilson represented the United States, Mr David Lloyd George represented Great Britain, and M. Georges Clémenceau represented France. These three men met with the Chinese and Japanese delegations separately, since, in the opinion of one of the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino, the issues at stake were "difficult to discuss with people who had preconceived ideas."³ To make matters worse for Wilson, however, both Lloyd George and Clemenceau stated at the very beginning that they felt obliged to support Japan, since both leaders considered their 1917 secret agreements with Japan to still be in effect.

For this reason, it fell on Wilson alone to determine a suitable compromise, a goal which he achieved in a series of meetings with the Japanese delegation between 22–30 April 1919. When discussing the return of the German concession to China, Wilson convinced the Japanese delegates to make the following 30 April assurances. Although not technically secret, this agreement was not widely publicized. (See Figure 12.1)

**The White House,
Washington.**

CODE 1 May, 1919.

The President of the United States,
Paris.

I have not made use of the Japanese statement, but am keeping my ear
to the ground and waiting. My feeling is that an attempt to explain
the compromise, when no demand is made, would weaken our position
instead of strengthening it. I will therefore do nothing about the
Japanese matter unless you insist. It would help if I could unof-
ficially say: First. The date of your probable return to the country;
Second. Whether your country to discuss the League of Nations is possible.
The adoption of the labor program as part of the peace program, is most
important, but not enough emphasis is being placed upon it. Could you
not make a statement of some kind that we could use here, showing the im-
portance of this program as helping toward the stabilisation of labor
conditions throughout the world.

20633 TUMULTY.

Figure 12.1 President Wilson's secretary, Tumulty, confirming on 1 May 1919 that the 30 April 1919 agreement with Japan was not widely publicized

On 4 May 1919, Chinese students demonstrated against the terms of the peace treaty. These demonstrations were later called the “May 4th Movement.” Many historians date the beginning of the Communist movement in China from these events.

30 April 1919 Notes exchanged between Japan and the United States⁴

In reply to questions by President Wilson, Japanese delegate declared as follows: the policy of Japan is to hand back the Shandong peninsula in full sovereignty of China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Qingdao.

The owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose.

The police force will be composed of Chinese and such Japanese instructor[s] as the directors of the railway may select and will be appointed by the Chinese Government.

Notes

- 1 Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1960), Volume One, 59–62; Volume Two, 244.
- 2 Gaimushō, File: 2.3.1–3.4.
- 3 Gaimushō, File: 2.3.1–3.4.
- 4 Bruce A. Elleman, *Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 82, citing Gaimusho, File: 2.3.1–3.1.

25 July 1919— Karakhan Manifesto

Following the Bolshevik's October Revolution in 1917, the Soviet government stated in the 25 July 1919 Karakhan Manifesto that it would immediately abolish all of Tsarist Russia's so-called "unequal treaties" with China. This manifesto further renounced all annexations of foreign lands, any subjugation of other nations, and all indemnities. The Soviet government also promised to respect China's territorial integrity by abolishing all secret treaties, and, in particular, Russia's secret treaty with China from 1896, as well as Russia's secret treaties with Japan from 1907 to 1916 that divided Manchuria into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence. To most outsiders, the 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916 secret treaties now appeared moot.

After China's requests were rejected at the Paris Peace Conference, the Soviet government issued its manifesto on 25 July 1919, signed by the deputy people's commissar, Lev Karakhan. A telegraphed copy of the Karakhan Manifesto was received by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 March 1920.¹ (See Figure 13.1)

The manifesto itself was masterful propaganda. It was addressed not only to the "people of China" but also to the governments of both "North and South China," a strong indicator that this manifesto was intended as a propaganda declaration to the people of China, an official declaration to the internationally-recognized Chinese government in Beijing, as well as an attempt to communicate with Sun Yat-sen's government in southern China. As such, the Karakhan Manifesto was important not only to the Soviet foreign ministry, called Narkomindel, but also to the Communist International, or Comintern, since it was hoped that this manifesto would help these two organizations to first make contact, and then form an alliance with various pro-Soviet groups in China.

The Soviet promises contained in the Karakhan Manifesto were virtually identical to the proposals that the Chinese delegation had presented to,

10

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JOURNAL NO. 7068

PEKING STATION.

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Time	Time
Class	Words
Station from	Date

TELEGRAM No 5705

REMARKS

---10---

GOUVERNEMENT QU'ELLES VOUDRONT ADOPTER CHEZ ELLES.
 ALINEA. LE GOUVERNEMENT DES SOVIETS RESTITUE AU
 PEUPLE CHINOIS SANS EXIGER AUCUNE ESPECE DE
 COMPENSATION VIRGULE LE CHEMIN DE FER CHINOIS
 DE L'EST, VIRGULE AINSI QUE TOUTES LES
 CONCESSIONS MINIERES, VIRGULE FORESTIERES, VIRGULE
 AURIFERE, ET AUTRES QUI LUI FURENT ARRACHEES
 PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DES TZARS, VIRGULE LE
 GOUVERNEMENT KERENSKY ET LES BRIGANDS KHORVAT
 VIRGULE SEMENOFF, VIRGULE KOLTCHAK, VIRGULE LES EX-
 GENERAUX, VIRGULE LES NEGOCIANTS ET LES CAPITALI-
 STES RUSSES!

Figure 13.1 The Karakhan Manifesto's original promise to return the CER to China without compensation, 26 March 1920

and had had rejected by, the Paris Peace Conference. Even the ordering of the points exactly followed the Chinese delegation's proposals regarding territorial integrity, preservation of sovereign rights, and economic and fiscal independence. Specifically, the Karakhan Manifesto promised China that it had renounced all annexations of foreign lands, any subjugation of other nations, and indemnities whatever.

With regards to China's sovereign rights, Karakhan promised to abolish all special privileges and concessions in China, and he furthermore promised to respect China's economic and fiscal independence by cancelling Russia's share of the Boxer indemnity. Finally, Karakhan referred specifically to the Versailles Treaty when he warned that:

If the Chinese desire to become free like the Russian people, and to escape the destiny prescribed for it at Versailles in order to transform it into a second Korea or a second India, it should understand that its only allies and brothers in the struggle for liberty are the Russian worker and peasant and the Red Army of Russia.

The order and type of promises which appeared in the Karakhan Manifesto leave little doubt that an important source for this declaration was the Chinese delegation's failed proposals at the Versailles Peace Conference.²

The one significant addition to the Chinese delegation's proposals was a promise to return the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) to China without compensation. This point was similar to Chicherin's announcement of the previous year, but went much further:³

The Soviet government restores to the Chinese people without exacting any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all concessions of minerals, forests, gold, and others which were seized from them by the government of the Tsars, the government of Kerensky, and the brigands Horvath, Semenov, Kolchak, the former generals, merchants, and capitalists of Russia.

The later controversy between the Soviet government and the Beijing government over the Karakhan Manifesto was to revolve around the fact that when this 25 July 1919 document was published in the Soviet press a month later, the 26 August 1919 *Izvestiia* edition did not contain the crucial sentence about returning the Chinese Eastern Railway without compensation. (See Figure 13.2)

Instead, a line which appeared in a different part of the both manifestoes simply declared that the Soviet government "did not wait to return the Manchurian railway to the Chinese people."⁴

That two versions of the Karakhan Manifesto were published in 1919 can no longer be denied. Three archival and published documents support this conclusion. First, a Bolshevik Foreign Ministry (Narkomindel) official, Vladimir Vilenskii, published a version of the Karakhan Manifesto in the summer of 1919 that included the promise to return the railway to China without compensation.⁵ Second, the telegraphed copy of the Karakhan



Manifesto received by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (Waichiaopu) on 26 March 1920, also included this promise, as did the versions which ended up being published in the Chinese press and in the *China Yearbook*. Finally, an official Communist International publication, entitled *Bulletin*

of the *Communist International's Far Eastern Secretariat*, dated 24 April 1921, listed the Soviet government's promise as follows: "The Soviet Government renounces all mining and lumber concessions in Manchuria, and returns to China without compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway and everything that was forcibly seized by the tsarist government, the brigands Kolchak and Semenov and the Russian bourgeoisie."⁶

These three copies of the original Karakhan Manifesto—the 1919 Vilenskii pamphlet, the 1920 telegram to the Beijing government, and the version published in the Comintern's own Siberian journal in 1921—prove that the Soviet government did offer to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to China free of charge. That the Soviet government repeatedly presented the more generous manifesto to Beijing, to Sun Yat-sen's opposition Guangzhou government, and to the Chinese people between 1919 and 1921, and the less generous version after 1921, cannot be denied. These facts suggest, therefore, that the Soviet government intentionally made two copies of the Karakhan Manifesto, one to satisfy its propaganda goals and the other to satisfy its diplomatic goals, and then later was able to pick and choose which version of the Karakhan Manifesto best suited its purposes. The importance of locating the original telegram in Taiwan cannot be understated, since it confirms that the translation given to the *China Yearbook* was accurate when it repeated that the Chinese Eastern Railway was to be returned to China without compensation.

25 July 1919, Declaration to the Chinese nation and the governments of southern and northern China⁷

At a time when the Soviet troops, having defeated the army of the counter-revolutionary despot Kolchak, supported by foreign bayonets and foreign gold, have entered Siberia in triumph and are marching to join with the revolutionary people of Siberia, the Council of People's Commissars addresses the following brotherly words to all the peoples of China.

After two years of struggle and incredible effort, Soviet Russia and the Soviet Red Army are marching across the Urals to the East, not to coerce, not to enslave, not to conquer. Every Siberian peasant and every Siberian worker already knows this. We bring to the people's liberation from the yoke of foreign bayonets and the yoke of foreign gold, which are stifling the enslaved peoples of the East, and particularly the Chinese people. We bring help not only to our own laboring classes, but to the Chinese people too, and we once more remind them of what they have been told ever since the great October revolution of 1917, but which was perhaps concealed from them by the venal press of America, Europe, and Japan.

As soon as the Workers' and Peasants' Government took power into its own hands in October, 1917, it addressed all the peoples of the world, in the name of the Russian people, with the proposal to establish a firm and

lasting peace. The principle on which this peace was to be established was the renunciation of any seizure of foreign territory, the renunciation of any coercive annexation of foreign nationalities, and of any indemnities. Every people, whether great or small, wherever it dwelt, whether up to then it had lived an independent life or was included against its will as a constitutional part of another state, should be free in its internal life, and no Government was to keep it by force within its frontiers.

Immediately after this the Workers' and Peasants' Government proclaimed that all the secret treaties concluded with Japan, China, and the former Allies were annulled; these were treaties by which the Tsarist Government, together with its Allies, by force and bribery enslaved the peoples of the East, and in the first place the people of China, in order to provide profits for Russian capitalists, Russian landlords, and Russian generals. The Soviet Government then proposed to the Chinese Government that they start negotiations to annul the treaty of 1896, the Peking protocol of 1901, and all agreements concluded with Japan between 1907 and 1916; that is, to return to the Chinese people everything that was taken from them by the Tsarist Government independently, or together with the Japanese and the Allies. Negotiations on this question were continued up to March, 1918. Suddenly, the Allies seized the Peking Government by the throat, showered gold on the Peking mandarins and the Chinese Press, and forced the Chinese Government to refuse to have any relations with the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Government. Anticipating the return to the Chinese people of the Manchurian Railway, Japan and its allies seized it themselves, invaded Siberia, and even forced Chinese troops to help them in this criminal and unparalleled robbery. But the Chinese people, the Chinese workers and peasants, could not even learn the truth, could not find the reason for this invasion by the American, European, and Japanese robbers of Manchuria and Siberia.

Now we again address the Chinese people, in order to open their eyes.

The Soviet Government has renounced the conquests made by the Tsarist Government which deprived China of Manchuria and other areas. Let the peoples living in those areas themselves decide within the frontiers of which State they wish to dwell, and what form of government they wish to establish in their own countries.

[the following section (in italics) was not included in the 26 August 1919 *Izvestiia*]

The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without compensation of any kind the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines which were seized from them by the government of Tsars, that of Kerensky, and the outlaws Horvath, Semenov, Kolchak, the Russian generals, merchants, and capitalists.

The Soviet Government renounces the receipt from China of the 1900 Boxer rebellion indemnity, and it is obliged to repeat this a third time because, according to the information reaching us, this indemnity, despite our renunciation, is being exacted by the Allies to pay the salaries and to satisfy the whims of the former Tsarist ambassador to Peking and the former Tsarist consuls in China. All these Tsarist slaves have long been deprived of their powers, but they continue at their posts and deceive the Chinese people with the help of Japan and the Allies. The Chinese people should know of this and should expel them from their country as imposters and rogues.

The Soviet Government abolishes all special privileges and gives up all factories owned by Russian merchants on Chinese soil. Not one Russian official, priest, or missionary shall be able to interfere in Chinese affairs, and if he commits a crime, he should be subject to the justice of the local courts. In China there should be no authorities and no courts except the authorities and courts of the Chinese people.

In addition to these principal points, the Soviet Government is ready to discuss all other questions with the Chinese people represented by their plenipotentiaries, and to wipe out once and for all the acts of coercion and injustice committed in regard to China by former Russian Governments jointly with Japan and the Allies.

The Soviet Government is well aware that the Allies and Japan will again do everything possible to prevent the voice of the Russian workers and peasants from reaching the Chinese people, that the return to the Chinese people of what was taken from them requires first of all putting an end to the robber invasion of Manchuria and Siberia. Therefore it is now sending the news to the Chinese people, together with its Red Army, which is marching across the Urals to the East to help the Siberian peasants and workers, to liberate them from the bandit Kolchak and his ally Japan.

If the Chinese people wish, like the Russian people, to become free and to avoid the fate which the Allies prepared for them at Versailles, a fate designed to turn China into a second Korea or a second India, they must understand that their only allies and brothers in the struggle for freedom are the Russian workers and peasants and their Red Army.

The Soviet Government proposes to the Chinese people, in the person of their Government, that they enter right away into official relations with us and send their representatives to meet our army.

Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
L. Karakhan

25 July 1919
Moscow

Notes

- 1 French-language telegram received in Beijing on 26 March 1920; WJDA; 03-32, 463(1).
- 2 Victor A. Yakhontoff, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1931), 381–384.
- 3 Original French-language telegram from Soviet government to Beijing government, 26 March 1920, WJDA, 03-32, 463(1), 10; English translations have generally derived from the 1924 *China Yearbook* which received a translated copy of the 1920 telegram from the Beijing Government's Foreign Ministry.
- 4 "Obrashchenie Sovetskoi Rossii i Kitaiu" (Appeal to Soviet Russia and China), *Izvestiia*, 26 August 1919.
- 5 The original French-language telegram sent from Moscow to Beijing via Irkutsk, conforms to copies of this text which appeared in Russian in Vladimir Vilenskii *Kitai i Sovetskaia Rossiia* (*China and Soviet Russia*), (Moscow, 1919), 15.
- 6 *Biulleteni Dal'ne-Vostochnogo Sekretariata Komintern* (*Bulletin of the Communist International's Far Eastern Secretariat*), Irkutsk, # 5, (24 April 1921), 3; This journal was formerly restricted in the Soviet Union and only became available at the Lenin Library during the spring of 1989.
- 7 Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 269–271; italics added by author to show disputed promise to return the CER to China without compensation.

31 May 1924—Sino-Soviet secret protocol

After all Sino-Soviet negotiations ended in failure, on 27 February 1924, the Soviet envoy to China, Lev Karakhan, appeared to be standing by his former manifesto when he told the Beijing government that China could buy back the railway from the Soviet Union in exchange for continued Soviet use of the Chinese Eastern Railway to transport goods from Manzhouli to Vladivostok. Until the terms of the railway's sale were decided, however, Karakhan suggested temporary joint management of the railway with China, with a managing board composed of five Russian members and five Chinese members. Karakhan further proposed that the price and the terms of the sale and return of the railway to China should be decided at a Sino-Soviet conference which would follow one month after official relations were opened.

As part of the 31 May 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty, a secret agreement was signed which stated: "It is agreed that pending the conclusion of such new Treaties, Agreements, etcetera, all the old Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etcetera, will not be enforced."¹ (See Figure 14.1)

But this secret agreement tacitly recognized all former treaties, since they were unenforced, but had not been abolished. Soviet efforts to renew the former treaties were rewarded in 1924, when Karakhan convinced Foreign Minister Wellington Koo to recognize the existence of the former treaties, albeit unenforced. Simply by refusing to convene the promised conference, therefore, the Soviet Union could block the sale of the railway to China and continue to make use of the more advantageous terms of the Tsarist treaties by arguing that the 1924 treaty recognized the previous treaty terms, even though agreeing that they "will not be enforced."²

Although this solution seemed to satisfy China's desire to abolish the unequal Sino-Russian treaties, agreeing not to enforce the 1915 treaty was not the same as abolishing it. Until a new agreement was negotiated to




Figure 14.1 Text of the 14 March 1924 draft secret protocol attached to the 31 May 1924 Sino-Soviet friendship treaty

replace the 1915 treaty, the secret protocol actually recognized that the treaty existed, even though unenforced. In fact, all the USSR had to do was delay the Sino-Soviet conference so as to continue using the terms of all of the former treaties. With regard to the Soviet management of the CER, the management of the railway line quickly fell into Soviet hands.

The Soviet diplomats in Beijing used similar methods to ensure that Outer Mongolia would remain “autonomous” from China, since even though the Soviet Union publicly recognized that Outer Mongolia was an “integral” part of China, it refused to negotiate a timetable to withdraw the Red Army. So as long as a new treaty concerning Outer Mongolia was never negotiated, the Soviet troops could technically remain there indefinitely.

Once the Soviet Union had fully asserted its political, military, and economic authority over Outer Mongolia, Karakhan announced on 6 March 1925 that Moscow had decided to withdraw its troops and that the Red Army had already left Outer Mongolia. But American officials in Kalgan reported that about five hundred Soviet troops had actually remained in Outer Mongolia, and that these troops had helped train an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Mongolian troops.³

That the Soviet Union had no intention of returning Outer Mongolia to China’s control was confirmed in a 7 May 1925 meeting between Chicherin and the Chinese consul in Moscow, at which time Chicherin warned that if China sent troops into Outer Mongolia, the “Mongolian people would certainly resist and the Soviet Union would not just sit by and watch but would immediately support them.”⁴ For all intents and purposes, the status of Outer Mongolia as a Soviet puppet state continued all the way through the end of the Cold War in 1989, and even further until 1991, when the USSR dissolved.

Agreements on general principles for the settlement of the questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with six declarations, 31 May 1924⁵

The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to re-establish normal relations with each other, have agreed to conclude an agreement on general principles for the settlement of the questions between the two countries, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China:
Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo,
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan,

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two Contracting Parties shall be re-established.

The Government of the Republic of China agrees to take the necessary steps to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Legation and Consular buildings formerly belonging to the Tsarist Government.

Article II. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to hold, within one month after the signing of the present Agreement, a Conference which shall conclude and carry out detailed arrangements relative to the questions in accordance with the principles as provided in the following Articles.

Such detailed arrangements shall be completed as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference as provided in the preceding paragraph.

Article III: The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to annul at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, et cetera, concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, et cetera, on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declaration of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920.

Article IV: The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all Treaties, Agreements, etcetera, concluded between the former Tsarist Government and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China, are null and void.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party.

Article V: The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as soon as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer

Mongolia—namely, as to the time-limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers—are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia.

Article VI: The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories, the existence and/or activities of any organizations or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.

Article VII: The Governments of the two contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their national boundaries at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.

Article VIII: The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to regulate at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the navigation of rivers, lakes and other bodies of water which are common to their respective frontiers, on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

Article IX: The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the principles as hereinafter provided:

- (1) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and the Local Governments of the Republic of China—such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the said Railway)—shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities.

- (2) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to the redemption by the Government of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as

all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the said Railway.

- (3) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall settle at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- (4) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9th, 1917.
- (5) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.
- (6) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up an arrangement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway pending the settlement of the questions as provided under Section (3) of the present Article.
- (7) Until the various questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out the Contract of August 27th/September 8th, 1896, for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the said railway and which do not prejudice China's rights of sovereignty, shall be maintained.

Article XI. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity.

Article XII. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction.

Article XIII. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up simultaneously with the conclusions of a Commercial Treaty at the Conference as provided in Article II of the present Agreement, a Customs Tariff for the two Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

Article XIV. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to discuss at the aforementioned Conference the questions relating to the claims for the compensation of losses.

Article XV. The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness thereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Agreement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway

The Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mutually recognizing that, inasmuch as the Chinese Eastern Railway was built with capital furnished by the Russian Government and constructed entirely within Chinese territory, the said Railway is a purely commercial enterprise and that, excepting for matters appertaining to its own business operations, all other matters which affect the rights of the Chinese National and Local Governments shall be administered by the Chinese Authorities, have agreed to conclude an Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Railway with a view to carrying on jointly the management of the said Railway until its final settlement at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China:

Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo,

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I. The Railway shall establish, for discussion and decision of all matters relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway, a Board of Directors to be composed of ten persons, of whom five shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and five by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the Republic of China shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be Director-General.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint one of the Russian Directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Assistant Director-General.

Seven persons shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions of the Board of Directors shall have the consent of not less than six persons before they can be carried out.

The Director-General and Assistant Director-General shall jointly manage the affairs of the Board of Directors and they shall both sign all the documents of the Board.

In the absence of either the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General, their respective Governments may appoint another Director to officiate as the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General (in the case of the Director-General, by one of the Chinese Directors, and in that of the Assistant Director-General, by one of the Russian Directors).

Article II. The Railway shall establish a Board of Auditors to be composed of five persons, namely two Chinese Auditors, who shall be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and 3 Russian Auditors who shall be appointed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Chinese Auditors.

Article III. The Railway shall have a Manager, who shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Assistant Managers, one to be a national of the Republic of China and the other to be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The said officers shall be appointed by the Board of directors and such appointments shall be confirmed by their respective Governments.

The rights and duties of the Manager and the Assistant Managers shall be defined by the Board of Directors.

Article IV. The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various Departments of the Railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

If the Chief of Department is a national of the Republic of China, the Assistant Chief of Department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and if the Chief of Department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Assistant Chief of Department shall be a national of the Republic of China.

Article V. The employment of persons in the various departments of the Railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation

between the nationals of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article VI. With the exception of the estimates and budgets, as provided in article VII of the present Agreement, all other matters on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be referred for settlement to the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

Article VII. The Board of Directors shall present the estimates and budgets of the Railway to a joint meeting of the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors for consideration and approval.

Article VIII. All the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used pending a final settlement of the question of the present Railway.

Article IX. The Board of Directors shall revise as soon as possible the statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, approved on December 4, 1896, by the Tsarist Government, in accordance with the present Agreements and the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republics of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, and in any case, not later than six months from the date of the constitution of the Board of Directors.

Pending their revision, the aforesaid statutes, insofar as they do not conflict with the present Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and do not prejudice the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of China, shall continue to be observed.

Article X. The present Agreement shall cease to have effect as soon as the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway is finally settled at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924.

Article XI. The present Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (I)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declare that immediately after the signing of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, they will reciprocally hand over to each other all the real estate and movable property owned by China and the former Tsarist Government and found in their respective territories. For this purpose each Government will furnish the other with a list of the property to be so transferred.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (II)

The Government of the Republic China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby declare that it is understood that with regard to the buildings and landed property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the question of the transfer or other suitable disposal of the same will be jointly determined at the Conference provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, in accordance with the international laws regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland. As regards the buildings and property of the Russian Orthodox Mission belonging as it does to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Peking and Patachu, the Chinese Government will take steps to immediately transfer same as soon as the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will designate a Chinese person or organization, in accordance with the laws and regulations existing in China regarding property-holding in the inland.

Meanwhile the Government of the Republic of China will at once take measures with a view to guarding all the said buildings and property and clearing them from all the persons now living there.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English languages and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (III)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article IV of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, the Government of the Republic of China will not and does not recognize as valid any treaty, agreement, et cetera, concluded between Russia since the Tsarist regime and any third party or parties, affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of China. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (IV)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that the Government of the Republic of China will not transfer either in part or in whole to any third Power or any foreign organization the special rights and privileges renounced by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article X of the Agreement on General Principles between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924. It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (V)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article XI of the Agreement on General Principles between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [of May] 31, 1924:

1. The Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renounces, will after the satisfaction of all prior obligations secured thereon be entirely appropriated to create a fund for the promotion of education among the Chinese people.
2. A special Commission will be established to administer and allocate the said fund. This Commission will consist of three persons, two of whom will be appointed by the Government of the Republic of China and one by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Decisions of the said Commission will be taken by unanimous vote.
3. The said fund will be deposited as it accrues from time to time in a Bank to be designated by the said Commission.

It is further understood that this expression of understanding has the same force and validity as a general declaration embodied in the said Agreement on General Principles.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (VI)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that they will establish equitable provisions at the Conference as provided in Article II of the Agreement on General Principles between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, for the regulation of the situation created for the citizens of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the relinquishment of the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction under Article XII of the aforementioned Agreement, it being understood however that the nationals of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be entirely amenable to Chinese jurisdiction.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Declaration (VII)

The Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly declare that it is understood that with reference to Article IV of the Agreement on General Principles between the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 31, 1924, hereby agree, in explanation of Article V of the Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway of the same date, which provides for the principle of equal representation in the filling of posts by citizens of the Government of the Republic of China and those of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the application of this principle is not to be understood to mean that the present employment of Russian nationalist shall be dismissed for the sole purpose of enforcing the said principle. It is further understood that access to all posts is equally open to citizens of both Contracting Parties, that no special preference shall be shown to either nationality, and that the posts shall be filled in accordance with the ability and technical as well as educational qualifications of the applicants.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Declaration in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at the City of Peking this Thirty-First Day of the Fifth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Thirty-First Day of May One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Four.

(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo

(Seal) L. M. Karakhan

Peking May 31, 1924

Mr. L. M. Karakhan,
Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
To the Republic of China,
Peking

Dear Mr. Karakhan,

On behalf of my Government, I have the honor to declare that an Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having been signed between us today, the Government of the Republic of China will, in the interests of friendship between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, discontinue the services of all the subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed by the Chinese army and police forces, as they constitute by their presence or activities a menace to the safety of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If you will furnish my Government with a list of each persons, the authorities concerned will be instructed to adopt the necessary action.

I have the honor to remain,

Yours faithfully,
V. K. Wellington Koo
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of China

May 31, 1924,
Peking

Dear Dr. Koo,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following Note from you under this date:

“On behalf of my Government, I have the honor to declare that an Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

having been signed between us to-day, the Government of the Republic of China will, in the interests of friendship between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, discontinue the services of all the subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed by the Chinese army and police forces, as they constitute by their presence or activities a menace to the safety of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If you will furnish my Government with a list of each persons, the authorities concerned will be instructed to adopt the necessary action.”

In reply, I beg to state, on behalf of my Government, that I have taken note of the same and that I agree to the propositions as contained therein.

I have the honor to be

Very truly yours.
L. M. Karakhan

Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Republic of China.

Notes

- 1 Draft Treaty–Secret Protocol, 14 March 1924, WJDA, 03-32, 506(5). This secret protocol was never previously published with the final treaty, but the original signed copy is included with the other treaty provisions.
- 2 Bruce A. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 100–104.
- 3 Alecia J. Campi “The Political Relationship Between the United States and Outer Mongolia 1915–1927: The Kalgan Consular Records” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1987), 218.
- 4 WJDA, 204(3).
- 5 League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Volume XXXVII (1925), 175–202. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2037/v37.pdf>.

20 September 1924— Soviet-Zhang Zuolin secret protocol

After signing the 31 May 1924 treaty with the Beijing government, which included an all-important secret protocol recognizing the former Sino-Russian unequal treaties, albeit unenforced, Soviet diplomats signed a second agreement with Zhang Zuolin's Manchurian government on 20 September 1924 to regain a majority of the positions on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

According to its 31 May 1924 Treaty with Beijing, Moscow and Beijing each had a half-share in the Chinese Eastern Railway, but a second secret agreement with Zhang Zuolin transferred effective control over the railway away from Beijing and to the Mukden government. In exchange, the railway would be returned free of charge to China 60 years after the August 1896 contract; in other words, by August 1956.

The Soviet government then used the 31 May 1924 secret protocol which suspended all former Sino-Russian treaties to in turn alter its agreement with Zhang Zuolin. For example, a special note appeared in the 20 September treaty:

In carrying out the aforesaid principle of equal representation, the regular operation of the Railway and the progress of its affairs shall in no ways be hampered and hindered. That is, the appointment of officers of both nationalities shall be governed by the consideration of their experience, characters and qualifications.

Soviet officials soon greatly outnumbered their Chinese counterparts, since there was a total of 120 Soviet officials to 80 Chinese officials in the railway administration.¹

Article V further stated: "The two Contracting Parties agree to demarcate their national boundaries by a Commission to be appointed by

them, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.” So long as no new agreement was reached, this article guaranteed that any illegal Soviet annexation of Chinese territory would remain under Moscow’s control.

Finally, a Secret Protocol stated that wherever the term China appeared in the 31 May 1924 Sino-Soviet Treaty, it actually referred to the “Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China,” which was the official name of the separatist Manchurian government. (See Figure 15.1) What this meant in practice was the Moscow and Mukden now called the shots on the management of the CER, not Moscow and Beijing.

By late 1924, therefore, the Soviet Union had not only used secret diplomacy to consolidate its hold over the Chinese Eastern Railway, it had also




Figure 15.1 Chinese-language copy of the 20 September 1924 secret protocol stating that wherever China appeared in the 31 May 1924 treaty with the USSR, it actually meant the “Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China,” which was the separatist Manchurian government

successfully used secret diplomacy to renew Imperial Russia's spheres of influence in Northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. This forced Japan into disregarding its promises at the Washington Conference not to divide China into spheres of interest, resulting in a new treaty with the USSR that once again recognized the secret agreements of 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916.

Agreement entered into between the autonomous government of the three eastern provinces of the Republic of China and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics²

The Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to promote friendly relations and to adjust the various problems concerning mutual rights and privileges, have agreed to conclude an agreement, and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China: Cheng Chien, Lu Jung Huan and Chung Shih Ming:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: N. K. Kuznetzoff;

Who, having communicated to one another their respective full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I—The Chinese Eastern Railway

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to settle the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway as follows:

- (1) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations which are under the direct control of the said Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and the Local Governments of the Republic of China—such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation, and landed property (with the exception of lands required by the said Railway itself)—shall be administered by the Chinese authorities.

- (2) That part of this Agreement, which pertains to the Chinese Eastern Railway, shall cease to have effect as soon as an agreement has been

reached between the two Contracting Parties in regard to the redemption by China of this Railway, or upon the expiration of the period mentioned in Item 13 of Article I of this Agreement, when the Railway will be returned to China.

- (3) With the exception of the estimates and budgets, as provided in Item 4 of Article I of this Agreement, all other matters on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be referred for settlement by amicable and equitable methods to the Governments of the two Contracting Parties.
- (4) The Board of Directors shall present the estimates and budgets of the Railway to a joint meeting of the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors for consideration and approval.
- (5) The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.
- (6) The contract of August 27th (September 8th), 1896, for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, shall be revised within four months after the signing of this Agreement, by a Commission to be appointed by the two Contracting Parties, in accordance with the articles herein contained. Until the said Contract is revised, the rights of the two Governments arising out therefrom, which do not conflict with this Agreement nor prejudice China's rights of sovereignty, shall be maintained.
- (7) The Railway shall establish a Board of Auditors to be composed of five persons, namely two Chinese Auditors, who shall be appointed by the Republic of China, and three Russian Auditors, who shall be appointed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Chinese Auditors.
- (8) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the settlement of the question of indebtedness of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, by a Commission to be appointed by the two Contracting Parties, in accordance with Item 4 of Article IX of the Sino-Russian Agreement on General Principles signed at Peking on May 31, 1924.
- (9) All the net profits of the Railway shall be held by the Board of Directors and shall not be used before the question as to how to divide these profits between the two Contracting Parties is settled by a Commission to be appointed by the two Governments.
- (10) The Board of Directors shall revise as soon as possible the statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, approved on December 4, 1896, by the former Russian Government, in accordance with this

Agreement, and in any case, not later than four months from the date of the constitution of the Board of Directors. Pending their revision, the said statutes, insofar as they do not conflict with this Agreement and do not prejudice the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of China, shall continue to be observed.

- (11) The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various Departments of the Railway shall be appointed by the Board of Directors. If the Chief of the Department is a national of the Republic of China, the Assistant Chief of Department shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and if the Chief of Department is a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Assistant Chief shall be a national of the Republic of China.
- (12) The employment of persons in the various departments of the Railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Republic of China and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Note—In carrying out the aforesaid principle of equal representation, the regular operation of the Railway and the progress of its affairs shall in no ways be hampered and hindered. That is, the appointment of officers of both nationalities shall be governed by the consideration of their experience, characters and qualifications.

- (13) The concession period of eighty years mentioned in Article 12 of the Contract of August 27th (September 8th) 1896, for the Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, shall be reduced to sixty years, upon the expiration of which the line with all its appurtenances will pass free of charge to the Chinese Government.

The question of further reducing the aforementioned period of sixty years may be taken up for consideration with the approval of the two Contracting Parties.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, upon the signing of this Agreement, to the redemption by China of the said Railway with Chinese capital, the actual and fair cost of which to be fixed by the two Contracting Parties.

- (14) The Railway shall have a Manager, who shall be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and two Assistant Managers, one to be a national of the Republic of China and the other to be a national of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The said officers shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and such appointments shall be confirmed by their respective Governments.

The rights and duties of the Manager and Assistant Managers shall be defined by the Board of Directors.

- (15) The Railway shall establish, as a body conducting discussions and exercising decision, a Board of Directors to be composed of ten persons, of whom five shall be appointed by the Republic of China and five by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

The Republic of China shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Director-General; While the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint one of the Russian Directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, who shall also be the Assistant Director-General.

Seven persons shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions of the Board of Directors shall have the consent of not less than six persons before they can be carried out.

The Director-General and Assistant Director-General shall jointly manage the affairs of the Board of Directors and they shall both sign all the documents of the Board.

In the absence of either the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General, their respective Governments may appoint another Director to officiate as the Director-General or the Assistant Director-General (in the case of Director-General, by one of the Chinese Directors, and in that of the Assistant Director-General, by one of the Russian Directors).

Article II—Propaganda

The two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories the existence and/or activities of any organizations or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

The two Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party.

Article III—Rights of navigation

The two Contracting Parties agree to settle the question relating to the navigation, by their respective ships of all kinds, of rivers, lakes and other bodies of water which are common to their respective frontiers, on the basis of equality and reciprocity; the details of which question shall be fully regulated within two months after the signing of this Agreement, by a Commission to be appointed by the two Contracting Parties. Inasmuch as the passenger and freight traffic on the Lower Amur down to its mouth

and on the Sungari up to Harbin are questions concerning momentous privileges on the part of the Republic of China and on that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively, the two Contracting Parties agree to authorize the said Commission to discuss these questions with a view to preserving their respective privileges in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

Article IV—Constitution of commissions

The various Commissions provided in the foregoing Articles shall begin to officiate within one month after the signing of this Agreement, and all questions shall be settled by them as soon as possible, and in any case, except where time has been fixed in the foregoing Articles, not later than six months.

Article V—Demarcation of boundaries

The two Contracting Parties agree to demarcate their national boundaries by a Commission to be appointed by them, and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries.

Article VI—Commercial treaty and customs tariff

The two Contracting Parties agree to a drawing up of a Commercial Treaty and a customs tariff on the basis of equality and reciprocity by a Commission to be appointed by the two Governments.

Article VII—Agreement coming into effect

This Agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature.

In witness thereof, the plenipotentiaries of the two Contracting Parties have signed this Agreement in duplicate both in the Chinese, Russian and English languages, and have affixed their seals thereto. In case of disputes as to interpretation the English text shall govern.

Done at the City of Mukden this Twentieth Day of the Ninth Month of the Thirteenth Year of the Republic of China, which is, the Twentieth Day of September One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-four.

Chen Chien (Seal)
Lu Jung Huan (Seal)
Chung Shih Ming (Seal)
Kuznetzoff (L. S.)

Notes

- 1 *Chung-o Kuan-yu Chung-tung-lu chih Chiao-she Shih-lueh* (A History of Sino-Russian Negotiations on the Chinese Eastern Railway), published by the *Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yuan-hui Hsuan-chuan Pu-yin* 1929.11, 20–21. A copy of this publication is located in the Archives of the Historical Commission of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party, Taiwan.
- 2 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929* (Concord, NH: Rumford Press, 1929), 143–151.

20 January 1925— Soviet-Japanese convention

By resorting to secret diplomacy, Soviet diplomats regained most of the former Tsarist concessions in China, and they also separated Outer Mongolia from full Chinese sovereignty. The final step in this intricate process was leveraging the Soviet Union's enhanced position in Manchuria to force Japan into negotiations that tacitly redivided Manchuria into Japanese and Soviet spheres of influence. Tokyo reluctantly agreed to carry out secret negotiations with Moscow. When the Soviet Union and Japan signed this convention on 20 January 1925, the Japanese government ignored its earlier promises at the Washington Conference not to create spheres of influence in China. The Soviet-Japanese convention also directly undermined the Open Door Policy's goal of protecting China from being partitioned by competing foreign powers.

Karakhan opened these secret negotiations with Yoshizawa by insisting that all former Soviet-Japanese treaties be abolished. He presented a proposal to Yoshizawa to do so on 15 May 1924. The Soviet goal included negotiating new treaties with Japan without ever recognizing the validity of the former agreements. Therefore, in this first Soviet draft, not only was there no attempt to reaffirm the former treaties, but point three specifically suggested concluding a Soviet-Japanese Commercial Agreement and point five suggested signing a Fishing Convention, while point seven suggested that all treaties with third parties aimed against the other should be annulled.¹

In reply, Yoshizawa proposed on 17 May 1924 that the following article appear in the future treaty:

Treaty of Peace of 1905 shall remain in force in its entirety.
Other treaties and agreements concluded between Japan and
Russia shall be replaced by new treaties and agreements so

as to conform to new situation, it being understood that all rights and interests secured through old treaties and agreements to the High Contracting Parties and respective nationals shall be respected.²

Clearly, the Soviet proposal was intended to first cancel all former treaties and then negotiate new treaties. In sharp contrast to the Soviet approach, Japan hoped to retain the old treaties so that it would not lose control over its “rights and interests” in Korea, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia. Later, Yoshizawa changed his proposal on 25 May 1924 to make it clear that the status quo should not be affected:³

As regards the other treaties and agreements concluded between the Imperial Japanese Government and the former Russian Government, that is to say, the Imperial Russian Government and the Provisional Russian Government which succeeded [it], the Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to revise them at a future conference in a manner corresponding to the altered circumstances, on the basis that the rights and interests enjoyed by the respective governments, citizens or subjects of the two countries by virtue of these instruments shall be fully respected, and that accomplished facts accruing from them shall not be affected.

As late as 24 May 1924, however, just a week before the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty on 31 May 1924, Yoshizawa reported that Karakhan refused to accept Japan’s draft. Karakhan insisted repeatedly that the Soviet position was to first “open diplomatic relations” and only later negotiate new treaties.⁴

In addition to insisting that the Portsmouth Peace Treaty be recognized by both countries, Yoshizawa also made two further proposals intended to guarantee Japan’s sphere of influence in China. The first was a denunciation by both sides of any “military alliance, nor any secret agreement of military alliance, nor any secret agreement entered into with any third party,” which was “calculated to infringe upon the sovereignty or territorial rights of or to menace the safety of the other.”⁵ The second proposal was that neither the USSR nor Japan should conclude any treaty or agreement with any third party looking to the cession, transfer or lease of any portion of their territories adjacent to the territory of the other, which is likely to be used in a manner affecting the security or vital interests of that other.⁶

Clearly, both of these points—if adopted—would have had the effect of halting the USSR from returning its Manchurian concessions to China,

which was the USSR's stated policy from 25 July 1919, when it announced the Karakhan Manifesto. In fact, Japan's reluctance to see the status quo altered in Manchuria actually suited the Soviet government quite well. Thereafter, the Soviet Union's negotiations with Japan resulted in an official convention signed on 20 January 1925 recognizing the validity of the 1905 Portsmouth Peace Treaty.

By recognizing this treaty, the Soviet Union and Japan actually reaffirmed the former Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria. They also agreed that all

Treaties, Conventions and Agreements, other than the said Treaty of Portsmouth, which were concluded between Japan and Russia prior to November 7, 1917, shall be re-examined at a Conference to be subsequently held between the Governments of the High Contracting Parties and are liable to revision or annulment as altered circumstances may require,

but since this conference was never held, this clause actually recognized the validity of the 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916 secret treaties. In return, the 1925 Soviet-Japanese treaty provided Japan with large oil concessions in North Sakhalin. This meant that the Japanese Navy now had a source of oil outside of its normal suppliers from the United States and the Dutch Indies.

By 1925, therefore, the Soviet Union and Japan had not only renewed almost exactly the same state of affairs which had existed prior to World War I, but Moscow wanted to use these economic concessions to push Japan into a conflict against the world's two strongest capitalist countries, the United States and Great Britain. During May 1925, Stalin further set the terms of this early "Cold War" conflict by announcing that the Soviet Union could now call on its allies, the "workers of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East," to "unleash the revolutionary lion in every country of the world."⁷

Basic convention between Japan and Russia, 20 January 1925⁸

The convention embodying basic rules of the relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to promote relations of good neighborhood and economic cooperation between them, have resolved to conclude a convention embodying basic rules in regulation of such relations and to that end, have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Republic of China, Jushii, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan, Ambassador to the Republic of China.

Article I

The High Contracting Parties agree that with the coming into force of the present Convention, diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between them.

Article II

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5th, 1905, shall remain in full force.

It is agreed that the Treaties, Conventions and Agreements, other than the said Treaty of Portsmouth, which were concluded between Japan and Russia prior to November 7th, 1917, shall be re-examined at a Conference to be subsequently held between the Governments of the High Contracting Parties and are liable to revision or annulment as altered circumstances may require.

Article III

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties agree that upon the coming into force of the present Convention, they shall proceed to the revision of the Fishery Convention of 1907, taking into consideration such changes as may have taken place in the general conditions since the conclusion of the said Fishery Convention.

Pending the conclusion of the convention so specified, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can maintain the practices established in 1924 relating to the lease of fishery lots to Japanese subjects.

Article IV

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties agree that upon the coming into force of the present Convention, they shall proceed to the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation in conformity with the

principles hereunder mentioned, and that pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the general intercourse between the two countries shall be regulated by these principles.

- (1) The subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall in accordance with the laws of the country: a/ have full liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, and b/ enjoy constant and complete protection for the safety of their lives and property.
- (2) Each of the High Contracting Parties shall in accordance with the laws of the country accord in its territories to the subjects or citizens of the other, to the widest possible extent and on condition of reciprocity, the right of private ownership and the liberty to engage in commerce, navigation, industries, and other peaceful pursuits.
- (3) Without prejudice in the right of each Contracting Party to regulate by its own laws the system of international trade in that country, it is understood that neither Contracting Party shall apply in discrimination against the other Party any measures of prohibition, restrictions or impost which may serve to hamper the growth of the intercourse, economic or otherwise, between the two countries, it being the intention of both Parties to place the commerce, navigation and industry of each country, as far as possible, on the footing of the most favored nation.

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties further agree that they shall enter into negotiations, from time to time as circumstances may require, for the conclusion of special arrangements relative to commerce and navigation to adjust and to promote economic relations between the two countries.

Article V

The High Contracting Parties solemnly affirm their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right of a State to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and restrain all persons in any governmental service for them, and all organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from them, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatever to endanger the order and security in any part of the territories of Japan or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It is further agreed that neither Contracting Party shall permit the presence in the territories under its jurisdiction—(a) of organizations or groups pretending to be the Government for any part of the territories of

the other Party, or (b) of alien subjects or citizens who may be found to be actually carrying on political activities for such organizations or groups.

Article VI

In the interest of promoting economic relations between the two countries and taking into consideration the needs of Japan with regard to natural resources, the Government of the Union of Socialist Republics is willing to grant to Japanese subjects, companies and associations concessions for the exploitation of minerals, forests and other natural resources in all the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article VII

The present Convention shall be ratified.

Such ratification by each of the High Contracting Parties shall, with as little delay as possible, be communicated, through its diplomatic representative at Peking, to the Government of the other Party, and from the date of the later of such communications this Convention shall come into full force.

The formal exchange of the ratifications shall take place at Peking as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Peking, this Twentieth Day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty Five.

K. Yoshizawa
(*L. S.*)

L. Karakhan
(*L. S.*)

Notes

- 1 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1-106-5.4 (MT 251.106.19 1434–1426).
- 2 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1-106-5.4 (MT 251.106.19 1527–1531).
- 3 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1-106-5.5 (MT 251.106.19 1909).
- 4 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1-106-5.5 (MT 251.106.19 1910–1912).
- 5 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1-106-5.6 (MT 251.106.19 2285).
- 6 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1-106-5.6 (MT 251.106.19 2285).
- 7 “Extracts from a Report by Stalin on the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” 9 May 1925, Jane Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. 2, 25–28.
- 8 League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Volume XXXIV (1925), 32–53. <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1925/69.html>.

20 January 1925—Bessarabia secret protocol

I ncreased access to the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives in Tokyo has produced copies of a secret Soviet-Japanese agreement concerning Bessarabia, signed on 20 January 1925. These formerly secret documents are important for several reasons: first, because they prove that both the Soviet Union and Japan resorted to secret diplomacy at a relatively early stage in their relations; second, they show how the Soviet government was able to block all League of Nations attempts to recognize Rumania's 1918 reunion with Bessarabia; and third, they provide important new insights on how the Soviet Union utilized diplomatic relations with its Far Eastern neighbors, in this case, Japan, to influence European affairs.

On 28 November 1918, Bucovina voluntarily joined Rumania, while on 1 December 1918, Transylvania followed suit. After the fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917, the Moldavian Democratic Republic voted in January 1918 to reunite the former Tsarist protectorate of Bessarabia with Rumania. This was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Karakhan sought to convince Yoshizawa to promise not to ratify this treaty, but Japan was concerned that doing so might undermine its standing in Europe.

The Soviet Union's negotiations with Italy during the fall of 1924 resulted in a decision by the Italian government not to ratify the Paris Treaty. After the Soviet Union gained Italy's support, the Japanese government became much more willing to follow suit. (See Figure 17.1)

On 19 January 1925, the Taishō Emperor and Regent Hirohito both signed Yoshizawa's official credentials, giving him permission to sign the Soviet-Japanese convention.¹ This document is especially interesting

Confidential.

My Dear Ambassador,

With reference to your letter of the 20th inst., on the subject of the Bessarabian Treaty, I beg to inform Your Excellency in accordance with instructions from my Government that unless and until the said Treaty shall have been ratified by all the European signatory Powers, the Japanese Government have no intention of proceeding to the steps required for its ratification, considering that it deals with an essentially European question.

Believe me,

my dear Ambassador,

Yours sincerely

(Signed) K. Yoshizawa.

His Excellency

Mr. Lev Mikhailovitch Karakhan,

Ambassador of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics.

Figure 17.1 20 January 1925 Soviet-Japanese secret agreement on Bessarabia

because it shows that Hirohito, the next emperor of Japan, was cognizant of the Japanese-Soviet secret diplomacy. A Soviet diplomat, Gregorii Besedovskii, later confirmed that this secret agreement was part of the Soviet-Japanese convention, signed on 20 January 1925.²

Karakhan and Yoshizawa signed the following secret notes³

Confidential

Peking, January 20, 1925.

My Dear Minister,

On the 28th of October, 1920, five Powers, including Japan, signed in Paris a Treaty recognizing the annexation by Rumania of the territory of Bessarabia belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Taking into consideration the restoration of friendly relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, my Government trust that the Japanese Government will not proceed to the ratification of the said Treaty, against which the Government of the Union has lodged an energetic protest with the signatory Powers.

Accordingly, under the instructions of my Government, I beg to request Your Excellency to be good enough to acquaint me with the decision of the Government of Japan in this matter for communication to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Believe me,
my dear Minister,
yours sincerely
L. Karakhan

Yoshizawa responded in an official note on behalf of the Japanese government⁴

Confidential

My dear Ambassador,

With reference to your letter of the 20th inst. on the subject of the Bessarabian Treaty, I beg to inform Your Excellency in accordance with instructions from my Government that unless and until the said Treaty shall have been ratified by all the European signatory Powers, the Japanese Government have no intention of proceeding to the steps required for its ratification, considering that it deals with an essentially European question.

Believe me,
my dear Ambassador,
Yours Sincerely,
K. Yoshizawa

Notes

- 1 Gaimushō, File 251–106–19, 6750–6751; The Taishō Emperor had serious health problems, so although Hirohito was officially only the Regent in 1925, he was, in fact, already responsible for almost all affairs of state.
- 2 Gregorii Besedovskii, *Na Putyakh k Termidoru* (On the Path to the Thermidore), (Paris: Izd-vo Mīshen', 1931), II, 13.
- 3 Gaimushō, File B760–2.
- 4 Gaimushō, File 2.5.1 106–5, Document # 230943.

22 December 1929—Sino-Soviet Khabarovsk treaty

Beginning in 1928, the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing tried to regain control over the CER, demanding the Soviet government sell the railway to China, as it had promised to do in 1924. During May 1929, however, the Chinese government tried to regain control over the Chinese Eastern Railway by force. Tensions increased, until an undeclared state of war existed.

On 3 December 1929, China's foreign minister, C. T. Wang, accused the USSR of reverting to force to resolve the dispute in a note to the Japanese chargé d'affaires, which was a violation of the Kellogg-Briand pact renouncing war. Wang described the Soviet policy as promoting war with China and described how the Soviet armed invasion of Manchuria had resulted in the occupation of the cities of Manzhouli and Chailiner during the middle of November.¹ Wang was clearly hoping that Tokyo would intervene on Nanjing's side, but, upholding its 1925 renewal of the 1916 secret treaty with the USSR, Tokyo remained neutral.

The Soviet-Chinese undeclared war lasted about five months. By December 1929, it was reported that the Red Army had taken the Manchurian cities of Hailar and Manzhouli.² The resulting Sino-Soviet Khabarovsk agreement, which ended the conflict, was actually described as enhancing "Russian prestige and influence in Manchuria."³ Among other things, it promised that Soviet consulates in China would obtain all privileges and the full inviolability to which international law and custom entitled them, which actually meant consular jurisdiction, a type of extraterritoriality impacting foreign diplomats. It was exactly this type of privilege the Karakhan Manifesto had promised to renounce.

The Khabarovsk protocol 22 December 1929⁴

On December 22, 1929, M. Simanovsky, representing the U.S.S.R. and Mr. Tsai Yung-sheng, representing the National Government of China, signed the following protocol at Khabarovsk:

1. Preliminary conditions of the Government of the U.S.S.R. understood by both parties in full conformity with the telegram of Mr. Litvinov of November 27 and the Nikolsk-Ussuisk Protocol of December 3 as to the restoration of the situation existing prior to the conflict and based upon the Mukden and Beijing Agreements.

All outstanding questions which have arisen during the period of joint Soviet-Chinese management of the Railway are to be solved at the forthcoming conference. Accordingly the following measures are to be immediately carried out:

- (a) Restoration, on the basis of the old agreement, of the activity of the Management of the C.E.R. and resumption by Soviet members of their duties. Henceforth, the Chinese Chairman of the management and the Soviet Vice-Chairman of the Management must act only jointly in conformity with article 6 of the Soviet-Mukden Agreement.
 - (b) Restoration of the former proportion of offices held by Soviet and Chinese citizens and reinstatement (or immediate appointment of new candidates should such be recommended on the Soviet side) of Soviet citizens, officers, chiefs and assistant chiefs of departments.
 - (c) Orders and instructions on the C.E.R. issued on behalf of the Management and Administration of the C.E.R. beginning on July 10, 1929, are considered invalid unless properly confirmed by the local management and administration on the road.
2. All Soviet citizens, without exception, arrested by Chinese authorities after May 1, 1929, and in connection with the conflict immediately to be released without subdivisions into any categories, including Soviet citizens arrested during the search of the Harbin consulate on May 27, 1929.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. also immediately to release all Chinese citizens, without exception, arrested in connection with the conflict and interned Chinese soldiers and officers.

3. All workers and employees of the C.E.R., citizens of the U.S.S.R. discharged or resigned, beginning July 10, to be given the right and opportunity immediately to return to positions held prior to discharge and to receive money owing them from C.E.R. Those discharged and

resigned, who fail to utilize this right, must immediately be paid full wages, pension dues etc., owing to them. Vacancies may [be] filled only by a proper order of the lawful management and administration of the C.E.R. and all former Russian citizens of the U.S.S.R. employed by the C.E.R. during the conflict must be summarily and immediately discharged.

4. Chinese authorities immediately to disarm the Russian White Guards detachments and deport from the Three Eastern Provinces their organizers and inspirers.
5. Leaving open the question of resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations between U.S.S.R. and China until the Soviet-Chinese Conference, both parties consider consulates in the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces and Chinese consulates at respective points in the Soviet Far East. In view of the fact, that the Union Government declared on May 21, 1929, that 'since the Chinese Authorities have proved by all their actions their clear unwillingness and inability to reckon with the generally accepted principles of International Law and customs, it on its part does not henceforth regard itself bound by these principles in relation to Chinese representation in Moscow and Chinese Consulates in Soviet Territory and that this representation and these consulates will no longer enjoy the extraterritoriality to which International Law entitles them' and that both parties intend to restore consular relations between them on the basis conforming with the principles of International Law and Customs, the Mukden Government declares, that it undertakes to assure the Soviet Consulates on the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces full inviolability of these privileges. On its part the Government of the U.S.S.R. discontinues the special regime established by it between May 21, 1929, and the rupture of relations for Chinese consulates and grants these Consulates, which are to be restored by virtue of the first clause of this point, on the territory of the Soviet Far East, all privileges and the full inviolability to which International Law and Custom entitle them.
6. With regard to the restoration of Consulates, opportunity immediately is given for the resumption of normal activity of all Soviet business organizations existing before the conflict within Three Eastern Provinces. Similar opportunity is offered to restore Chinese commercial enterprises which existed within the U.S.S.R. and whose operations were discontinued in connection with the C.E.R. conflict. The operation of commercial relations between the two countries as a whole to be settled at the Soviet-Chinese conference.

7. The question of real guarantees of observance of agreements and the interests of both sides are to be solved at the forthcoming conference.
8. The Soviet-Chinese conference to regulate all outstanding questions to be held at Moscow on January 25, 1930.
9. The peaceful situation on the frontiers of China and the U.S.S.R. to be restored immediately with the subsequent withdrawal of troops by both sides.
10. This Protocol comes into force from the moment of its signature.

Notes

- 1 Gaimushō, File 192.5-4-4.
- 2 Gaimushō, File 192 5-4-14.
- 3 “Victory of Russian Seen in Protocol,” *The Japanese Advertiser*, 21 December 1929.
- 4 Harriet L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), 182–184.

23 March 1935—CER protocol

Soon after sponsoring the formation of Manchukuo in 1931–1932, Tokyo and Moscow agreed to convene a conference and during 1935 they negotiated the terms of sale of the CER to Japan. The treaty of 23 March 1935 included 15 articles and one confidential protocol. Most of the published terms were fairly simple. For example, Article II transferred the CER to the Manchukuo government. Article IV stated that the Soviet government assumed responsibility for all claims of “shareholders, bondholders, and creditors of the North Manchurian Railway incurred prior to the Russian Revolution of March 9th, 1917.” The Manchukuo government, in turn, accepted responsibility for all claims and obligations after that date. Article XIII stated that all “treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts” concluded between Russian or Soviet governments and any Chinese authority concerning the railway were declared null and void:

[T]he clauses concerning the North Manchuria Railway contained in the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed at Peking on May 31st, 1924; the whole of the Agreement between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Provisional Management of the CER signed at Peking at the same date; the clauses concerning the North Manchuria Railway contained in the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China signed at Mukden on September 20th, 1924, are included in the number of those which are hereby declared null and void.¹

All of these published articles appeared consistent with accepted international practices. The Confidential Protocol stated that Moscow would assume responsibility for all demands and claims concerning the railway before 31 May 1924, provided that Manchukuo and the USSR would bear equal responsibility for all pending lawsuits against the railway that had been brought before the Manchukuo law courts since 31 May 1924. It also stated that the USSR would bear no responsibility for any lawsuits that might be brought before the courts after the signing of the 1935 agreement transferring the CER to Manchukuo. (See Figure 19.1)

This secret protocol had a significant impact on China. Even prior to 31 May 1924, the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Paris, which represented the White Russians whose shares in the railway had been canceled in 1921, had begun lawsuits against the CER. According to the secret protocol, therefore, the Soviet government was solely responsible for this litigation. But the protocol determined that the USSR and Japan were jointly responsible for the lawsuit initiated by China's Nationalist government in Nanjing, which was begun after 31 May 1924. The secret protocol reveals that the Soviet Union and Japan continued to cooperate against China, a fact that the Soviet propaganda vehemently denied in its public statements throughout China and in the rest of the world.

The secret protocol also contradicted Soviet propaganda claiming that the Soviet Union alone was fighting to protect China's sovereignty and national interests from Japanese imperialism. Although Article XIII stated that all clauses in the 31 May 1924 treaty concerning the CER were null and void, this did not necessarily include the 31 May secret protocol, which did not specify the railway by name. Therefore, in response to Chinese litigation, the Soviet government could still refer to this protocol to fight China's claims. By secretly agreeing to work with Japan on all lawsuits arising from the 1924 to 1935 period, the Soviet Union also extended the benefits of the 31 May 1924 protocol to Japan. The USSR's actions were not only equally as imperialist as Japan's, therefore, but the Soviet government actually helped Japan consolidate its position in China.

Following the sale of the CER, a 1937 secret Foreign Ministry publication reprinted the 1907–1916 treaties and claimed that they were still valid. The 1907 secret treaty was substantially altered, however, since a crucial section on the CER was completely eliminated. The presence of this alteration in 1937 is a final reconfirmation that the 1925 article renewing all Russo-Japanese treaties—until changed by an official Soviet-Japanese conference, which never happened—were still considered to be valid, since the results of the 1935 CER conference immediately led to substantive changes to the 1907 treaty.

(Confidential)

In connection with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article IV of the Agreement for the Transfer to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway, signed this day at Tokyo, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to assume responsibility for all demands and claims concerning the North Manchuria Railway on the part of any third party, other than those for the fulfilment of the obligations mentioned in the said paragraph, provided that the Governments of Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear in equal shares the obligations that may arise from all pending lawsuits concerning the business of the North Manchuria Railway carried on on and after May 31st, 1924, brought before the Manchoukuo law courts against the North Manchuria Railway up to December 20th, 1934, for which the final judgement of the Manchoukuo law courts may hold the North Manchuria Railway liable.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further declare that they will not assume responsibility for any lawsuits, which are pending before the Manchoukuo law courts at the time of the coming into force of the said Agreement, or which may be brought before the said courts in future, concerning the business of the North Manchuria Railway as between March 9th, 1917 and May 31st, 1924.

Figure 19.1 23 March 1935 Soviet-Japanese secret CER protocol

23 March 1935—Soviet-Japanese secret CER protocol

(Confidential)

In connection with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article IV of the Agreement for the Transfer to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway, signed this day at Tokyo, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to assume responsibility for all demands and claims concerning the North Manchuria Railway on the part of any third party, other than those for the fulfilment of the obligations mentioned in the said paragraph, provided that the Governments of Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear in equal shares the obligations that may arise from all pending lawsuits concerning the business of the North Manchuria Railway carried on and after May 31st, 1924, brought before the Manchoukuo law courts against the North Manchuria Railway up to December 20th, 1934, for which the final judgement of the Manchoukuo law courts may hold the North Manchuria Railway liable.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further declare that they will not assume responsibility for any lawsuits, which are pending before the Manchoukuo law courts at the time of the coming into force of the said Agreement, or which may be brought before the said courts in future, concerning the business of the North Manchuria Railway as between March 9th, 1917 and May 31st, 1924.

Note

- 1 *Agreement for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the North Manchurian Railway*, 23 March 1935, Gaimushō, File 1674, IMT 345, 142–148.

21 August 1937—Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty

During early July 1937, the Japanese garrison near Beijing (then called Peiping) began to conduct field exercises based on the 1901 Boxer Protocol allowing foreign troops to be stationed between Tianjin and Beijing. On 7 July 1937, after receiving fire from Chinese troops, a Japanese unit reported one of its soldiers missing near Marco Polo Bridge, south of Peiping. Thinking the missing man had been captured by Chinese rebels, they demanded a search of the nearby town of Wanping. Local Chinese officers refused, sparking a Japanese attack. After the Chinese successfully repulsed them, the Japanese War Ministry mobilized five divisions into North China.

This so-called Marco Polo Bridge Incident started out as a minor skirmish between Nationalist and Japanese troops but soon escalated into all-out war. On 17 July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek declared that China had no choice but to struggle for national survival. By 30 July 1937, Beijing and Tianjin had both fallen to Japan, and on 13 August 1937, fighting erupted in Shanghai, when Chiang ordered his air force to bomb Japanese warships in the harbor. Japan responded by sending massive reinforcements to central China. In desperation, Chiang turned to the Soviet Union for help.

The Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty was signed on 21 August 1937 between the ROC and USSR, just a month after Japan's 7 July 1937 attack. This pact allegedly had a secret section detailing closer political and military links and in March 1938, the Soviet government loaned the Nationalists \$50 million. In 1939, a secret annex attached to a Sino-Soviet trade agreement granted all Soviet Trade Representatives full diplomatic immunity, a privilege the Karakhan Manifesto had promised to give up. (See Figure 20.1) Thinking that the USSR had already given up




Figure 20.1 Annex attached to the 16 June 1939 Treaty of Commerce between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics granting Soviet trade representatives full diplomatic immunity

extraterritoriality, Great Britain and the United States canceled their unequal treaties with China in 1943. After World War II ended, this meant the Soviet officials had greater privileges—including tacit extraterritoriality for their commercial agents—than all of the other foreign countries, which helps explain the Soviet victory in China.

Almost immediately after the 1937 treaty with China was signed, the Soviet Union—in league with the warlord Sheng Shicai—attacked Xinjiang, quickly defeating General Ma Hushan's 36th Nationalist Division. Soviet troops were soon stationed in Turfan, adjacent to the border with Gansu province.

Treaty of non-aggression between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed at Nanking, August 21st, 1937¹

The National Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the desire to contribute to the maintenance of general peace, to consolidate the amicable relations now existing between them on a firm and lasting basis, and to confirm in a more precise manner the obligations mutually undertaken under the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928, have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and have for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. Dimitri Bogomoloff, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of China;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article 1

The two High Contracting Parties solemnly reaffirm that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and they renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with each other, and, in pursuance of this pledge, they undertake to refrain from any aggression against each other either individually or jointly with one or more other Powers.

Article 2

In the event that either of the High Contracting Parties should be subjected to aggression on the part of one or more third Powers, the other High Contracting Party obligates itself not to render assistance of any kind, either directly or indirectly, to such third Power or Powers at any time during the entire conflict, and also to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the Party subjected to aggression.

Article 3

The provisions of the present Treaty shall not be so interpreted as to affect or modify the rights and obligations arising, in respect of the High Contracting Parties, out of bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements of which both High Contracting Parties are signatories and which were concluded prior to the entering into force of the present Treaty.

Article 4

The Present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in English. It comes into force on the day of signature by the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Either of the High Contracting Parties may notify the other, six months before the expiration of the period, of its desire to terminate the Treaty. In case both Parties fail to do so in time, the Treaty shall be considered as automatically extended for a period of two years after the expiration of the first period. Should neither of the High Contracting parties notify the other, six months before the expiration of the two-year of its desire to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue in force for another period of two years, and so on successively.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereunto their seals.

Done at Nanking, the twenty-first day of August, 1937.

(Signed) Wang Chung-Hui

(Signed) D. Bogomoloff.

Certified true copy:

Assistant Director of the

Department of International Affairs:

Lin chi-han

Note

1 www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1937/153.html.

23 August 1939— Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty impact on Asia

The Soviet-Japanese division of China into spheres of influence, as well as the USSR's secret agreement with Japan on Bessarabia, did not mean they were friends. Border tensions spiraled out of control and a military clash in August 1938 at Zhanggufeng on the Manchukuo-Korean-Soviet border ended in stalemate. A year later, a pitched battle on the Outer Mongolian-Manchukuo frontier at Nomonhan became an important turning point in Japanese strategy. From May through September 1939 massive armored divisions fought aggressively, but Soviet forces prevailed.

This was a military disaster for Japan, but military victory left Moscow free to turn to Berlin in order to negotiate a secret agreement, which—among other territorial gains—would return Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. On 23 August 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact's secret protocols, signed by the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, agreed that Germany would not oppose the USSR's annexation of Bessarabia: "The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas." After May 1940, Germany's swift military victory over France left Rumania without support.

When Stalin, on 26 June 1940, demanded that Bessarabia and northern Bucovina had to be turned over to Moscow, Carol II, the king of Rumania, was forced to concede.¹ The Soviet government then held a mock plebiscite in Bessarabia to make this action official.² On 4 July 1940, the Soviet government requested that Japan recognize Bessarabia as an integral part of the Soviet Union, and Tokyo complied.³

The government of the German Reich and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics⁴

Desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April, 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following Agreement:

Article I

Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other Powers.

Article II

Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third Power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third Power.

Article III

The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article IV

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties, neither shall participate in any grouping of Powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

Article V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

Article VI

The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not advance it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

Article VII

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Secret additional protocol***Article I***

In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.

Article II

In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

Article III

With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.

Article IV

This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich v. Ribbentrop
Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R. V. Molotov

Notes

- 1 Vlad Georgescu, *The Romanians: A History* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1991), 210.
- 2 Charles F. Delzell, "Russian Power in Central-Eastern Europe," in John L. Snell, ed., *The Meaning of Yalta* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 80.
- 3 Gaimushō, File B100-JR/1.
- 4 Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact.

13 April 1941—Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Soviet Union had expanded its sphere of influence in both the Far East and in Europe. During secret Soviet-Japanese negotiations leading up to the signing of a non-aggression pact in 1941, however, the two countries made other important decisions. First, in return for the USSR recognizing the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, Japan agreed to recognize all new Soviet acquisitions in Europe, such as Bessarabia. In return for Moscow's agreement to muzzle the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) anti-Japanese activities, Tokyo agreed to leave the CCP in control of three provinces in northwest China. Finally, the USSR agreed not to interfere when Japan invaded Vietnam and Indonesia, while Japan would stand aside when Moscow moved into Afghanistan.¹

Furthermore, these secret documents show that on 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese diplomats agreed that:

The USSR will abandon its active support for Chiang [Kai-shek regime] and will repress the Chinese Communist Party's anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist Party will retain as a base the three [Chinese] northwest provinces (Shensi, Gansu, Ningxia).²

Finally, the USSR agreed to respect the "territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchoukuo," while Japan agreed to respect "the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic." This was the same kind of "spheres of interest" division of China as the 1907, 1910, and 1912 Tsarist-Japanese secret treaties that the Bolsheviks initially denounced, but then secretly renewed in 1925.

These agreements helped set the stage for the forthcoming war in the Pacific that pitted Japan against the United States.

Pact of Neutrality between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan³

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, have decided to conclude a pact on neutrality, for which purpose they have appointed as their Representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics –

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan –

Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Sacred Treasure of the First Class, and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lieutenant General, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Rising Sun of the First Class and the Order of the Golden Kite of the Fourth Class, who, after an exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form, have agreed on the following:

Article one: Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.

Article two: Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

Article three: The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

Article four: The present Pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo, also as soon as possible.

In confirmation whereof the above-named Representatives have signed the present Pact in two copies, drawn up in the Russian and Japanese languages, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th day of the fourth month of the 16th year of Showa.

V. Molotov;
Yosuke Matsuoka;
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa

Declaration

Declaration

In conformity with the spirit of the Pact on neutrality concluded on April 13, 1941, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Japan, in the interest of insuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the U.S.S.R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchoukuo and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Moscow, April 13, 1941

On behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R.
V. MOLOTOV

On behalf of the Government of Japan
YOSUKE MATSUOKA
YOSHITSUGU TATEKAWA

Denunciation[edit]

Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan

The American Ambassador at Moscow transmitted to the Secretary of State, by a telegram dated August 5, 1945, the following statement, as received from the press section of the Foreign Office, regarding Soviet denunciation of the U.S.S.R.-Japanese neutrality pact:

“Today at 3 p.m. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Mr. V. M. Molotov, received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. N. Sato, and made the following statement to him in the name of the Soviet Government:

The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was concluded on April 13, 1941, that is, before the attack of Germany on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and England and the United States on the other. Since that time the situation has been basically altered. Germany has attacked the USSR, and Japan, ally of Germany, is aiding the latter in its war against

the USSR. Furthermore Japan is waging a war with the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.

In these circumstances the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR has lost its sense, and the prolongation of that pact has become impossible.

On the strength of the above and in accordance with Article Three of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the lapse of the five-year period of operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes know [sic] to the Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador Mr. N. Sato, promised to inform the Japanese Government of the statement of the Soviet Government.”

Declaration of War

Soviet Declaration of War on Japan

London, Aug., 8, 1945 - Foreign Commissar Molotov's (sic) announcement of the declaration of war, as broadcast by Moscow, follows:

“On Aug. 8, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Molotov received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Sato, and gave him, on behalf of the Soviet Government, the following for transmission to the Japanese Government:

After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan became the only great power that still stood for the continuation of the war.

The demand of the three powers, the United States, Great Britain and China, on July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan, and thus the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all basis.

Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace.

Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposals of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26.

The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, free the people from further sacrifice and suffering and give the Japanese

people the possibility of avoiding the dangers and destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to capitulate unconditionally.

In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from Aug. 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan.

Notes

- 1 Gaimushō, File B100-JR/1.
- 2 Gaimushō, File B100-JR/1, 2.1.00-23.
- 3 The Avalon Project, Yale University, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/20th.asp.

11 February 1945— Yalta agreement

Sino-Soviet negotiating records from 1945 are especially important because they prove that the USSR resorted to secret diplomacy to fulfill Russia's long-term goal of separating Outer Mongolia from China. After China's 1911 revolution, Russia forced China's weak republican government to recognize Outer Mongolia's autonomy in 1915. Outer Mongolia's status as a Russian protectorate was then renewed after the October Revolution, when the Red Army invaded in 1921 and Soviet diplomats negotiated the secret protocol with Beijing in 1924. Only in 1945, however, did Russia achieve its ultimate goal, when Stalin's secret negotiations with Chiang resulted in China's recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence. The minutes of these negotiations show that it was tacitly understood by both parties that Outer Mongolia had really become part of the USSR.

The very brevity of the thirteen-word 11 February 1945 Yalta resolution on Outer Mongolia—"the status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved"—doomed it to ambiguity. The widespread misunderstanding of what the Yalta agreement meant by "status quo" subsequently led one American scholar of Soviet history to conclude: "The status quo, i.e., virtual Soviet possession of Outer Mongolia, was also to be included in the future Soviet-Chinese treaty."¹ A second historian concluded that status quo "implied Soviet domination of the area."² A third claimed that "Outer Mongolia, as arranged at Yalta, gravitated completely within the Soviet orbit."³

American scholars were quick to criticize President Roosevelt for this failing: "Roosevelt did not drive a hard bargain at Yalta."⁴ One scholar even accused Roosevelt of specifically agreeing to Stalin's request for "recognition of the independence from China of Outer Mongolia."⁵ A third author falsely claimed that it was Yalta which dictated that "a plebiscite to be

held in Outer Mongolia.”⁶ The very secrecy shrouding the 1924 protocol has also led Taiwanese historians to blame Roosevelt for giving Stalin a “powerful pretext” for encroaching on Chinese national interests, mistakenly blaming the loss of Outer Mongolia on Yalta’s direct reference to the “Mongolian People’s Republic.”⁷

In fact, “status quo” actually meant leaving Outer Mongolia as part of China. It was Chiang Kai-shek who traded away Outer Mongolia for Stalin’s promise—which he later broke—not to support the Chinese Communists. To save face, a fake plebiscite was used—just like in Bessarabia—to cover up the fact that Outer Mongolia was not even represented at the negotiations. No boundaries were negotiated, leaving lingering Sino-Soviet disputes over the Sino-Mongolian border.

Yalta agreement⁸

The Yalta agreement in its entirety follows:

February, 1945 Washington, March 24—The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
 - a. The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
 - b. The commercial port of Dairen [Dalian] shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
 - c. The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen [Dalian], shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese

company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Signed;

Joseph Stalin/ Franklin D. Roosevelt/ Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945.

Notes

- 1 Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion & Coexistence The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1967* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 371.
- 2 George A. Lensen, “Yalta and the Far East,” in John L. Snell ed., *The Meaning of Yalta* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 157.
- 3 Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964), 332.
- 4 Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1990), 608.
- 5 John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 78.
- 6 Walter LaFeber *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1966* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 25.
- 7 Wu Hsiang-hsiang, *E-ti Ch'in-lueh Chung-kuo Shih* (A History of Imperial Russia's Invasion of China) (Taipei, Taiwan: Cheng Chung Book Company, 1954), 477; Lu Ch'iu-wen, *Chung-e Wai-meng Chiao-she Shih-mo* (The Ins and Outs of Sino-Russian Negotiations on Outer Mongolia) (Taipei, Taiwan: Cheng-wen Publishing Company, 1976), 242–247.
- 8 United States History: www.u-s-history.com/pages/h2066.html.

14 August 1945—Sino-Soviet friendship treaty

Dr T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law as well as China's official envoy to Moscow during the 1945 Sino-Soviet negotiations, defended the American definition of status quo in his initial talks with Stalin:

When I left Washington I had no idea that Outer Mongolia question would be a problem. I told Truman that we might settle this question by not discussing it. I said *status quo* was that juridical sovereignty remains with China. It is true we cannot exercise this sovereignty. Truman agreed and also Secretary of State. In Chungking I discussed with Chiang. None of us had any idea that Outer Mongolia would be an obstacle in our discussions.

Elsewhere, Soong repeated that the American and Chinese understanding of status quo did not mean Outer Mongolian independence: "That was not my understanding when I discussed [it] in Washington." Soong also explained why his government hesitated: "If we are to recognize status quo in Mongolia which has many times been recognized by Soviet Union as integral part of China our position as a government will be badly shaken before our people."¹

By contrast, Stalin insisted that preserving the status quo meant: "China will recognize independence." This interpretation of status quo then led the USSR's foreign minister, V. M. Molotov, to warn that leaving Outer Mongolia's status undetermined will "hamper and spoil the Sino-Soviet relations." Stalin bluntly stated "*Status quo* is formal recognition of independence," and argued that the Yalta agreement backed up Moscow's demand that China had to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence: "It's our formula. They signed. I am prepared to repeat that." Molotov then reiterated: "That's how the matter stood. Independence was meant."² Chiang's 9 July 1945 telegram cut a deal with Stalin. (See Figure 24.1)

1) Sovereignty and administrative integrity of Manchuria. Stalin has expressed his respect of this point for which we are very grateful.

Stalin : Did you expect anything else from me?

Soong : I am translating textually the telegram.

For common interest of China and Russia, China is ready to afford joint use of Port Arthur. Dairen declared an open port for period 20 years. As to administration of Port Arthur and Dairen this should go to China so that China has real sovereignty and administrative integrity in Manchuria.

Molotov : Port Arthur and Dairen, both?

Soong : Yes. Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway main lines to be operated jointly by Soviet Union. Profits to be divided equally. Right of the Railways should belong to China. Branch lines, other enterprises not connected with exploitation of railways not included in joint administration. Period also 20 years.

2) Sin-kiang. In the last year or so there broke out rebellion in Sin-kiang so that communication between China and Sin-kiang broken : trade and commerce cannot be maintained. We are anxious that Soviet Russia, in accordance with previous agreement, co-operate with us to eliminate trouble so that trade, communication could be resumed. Altai range : originally belonged to Sin-kiang, should continue form part of Sin-kiang.

3) Chinese Government. Because of Chinese communist administration and army, who are not united within the central government, wish Soviet Government to give to central Chinese Government alone all moral and material support. Any assistance given to China should be confined to the central government.

4) Outer Mongolia. Chinese government regards that since Outer Mongolia question is the stumbling block in Sino-Soviet relations, for common interest of Soviet Union and China and lasting peace, is ready after the defeat of Japan and acceptance of the three points by Soviet Government, to grant Outer Mongolia its independence. On this matter, in order to avoid future disputes, to go through form of plebiscite. After plebiscite Chinese Government will declare independence. As to area of Outer Mongolia should conform former area set out in our maps. Chinese Government deeply hopes Soviet Government can understand the enormous sacrifice and utmost sincerity of the Chinese Government, so as to secure two countries lasting and fundamental co-operation. Will you please communicate to Stalin without any reservation."

Figure 24.1 Chiang Kai-shek's 9 July 1945 four-point telegram

After agreeing to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence, Chiang Kai-shek clearly expected that his secret pact with Stalin would guarantee the Nationalists' power throughout China. However, immediately after the plebiscite confirming Outer Mongolia's independence was over, the USSR actively supported the Communists' bid to take all of China. Following the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Outer Mongolian independence continued over the protests of the Communists, who felt that Outer Mongolia had previously been promised to them. In fact, during 1922, the Chinese Communist Party's Second Congress had passed resolutions favoring Outer Mongolia's eventual merger into a "United States of China, a Republic."³ Since the Soviet-funded Communist International approved these resolutions, the Chinese Communists could not help but feel cheated when the USSR retained Outer Mongolia after negotiating the 1950 Sino-Soviet "Friendship" treaty.

What is more, Soviet leaders later delayed reopening negotiations on Outer Mongolia's borders with China, a dispute which continued to plague Sino-Soviet relations during the following decades; for example, Zhou Enlai reported during 1964 that he approached Khrushchev in January 1957, with a request to discuss territorial concerns and Khrushchev refused to comply.⁴ With regards to China's territorial integrity, therefore, Chiang's decision to grant Outer Mongolian independence with the expanded borders gained from Japan during the 1930s actually sanctioned the Soviet Union's imperialist intrusion into China's traditional Manchurian territories, thus representing the partial fulfillment of yet another Tsarist goal from the 1860s.

Furthermore, a secret article to the 14 August 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement gave the Soviet Navy control over the islands and waters surrounding Port Arthur and Dalian. (See Figure 24.2 for Annex and Figure 24.3 for map) A copy of this treaty given to the US government, now housed at the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, proves that Chiang never warned Washington about this secret article. This secret article blocked the US Navy from supporting the Nationalist troops in Manchuria with reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies, thereby turning the tide of war in Manchuria in favor of the Chinese Communists.

Treaty of friendship and alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R⁵

(Moscow, August 14, 1945)

THE President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.,

Desirous of strengthening the friendly relations that have always existed between China and the U.S.S.R., through an alliance and good neighborly post-war collaboration,

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON PORT ARTHUR
SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON AUGUST 14, 1945.

With respect to the boundary of the Area of the naval base provided in Article 2 of the Agreement on Port Arthur, there shall be drawn a line starting from a point to the south of Hou-shan-tao Bay on the western coast of the Liaotung Peninsula, and thence running eastward across Shih-ho Station and Tsou-chia-jui-tze to the eastern coast of the said Peninsula. All the land situate to the south of this line shall constitute the land area of the naval base, the city of Dairen being excepted.

On the water to the west of the Area provided by the Agreement in the Liaotung Peninsula, all the islands situate to the south of a line connecting a point at lat. 39° N., long. $120^{\circ}49'$ E. and a point at lat. $39^{\circ}20'$ N., long. $121^{\circ}31'$ E., and thence running northeastward towards Pu-lan-tien until it meets on its south the starting point of the boundary line on land are included in the Area of the naval base.

On the water to the east of the Area in the Liaotung peninsula, all the islands situate to the south of a line starting from the terminal point of the boundary line on land, thence running eastward across a point at lat. $39^{\circ}20'$ N., long. $123^{\circ}08'$ E., and thence southeastward to a point at lat. 39° N., long. $123^{\circ}16'$ E. are included in the Area of the naval base. (Attached hereto is a Russian map scaled 1:500,000.)

The boundary of the Area shall be determined on the spot and marked with boundary signs on land and, if necessary, also on the water by a Sino-Soviet Mixed Commission. Land and sea maps shall be drawn by the Commission, with detailed descriptions attached, the land map to be scaled 1:25,000 and the sea map, 1:300,000.

The date for the said Commission to commence its work shall be determined by the two Contracting Parties.

The descriptions and the maps showing the boundary of the Area so prepared by the said Commission shall be subject to the approval of the Governments of the two Contracting Parties.

(Initialed) Shih-chieh (Initialed) V.M.

Figure 24.2 Secret 14 August 1945 article giving Soviet Navy sea control over Manchurian Littorals




Figure 24.3 Map showing lines of Soviet Navy sea control

Determined to assist each other in the struggle against aggression on the part of enemies of the United Nations in this world war, and to collaborate in the common war against Japan until her unconditional surrender,

Expressing their unswerving aspiration to cooperate in the cause of maintaining peace and security for the benefit of the peoples of both countries and of all the peace-loving nations,

Acting upon the principles enunciated in the joint declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, in the four power Declaration signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, and in the Charter of the International Organization of the United Nations,

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty to this effect and appointed as their plenipotentiaries—

The President of the National Government of the Republic of China:
His Excellency Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China;

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.:

His Excellency Mr. V. M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,

Who, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties undertake in association with the other United Nations to wage war against Japan until final victory is won. The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually to render to one another all necessary military and other assistance and support in this war.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan and not to conclude, without mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese Government or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which do not renounce all aggressive intentions.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties undertake after the termination of the war against Japan to take jointly all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Japan.

In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties becoming involved in hostilities with Japan in consequence of an attack by the latter against the said Contracting Party, the other High Contracting Party shall at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance with the means in its power.

This article shall remain in force until such time as the organization “The United Nations” may on request of the two High Contracting Parties be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by Japan.

Article IV

Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article V

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to

the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party.

Article VI

The High Contracting Parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the post-war period with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries and to contributing to the cause of world prosperity.

Article VII

Nothing in this treaty shall be so construed as may affect the rights or obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the organization "The United Nations."

Article VIII

The present Treaty shall be ratified in the shortest possible time. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place as soon as possible in Chungking.

The Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification and shall remain in force for a term of thirty years.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties has given notice, a year before the expiration of the term, of its desire to terminate the Treaty, it shall remain valid for an unlimited time, each of the High Contracting Parties being able to terminate its operation by giving notice to that effect one year in advance.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals to it.

Done in Moscow, the fourteenth August, 1945, corresponding to the Fourteenth day of the Eighth month of the Thirty-fourth year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each one in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE U.S.S.R.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the
Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang)*

August 14, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

With reference to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed today between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., I have the honor to put on record the understanding between the High Contracting Parties as follows:

1. In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.
2. In the course of conversations regarding Dairen [Dalian] and Port Arthur and regarding the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity.
3. As for the recent developments in Sinkiang the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China.

If Your Excellency will be so good as to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the present note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

I take [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV

*The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) to the
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)*

August 14, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date reading as follows:

“With reference to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed today between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., I have the honor to put on record the understanding between the High Contracting Parties as follows:

1. In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the

- U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.
2. In the course of conversations regarding Dairen [Dalian] and Port Arthur and regarding the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognized their territorial and administrative integrity.
 3. As for the recent developments in Sinkiang the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China.

If Your Excellency will be so good as to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the present note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance."

I have the honor to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth above.

I avail [etc.]

WANG SHIH-CHIEH

*The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) to the
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)*

August 14, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

In view of the desire repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia for their independence, the Chinese Government declares that after the defeat of Japan should a plebiscite of the Outer Mongolian people confirm this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia with the existing boundary as its boundary.

The above declaration will become binding upon the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. signed on August 14, 1945.

I avail [etc.]

WANG SHIH-CHIEH

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the
Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang)*

August 14, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note reading as follows:

"In view of the desire repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia for their independence, the Chinese Government declares that after the defeat of Japan should a plebiscite of the Outer Mongolian people confirm this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia with the existing boundary as its boundary.

The above declaration will become binding upon the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. signed on August 14, 1945."

The Soviet Government has duly taken note of the above communication of the Government of the Chinese Republic and hereby expresses its satisfaction therewith, and it further states that the Soviet Government will respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia).

I avail [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV

Agreement concerning Dairen

IN VIEW of a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance having been concluded between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. and of the pledge by the latter that it will respect Chinese sovereignty in the control of all of Manchuria as an integral part of China; and with the object of ensuring that the U.S.S.R.'s interest in Dairen as a port of entry and exit for its goods shall be safeguarded, the Republic of China agrees:

1. To declare Dairen a free port open to the commerce and shipping of all nations.
2. The Chinese Government agrees to apportion in the mentioned port for lease to the U.S.S.R. wharfs and warehouses on the basis of separate agreement.
3. The administration of Dairen shall belong to China.

The harbor-master and deputy harbor-master will be appointed by the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway in agreement with the Mayor. The harbor-master shall be a Russian national, and the deputy harbor-master shall be a Chinese national.

4. In peacetime Dairen is not included in the sphere of efficacy of the naval base regulations, determined by the Agreement on Port Arthur of August 14, 1945, and shall be subject to the military supervision or control established in this zone only in case of war against Japan.

5. Goods entering the free port from abroad for through transit to Soviet territory on the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways and goods coming from Soviet territory on the said railways into the free port for export shall be free from customs duties. Such goods shall be transported in sealed cars.

Goods entering China from the free port shall pay the Chinese import duties, and goods going out of other parts of China into the free port shall pay the Chinese export duties as long as they continue to be collected.

6. The term of this agreement shall be thirty years and this Agreement shall come into force upon its ratification.

Protocol to the agreement on Dairen

1. At the request of the U.S.S.R. the Chinese Government leases to the U.S.S.R. free of charge one half of all port installations and equipment. The term of lease shall be thirty years. The remaining half of port installations and equipment shall be reserved for the use of China.

The expansion or re-equipment of the port shall be made by agreement between China and the U.S.S.R.

2. It is agreed that the sections of the Chinese Changchun Railway running from Dairen to Mukden that lie within the region of the Port Arthur naval base shall not be subject to any military supervision or control established in the region.

Agreement on Port Arthur

In conformity with and for the implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., the High Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

Article I

With a view to strengthening the security of China and the U.S.S.R. against further aggression by Japan, the Government of the Republic of China agrees to the joint use by the two countries of Port Arthur as a naval base.

Article II

The precise boundary of the area provided in Article I is described in the Annex and shown in the map (Annex 1).

Article III

The High Contracting Parties agree that Port Arthur, as an exclusive naval base, will be used only by Chinese and Soviet military and commercial vessels.

There shall be established a Sino-Soviet Military Commission to handle the matters of joint use of the abovementioned naval base. The Commission shall consist of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives. The Chairman of the Commission shall be appointed by the Soviet side and the Vice Chairman shall be appointed by the Chinese side.

Article IV

The Chinese Government entrusts to the Soviet Government the defense of the naval base. The Soviet Government may erect at its own expense such installations as are necessary for the defense of the naval base.

Article V

The Civil Administration of the whole area will be Chinese. The leading posts of the Civil Administration will be appointed by the Chinese Government taking into account Soviet interests in the area.

The leading posts of the civil administration in the city of Port Arthur are appointed and dismissed by the Chinese Government in agreement with the Soviet military command.

The proposals which the Soviet military commander in that area may address to the Chinese civil administration in order to safeguard security and defense will be fulfilled by the said administration. In cases of disagreement, such cases shall be submitted to the Sino-Soviet military commission for consideration and decision.

Article VI

The Government of the U.S.S.R. have the right to maintain in the region mentioned in Article II, their army, navy and air force and to determine their location.

Article VII

The Government of the U.S.S.R. also undertakes to establish and keep up lighthouses and other installations and signs necessary for the security of navigation of the area.

Article VIII

After the termination of this agreement all the installations and public property installed or constructed by the U.S.S.R. in the area shall revert without compensation to the Chinese Government.

Article IX

The present agreement is concluded for thirty years. It comes into force on the day of its ratification.

In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed the present agreement and affixed thereto their seals. The present agreement is made in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese language, both texts being authoritative.

Done at Moscow, August 14, 1945, corresponding to the 14th day of the 8th month of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE PRESIDUM OF
THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE U.S.S.R.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA

Annex 1 (to "Agreement on Port Arthur")

The territory of the area of the naval base provided for by Article II of the Agreement on Port Arthur is situated south of the line which begins on the west coast of Liaotung Peninsula—south of Housantaowan—and follows a general easterly direction across Shihe Station and the point of Tsoukiachutse to the east coast of the same peninsula, excluding the town of Dalny (Dairen).

All the islands situated in the waters adjoining the west side of the area on Liaotung Peninsula established by the Agreement, and south of the line passing through the points 39°00' North latitude, 120°49' East longitude; 39°20' North latitude, 121°31' East longitude, and beyond in a general north-easterly direction along the axis of the fairway leading to port Pulantien to the initial point on land, are included in the area of the naval base.

All the islands situated within the waters adjoining the eastern part of the area on Liaotung Peninsula and south of the line passing from the terminal point on land in an easterly direction towards the point 39°20' North latitude, 123°08' East longitude, and farther southeast through the

point 39°00' North latitude, 123°16' East longitude, are included in the area. (See attached map, scale 1:500,000.)

The boundary line of the district will be demarcated on the spot by a mixed Soviet-Chinese Commission. The Commission shall establish the boundary posts and, when need arises, buoys on the water, compile a detailed description of this line, enter it on a topographical map drawn to the scale of 1:25,000 and the water boundary on a naval map drawn to the scale of 1:300,000.

The time when the Commission shall start its work is subject to special agreement between the parties.

Descriptions of the boundary line of the area and the maps of this line compiled by the above Commission are subject to approval by both Governments.

W. S. V. M.

Agreement regarding relations between the Chinese administration and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces after the entry of Soviet troops into the "three Eastern Provinces" of China during the present joint military operations against Japan

THE President of the National Government of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desirous that the relations between the Chinese Administration and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces after the entry of Soviet troops into the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China during the present joint military operations against Japan should be governed by the spirit of friendship and alliance existing between the two countries, have agreed on the following:

1. After the Soviet troops enter the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China as a result of military operations, the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters relating to the prosecution of the war will be vested, in the zone of operations and for the time required for the operations, in the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.
2. A Chinese National Government representative and staff will be appointed for the recovered territory, whose duties will be:
 - (a) To establish and direct, in accordance with the laws of China, an administration for the territory cleared of the enemy.
 - (b) To establish the cooperation between the Chinese armed forces, both regular and irregular, and the Soviet forces in recovered territory.
 - (c) To ensure the active cooperation of the Chinese administration with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces and, specifically to give the local authorities direction to this effect, being

guided by the requirements and wishes of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.

3. To ensure contact between the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces and the Chinese National Government representative, a Chinese military mission will be appointed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.
4. In the zone under the supreme authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, the Chinese National Government administration for the recovered territory will maintain contact with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces through the Chinese National Government representative.
5. As soon as any part of the liberated territory ceases to be a zone of immediate military operations, the Chinese National Government will assume full authority in the direction of public affairs and will render the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces every assistance and support through its civil and military bodies.
6. All persons belonging to the Soviet forces on Chinese territory will be under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces. All Chinese, whether civilian or military, will be under Chinese jurisdiction. This jurisdiction will also extend to the civilian population on Chinese territory even in the case of offenses against the Soviet armed forces, with the exception of offenses committed in the zone of military operations under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, such cases coming under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces. In disputable cases the question will be settled by mutual agreement between the Chinese National Government representative and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.
7. With regard to currency matters after the entry of Soviet troops into the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China, a separate agreement shall be reached.
8. The present Agreement comes into force immediately upon the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. signed this day. The Agreement has been done in two copies, each in the Chinese and Russian languages. Both texts are equally valid.

Date _____

ON THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

ON THE AUTHORIZATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS.

*Agreement between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.
concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway*

THE President of the Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., desiring to strengthen the friendly relations and economic bonds between the two countries on the basis of the full observation of the rights and interests of each other, have agreed as follows:

Article I

After the Japanese armed forces are driven out of the Three Eastern Provinces of China the main trunk line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway from Manchouli to Suifenho and from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur united into one railway under the name "Chinese Changchun Railway" shall be in joint ownership of the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of China and shall be operated by them jointly.

There shall be joint ownership and operation only of those lands acquired and railway auxiliary lines built by the Chinese Eastern Railway during the time of Russian and joint Sino-Soviet administration and by the South Manchurian Railway during the time of Russian administration and which are designed for direct needs of these railways as well as the subsidiary enterprises built during the said periods and directly serving these railways. All the other railway branches, subsidiary enterprises and lands shall be in the complete ownership of the Chinese Government.

The joint operation of the aforementioned railway shall be undertaken by a single management under Chinese sovereignty and as a purely commercial transportation enterprise.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree that their joint ownership of the railway shall be in equal shares and shall not be alienable in whole or in part.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties agree that for the joint operation of the said railway the Sino-Soviet Company of the Chinese Changchun Railway shall be formed. The Company shall have a Board of Directors to be composed of ten members of whom five shall be appointed by the Chinese Government and five by the Soviet Government. The Board of Directors shall be in Changchun.

Article IV

The Chinese Government shall appoint one of the Chinese Directors as President of the Board of Directors and one as the Assistant President. The Soviet Government shall appoint one of the Soviet Directors as Vice-President of the Board of Directors, and one as the Assistant Vice-President. Seven persons shall constitute a quorum. When questions are decided by the Board, the vote of the President of the Board of Directors shall be counted as two votes.

Questions on which the Board of Directors cannot reach an agreement shall be submitted to the Governments of the Contracting Parties for consideration and settlement in an equitable and friendly spirit.

Article V

The Company shall establish a Board of Auditors which shall be composed of six members of whom three are appointed by the Chinese Government and three appointed by the Soviet Government. The Chairman of the Board of Auditors shall be elected from among the Soviet auditors, and Vice-Chairman from among the Chinese auditors. When questions are decided by the Board the vote of the Chairman shall be counted as two votes. Five persons shall constitute a quorum.

Article VI

For the administration of current affairs the Board of Directors shall appoint a Manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway from among Soviet citizens and one assistant manager from among Chinese citizens.

Article VII

The Board of Auditors shall appoint a General-Comptroller from among Chinese citizens, and an Assistant General-Comptroller from among Soviet citizens.

Article VIII

The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the various departments, Chiefs of sections, and stationmasters at important stations of the railway shall be appointed by the Board of directors. The Manager of the Railway has the right to recommend candidates for the abovementioned posts. Individual members of the Board of Directors may also recommend such candidates in agreement with the Manager. If the Chief of a department is a national of

China, the Assistant Chief shall be a national of the Soviet Union, and vice versa. The appointment of the Chiefs and assistant chiefs of departments and Chiefs of sections and stationmasters shall be made in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of China and nationals of the Soviet Union.

Article IX

The Chinese Government will bear the responsibility for the protection of the said Railway.

The Chinese Government will also organize and supervise the railway guards who shall protect the railway buildings, installations and other property and freight from destruction, loss and robbery, and shall maintain the normal order on the railway. As regards the duties of the police in execution of this Article, they will be determined by the Chinese Government in consultation with the Soviet Government.

Article X

Only during the time of war against Japan the railway may be used for the transportation of Soviet troops. The Soviet Government has the right to transport by the abovementioned railway for transit purpose military goods in sealed cars without customs inspection. The guarding of such military goods shall be undertaken by the railway police and the Soviet Union shall not send any armed escort.

Article XI

Goods for through transit and transported by the Chinese Changchun Railway from Manchouli to Suifenho or vice versa and also from Soviet territory to the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur or vice versa shall be free from Chinese Customs duties or any other taxes and dues, but on entering Chinese territory such goods shall be subject to Chinese Customs inspection and verification.

Article XII

The Chinese Government shall ensure, on the basis of a separate agreement, that the supply of coal for the operation of the railway will be fully secured.

Article XIII

The railway shall pay taxes to the Government of the Republic of China the same as are paid by the Chinese state railways.

Article XIV

Both Contracting Parties agree to provide the Board of Directors of the Chinese Changchun Railway with working capital the amount of which will be determined by the Statutes of the Railway.

Profits and losses and exploitation of the railway shall be equally divided between the Parties.

Article XV

For the working out in Chungking of the Statutes of joint operation of the railway the High Contracting Parties undertake within one month of the signing of the present Agreement, to appoint their representatives—three representatives from each Party. The Statutes shall be worked out within two months and reported to the two Governments for their approval.

Article XVI

The determination, in accordance with the provisions in Article I, of the properties to be included in the joint ownership and operations of the railway by China and the U.S.S.R. shall be made by a Commission to be composed of three representatives each of the two Governments. The Commission shall be constituted in Chungking within one month after the signing of the present Agreement and shall terminate its work within three months after the joint operation of the railway shall have begun.

The decision of the Commission shall be reported to the two Governments for their approval.

Article XVII

The term of this present Agreement shall be thirty years. After the expiration of the term of the present Agreement, the Chinese Changchun Railway with all its properties shall be transferred without compensation to the ownership of the Republic of China.

Article XVIII

The present Agreement shall come into force from the date of its ratification.

Done in Moscow, August 14, 1945, corresponding to the 14th day of the 8th month of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
U.S.S.R.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Notes

- 1 “Notes taken at Sino-Soviet Conferences,” 2 July 1945–14 August 1945, Victor Hoo Papers, Hoover Archives, 13–16.
- 2 Ibid., 13.
- 3 Ch'en Kung-po, C. Martin Wilbur, ed, *The Communist Movement in China* (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1960), 122.
- 4 “An Interview with Chou En-lai,” 1 August 1964, Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Studies, 7, 1965), 45.
- 5 www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/242.

22 August 1945—General Order Number One

From the end of World War II onwards, Russia and Japan remained in a state of war. A formal peace treaty ending World War II has continued to elude Moscow and Tokyo, even though both sides have expressed confidence that a treaty terminating Russo-Japanese hostilities will be signed soon. One of the primary factors impeding progress on the peace talks has been the territorial dispute over which islands actually constitute the Kurile Island chain. The Soviet Union annexed the entire Kurile Island chain, as well as the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, after World War II, even though they were formerly considered an indivisible part of the island of Hokkaido. This was due to the Soviet-American exchanges between Stalin and Truman over the exact wording of the United States' General Order No. 1. (see Figure 25.1)

The United States government never condoned the permanent cession of all of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union. Rather, Washington's policy from the Yalta Conference onward merely agreed that Moscow could negotiate directly with Tokyo to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. In an attempt to assist Japan in these negotiations, John Foster Dulles even suggested in 1956 that Japan link America's planned return of Okinawa to the Soviet return of the disputed Kurile Islands. According to the American viewpoint, in the absence of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty, the four disputed islands in the Kuriles occupied by Russia remain Japanese territory.

The United States government considers the four disputed islands in the southern Kuriles to be Japanese territory. Under the American interpretation of the Yalta Agreement, Russia has no legitimate claim to the two southern Kurile Islands, much less to the Habomais and Shikotan. American policy has always been that, in the absence of an official Russo-Japanese peace treaty, the disputed Northern Territories remain Japanese territory. Therefore, not only has it been historically inaccurate to accuse

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URGENT

From the PRESIDENT to GENERALISSIMO STALIN

Replying to your message of August 16, I agree to your request to modify General Order Number 1 to include all the Kurile Islands in the area to be surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. However, I should like it to be understood that the United States Government desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some one of the Kurile Islands, preferably in the central group, for military purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement, the location and other details to be worked out through the appointment of special representatives of our two governments for this purpose.

Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese forces on the Island Hokkaido to Soviet forces, it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese forces on all the islands of Japan proper, Hokkaido, Honahu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, to General MacArthur.

General MacArthur will employ allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of Japan proper as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our Allied surrender terms.

Action: Amb.

FILE

Stalin dhr

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Figure 25.1 President Truman's 18 August 1945 revised General Order No. 1 message to Stalin

the United States of ceding “all” of the Kuriles to the USSR, but it has been equally inaccurate to claim that during the 1950s, the United States exploited divisions in the Japanese government to torpedo a possible settlement between Moscow and Tokyo.

In fact, Stalin obtained control of the four disputed islands by carefully playing his diplomatic hand both at Yalta and in his correspondence with Truman over the wording of General Order No. 1, and then by trying to use Soviet *de facto* military occupation to obtain *de jure* international recognition of Soviet sovereignty over all of the Kuriles. Russian diplomats are concerned precisely because, should this diplomatic tangle ever unravel and Japan regain control over the Northern Territories, then other countries similarly affected by Soviet wartime diplomacy might begin to make their own territorial claims. China, in particular, may one day decide to claim border territories lost to the USSR during the same period and as a result of similar diplomatic methods.

China has long hoped to reclaim territory that the USSR first obtained during diplomatic negotiations with Japan in the 1930s, when Japan’s sphere of influence included much of northeast China and bordered on Soviet territory in Siberia and on the Soviet’s sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia. Later, Moscow confirmed these territorial gains by means of the Yalta agreement and the 14 August 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. Thereafter, through the early 1990s, China supported Japan’s claim to the southern Kuriles. But, beginning in 1991 China adopted a neutral policy on the Kuriles, as it sought to open border negotiations with Boris Yeltsin’s new Russian government, and so “turned its attention away from the Soviet Union and toward Japan as the Northeast Asian power most likely to challenge Chinese security interests in the twentyfirst century.”¹

General Order No. 1²

[Undated copy in Harriman papers, Truman’s revisions in brackets]

Military and Naval

1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

- a. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
- b. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 north latitude and Karafuto [and all of the Kurile Islands] shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.
- c. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, Bismarcks and the Solomons, shall surrender to (the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers).
- d. The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet.
- e. The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, US Army Forces in the Pacific.
- f. The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions,

- the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.)
2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control as follows:
 - (a) Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.
 - (b) Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.
 - (c) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.
 - (d) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position condition and movement.
 - (e) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing location and layouts of all mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and the safety lanes in connection therewith.
 - (f) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.
 - (g) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.
 3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground on the water or aboard ship until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.
 4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:
 - a. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
 - b. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.
 - c. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of a. above.
6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:
 - a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in Section 4 of this order).
 - b. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.
 - c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.
 - d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organizations in connection with their operations.
7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraph a, b and d of Section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.
8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.
9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:
 - a. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved to include the administrative and supply services essential to provide adequate food shelter, clothing and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

- b. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoner of war and civilian internees;
 - c. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities;
 - d. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their location.
10. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.
 11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared on instructions from Allied occupation commanders to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.
 12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or other allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.

Notes

- 1 Robert S. Ross, ed., *Fast Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 98–99.
- 2 General Order No. 1 (1945): https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/General_Order_No._1.

14 February 1950—Sino-Soviet friendship treaty

After creating the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong traveled to Moscow. It was his first trip abroad. He arrived in Moscow in December 1949 for eight weeks of talks with Joseph Stalin. The two leaders discussed whether to renegotiate the terms of the 1945 Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty signed by the Nationalists. For Mao, this question was important not only to determine the status of Manchuria and Xinjiang, where the USSR acquired important privileges, but to determine the future of Outer Mongolia, which the Nationalists had granted formal independence. Stalin rejected modification of the Yalta Agreement, while Mao agreed to respect the terms of the 1945 friendship treaty, but hoped that particular issues would be renegotiated.

The resulting treaty gave Stalin enormous diplomatic leverage over China. Simply by refusing to discuss certain issues, he could retain the status quo that favored Soviet interests. For example, in 1950, Stalin avoided discussing Outer Mongolia altogether, which by default remained in the Soviet sphere of influence, while the Soviet troops stationed in Outer Mongolia posed a potential security risk to Beijing, located just one day's drive from the Sino-Mongolian border. The USSR and PRC signed their own 30-year friendship treaty on 14 February 1950, almost five years to the day after the Yalta Treaty, thus tacitly recognizing its terms, although according to Zhou Enlai, the treaty was not signed on Valentine's Day, but was actually signed on 15 February.

Given Mao's diplomatic isolation, he could ill-afford to alienate the USSR. Mao desperately needed a security pact with Stalin to deter Japan and the United States. The USSR also agreed to provide China with a military alliance, \$300 million in credits, and military and industrial advisers. During the 1950s, it sent thousands of advisers, based on a secret agreement signed during March 1950. (See Chinese Draft of a Secret Agreement on the Working Conditions of Soviet Specialists in China of March 22, 1950). It also

agreed in principle to return Lüshun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dairen). Both pledged to fight alongside the other in the event of a third-party attack.

The PRC foreign ministry website states that the two countries exchanged “three notes, declaring null and void the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and the other agreements which were signed by the Soviet Government and the Kuomintang Government of China on 14 August 1945.”¹ However, it was impossible to go back on the Nationalist recognition of Outer Mongolia. So, it was the unequal parts of this treaty that would help undermine Sino-Soviet relations, eventually leading to the 1960 Sino-Soviet split and to Mao’s decision to invite President Richard Nixon to China and open diplomatic relations with the United States aimed at undermining the Soviet Union.

Treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China²

February 14, 1950

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China,

Being determined, by strengthening friendship and co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China, jointly to prevent the revival of Japanese imperialism and the repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or of any other State that might in any way join with Japan in acts of aggression,

Being anxious to promote a lasting peace and general security in the Far East and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Being firmly convinced that the strengthening of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China is in accordance with the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China,

Have decided for these purposes to conclude the present Treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Andrei Yanuarevich Vyshinsky,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China:

Chou En-lai, Chairman of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China.

The two plenipotentiary representatives, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties undertake to carry out jointly all necessary measures within their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and breach of the peace by Japan or any other State which might directly or indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression. Should either of the Contracting Parties be attacked by Japan or by States allied with Japan and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

The Contracting Parties likewise declare that they are prepared to participate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international action designed to safeguard peace and security throughout the world, and will devote all their energies to the speediest realization of these aims.

Article 2

The two Contracting Parties undertake, by common agreement, to strive for the conclusion at the earliest possible date, in conjunction with the other Powers which were their Allies during the Second World War, of a Peace Treaty with Japan

Article 3

Neither of the Contracting Parties shall enter into any alliance directed against the other Party, or participate in any coalition or in any action or measures directed against the other Party.

Article 4

The two Contracting Parties shall consult together on all important international questions involving the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, with a view to strengthening peace and universal security.

Article 5

The two Contracting Parties undertake, in a spirit of friendship and co-operation and in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual interests, mutual respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and

non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the other Party, to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other all possible economic assistance and to effect the necessary economic co-operation.

Article 6

This Treaty shall come into force immediately upon ratification; the exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Peking.

This Treaty shall remain in force for thirty years. If neither of the Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of the said period that it wishes to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for a further five years and shall thereafter be continued in force in accordance with this provision.

Done at Moscow, on 14 February 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. V. VYSHINSKY

By authorization of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China:

CHOU EN-LAI

Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen [Dalian]³

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China note that since 1945 the following radical changes have taken place in the situation in the Far East: Imperialist Japan has suffered defeat; the reactionary Kuomintang Government has been overthrown; China has become a People's Democratic Republic; and there has been established in China a new People's Government which has united all China, applied a policy of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, and proved its ability to uphold the State independence and territorial integrity of China and the national honor and dignity of the Chinese people.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic

of China consider that because of this new situation a new approach to the question of the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen is possible.

In accordance with these new circumstances the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China have decided to conclude this Agreement concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen.

Article 1

The two Contracting Parties have agreed that the Soviet Government shall transfer to the Government of the People's Republic of China, without charge, all the rights to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway together with all property belonging to the railway. The transfer shall be effected immediately after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan, but in any case not later than the end of 1952.

Until the transfer is effected, the present status of the joint Soviet-Chinese administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway shall remain unchanged; however, after this Agreement has come into force, the procedure whereby posts are occupied by representatives of the Soviet and Chinese Parties shall be altered and a system of rotation of posts (Manager of the Railway, President of the Board of Directors, etc.) at fixed intervals shall be established.

The specific means of effecting the transfer shall be agreed and determined by the Governments of the two Contracting Parties.

Article 2

The two Contracting Parties have agreed that Soviet troops shall be withdrawn from the jointly used naval base of Port Arthur and that the installations in this area shall be transferred to the Government of the People's Republic of China immediately after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan, but in any case not later than the end of 1952; the Government of the People's Republic of China shall compensate the Soviet Union for the expenditure incurred by the Soviet Union since 1945 in respect of the reconstruction and erection of the said installations.

Pending the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the transfer of the aforesaid installations, the Governments of the Soviet Union and China shall appoint an equal number of military representatives to constitute a Joint Sino-Soviet Military Commission, over which the two Parties shall preside in rotation and which shall administer military affairs in the Port Arthur area; specific measures for this purpose shall be determined by the Joint

Sino-Soviet Military Commission within three months after the entry into force of this Agreement and shall be applied after they have been approved by the Governments of both Parties.

The civil administration in the aforesaid area shall be under the direct control of the Government of the People's Republic of China. Until the Soviet troops are withdrawn, the zone in which Soviet troops are quartered in the Port Arthur area shall remain unchanged in accordance with the existing boundaries.

Should either of the Contracting Parties become the object of aggression by Japan or any State which might join with Japan, and as a result be involved in hostilities, China and the Soviet Union may, on the proposal of the Government of the People's Republic of China and with the consent of the Soviet Government, jointly use the naval base of Port Arthur for the conduct of joint military operations against the aggressor.

Article 3

The two Contracting Parties have agreed that the question of the port of Dairen shall be examined after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan.

The administration of Dairen shall be wholly in the hands of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

All property at present in Dairen which is temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Party shall be taken over by the Government of the People's Republic of China. For the purpose of effecting the transfer of said property, the Governments of the Soviet Union and China shall appoint three representatives from each Party to constitute a Joint Commission, which shall within three months after the entry into force of this Agreement determine specific measures for effecting the transfer of the property and shall, after the Joint Commission's proposals have been approved by the Governments of both Parties, complete their application in the course of 1950.

Article 4

The Agreement shall come into force on the date of its ratification. The exchanges of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Peking.

DONE at Moscow, on 14 February 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: (Signed) A. Y. Vyshinsky

By authorization of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (Signed) Chou En-lai

Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the grant of a credit to the People's Republic of China⁴

Whereas the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has acceded to the request of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China for the grant of a credit to China to pay for the equipment and other materials which the Soviet Union has agreed to supply to China, the two Governments have agreed as follows.

Article 1

The Government of the USSR shall grant to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China a credit in dollars in the amount of US\$300 million, at the rate of US\$35 per ounce of fine gold.

In view of the extreme devastation of China caused by the prolonged military operations in its territory, the Soviet Government has agreed to provide the credit at the favorable rate of interest of 1 per cent per annum.

Article 2

The credit referred to in article 1 shall be made available over a period of five years from 1 January 1950, in equal instalments of one-fifth of the total credit a year, in order to pay for deliveries of equipment and materials from the USSR, including equipment for power stations, metallurgical and engineering plants and coal and ore mines, railway and other transport equipment, rails and other materials for the reconstruction and development of China's national economy.

The nomenclature, quantities, prices and delivery dates of equipment and materials shall be fixed by a special Agreement between the Parties, the prices being determined on the basis of world market prices.

Any part of the credit remaining unused in any one year may be used in the succeeding years.

Article 3

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall repay the credit referred to in article 1 and the interest thereon in deliveries of raw materials and tea, and in gold and United States dollars. The prices,

quantities, and delivery dates of raw materials and tea shall be fixed by a special agreement, the prices being determined on the basis of world market prices.

The repayment of the credit shall be affected over a period of ten years in equal annual installments of one-tenth of the credit received, payable not later than 31 December of each year. The first regular installment shall be paid not later than 31 December 1954, and the last not later than 31 December 1963.

The interest on the credit which shall accrue from the date on which each installment of the credit is used shall be payable half-yearly.

Article 4

For the purpose of keeping accounts of the credit provided for by this Agreement, the State Bank of the USSR and the National Bank of the People's Republic of China shall open special accounts and shall jointly determine the procedure for the settlement and keeping of accounts under this Agreement.

Article 5

The Agreement shall enter into force from the date of signature and shall be subject to ratification. The exchanges of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Peking.

DONE at Moscow, on 14 February 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: (Signed) A. Y. Vyshinsky

By authorization of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (Signed) Chou En-lai

Chinese draft of a secret agreement on the working conditions of Soviet specialists in China of March 22, 1950⁵

Agreement

Between the Central People's Government of the USSR to grant the request of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China for Soviet specialists to be sent out to China and for the assistance to China in the reconstruction and development of the economy, the CPG of the PRC and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Government of the USSR shall send out Soviet specialists for the use of the CPG of the PRC at their request to work in companies and also in institutions and organizations of the People's Republic of China.

Article 2

The duration of the work of the Soviet specialists sent out to China shall be fixed at one year. An extension of the period of their stay in China shall be determined on the basis of mutual agreement of the parties.

The responsible authorities of both sides shall conjointly determine any recall of the Soviet specialists from China, whereby the premature recall of any Soviet specialist who had not been active for more than six months for reasons that do not depend on the CPG of the PRC shall be carried out at the expense of the Soviet side.

In the case of the premature recall of a Soviet specialist by the Soviet side, the latter is obligated to replace him with another specialist. The costs involved in such a recall and replacement shall be borne by the Soviet side.

Article 3

The CPG of the PRC will pay the Soviet specialists wages in Chinese currency equivalent to the salaries that are paid or will be paid to Chinese specialists with corresponding positions and qualifications, including provision of food and industrial goods and bonuses in addition to wages and the like with which Chinese specialists are supplied.

The CPG of the PRC shall compensate the Soviet side for the following expenditures for sending out the Chinese specialists to China: travel expenses for the specialists and their families, daily allowances, lodging expenses and wages for the period of the return trip on the territory of the USSR, expenses of baggage transportation to the extent of 80 kilograms per person, and travel expenses in the amount of salary paid in the USSR during the month prior to departure.

The CPG of the PRC shall pay travel expenses, daily allowances, lodging expenses, and wages for the period of the return trip on Chinese territory directly in Chinese currency for the specialist and his family, and vacation compensation in the amount of one month's salary for each year spent working in China, and to Soviet specialists active in Chinese teaching institutions a two month's salary for each working year.

Article 4

The CPG of the PRC shall pay the Soviet Government between 1,500 and 3,000 rubles for each specialist sent out, depending on his qualifications,

in compensation for the loss that the corresponding Soviet institution or factory suffers for sending its specialist abroad.

Article 5

The CPG of the PRC shall provide furnished apartments with heating and lighting free of charge or pay an amount sufficient for renting a furnished apartment with heating and lighting to the Soviet specialists for the period of their work in China.

Article 6

The CPG of the PRC engages in the case of the illness of a Soviet specialist not to terminate payment of salary for the entire period of the illness but no longer than three months.

In the event that the illness of a Soviet specialist lasts more than three months, the Government of the USSR is obligated to replace him with another specialist with the same qualifications.

Article 7

All conflicts arising from this Agreement will be resolved by diplomatic means by the CPG of the PRC and the Government of the USSR.

Article 8

The workings and salary conditions of the Soviet specialists provided for in the present Agreement will also apply to those Soviet specialists who had been sent out before the conclusion of the present Agreement to work in institutions, organizations, and companies in the People's Republic of China.

Article 9

This Agreement becomes effective on the day it is signed and will remain in effect until the end of a six-month period that begins on the day on which one of the sides expresses the wish to terminate its effectiveness.

Done in Moscow “...” ... 1950 in two copies, each in the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By the authorization of the Centrals People's Government of the People's Republic of China

By the authorization of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Notes

- 1 www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml.
- 2 <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19500214.T1E.html>.
- 3 United Nations, “Treaty Series,” Vol. 226, Nos 3103–3126 (1956), 31–44; <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20226/v226.pdf>.
- 4 www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml.
- 5 Dieter Heinzeg, *The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 415–420.

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